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.Editorial Note 
The articles in this issue of the Asbury Theological Journal focus on the 
theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, who is perhaps the foremost systematic 
theologian in the final quarter of the twentieth century. Born in 1928 in Stettin 
(then Germany, now Poland), he studied philosophy and theology at the 
Universities of Berlin, Gottingen, Basel and Heidelberg. Pannenberg received 
his doctor of theology degree from Heidelberg in 1953, completing his Habili-
tation for systematic theology in 1955. He has served as Privatdozent at Hei-
delberg, and as professor of systematic theology at Wuppertal, atthe University 
of Mainz and, since 1967, at the University of Munich, where he is director of 
the Institute of Ecumenical Theology. 
Professor Pannenberg has written or edited more than thirty books and 
scores of articles, some of which have profoundly influenced the direction of 
twentieth-century theology. He has recently completed the first two volumes 
in a projected three-volume systematic theology, and is currently at work on the 
final installment of that project. 
This Asbury Theological Journal contains two papers given by Professor 
Pannenberg for the 1991 Theta Spring Phi Lecture Series at Asbury Theologi-
calSeminary. "The Church Today" offers both a critique of the Church' s present 
functioning in Western culture and a program whereby the Church can meet 
the ecumenical and spiritual challenges which it currently faces. "The Christian 
Vision of God: The New Discussion on the Trinitarian Doctrine" explores how 
recent debate on the Trinity addresses and, in some cases, clarifies long-
standing problems associated with this doctrine. In addition to the formal 
presentation of papers, the Theta Phi Series included opportunities for dia-
logue with Professor Pannenberg. (See "Theta Phi Panel Discussion" and 
"Theta Phi Talkback Session.) 
This issue concludes with two articles examining Pannenberg' s signifi-
cance for contemporary theology. In "Above, Within or Ahead Of? Pannen-
berg' s Eschatologicalism as a Replacement for Supernaturalism," Professor 
Laurence Wood of Asbury Theological Seminary considers the" eschatological 
model" which Pannenberg adopts as aframeworkfor his theology over against 
the "supernatural model" generally employed by modem theologians. In 
"Wolfhart Pannenberg: Reason, Hope and Transcendence," Professor Stanley 
Grenz of Carey /Regent College (Vancouver, British Columbia) presents an 
overview of Pannenberg' s life and thought and describes briefly some salient 
features in the theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg. 
It is hoped that the articles in this issue of the Asbury Theological Journal will 
encourage careful attention to the theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg among 
North American Christians, and especially among those who consider them-
selves within the Evangelical tradition. 
DAVID R. BAUER 
Associate Professor of Biblical Studies 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
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The 
Church Today 
WOLFHART PANNENBERG 
In its early days, this century was celebrated by Christians in Europe 
and in America with great anticipation. Especially, the politically dominat-
ing role of Europe in the world was expected to help the Christian mission-
ary efforts in completing the process of Christianization on a global scale. In 
looking back from the end of the century Christians should not dismiss such 
expectation too easily as triumphalism. Otherwise, the missionary zeal of 
the apostle Paul might perhaps be labelled triumphalistic, too. But certainly 
those high expectations among Christians did not take seriously enough the 
forces of secularism, and in particular of secular nationalism, which soon 
would hurl Europe into the abyss of World War I that was to destroy its 
dominating political control of their ancient settlements in Asia Minor. That 
attitude continued after World War II in the Cyprus affair and still contrib-
utes to bitterness between Eastern and Western Christians. This is but one 
example of how alienated Western power politics has become from any re-
sponsibility concerning the situation of Christianity and of Christians 
around the world. Certainly, the period of decolonization helped the Chris-
tian churches in the Third World to obtain or reaffirm their independence, 
and Christian missions in those cultures were not without their successes in 
the second half of this century, especially in Africa and in some regions of 
Eastern Asia. But, at the same time, a remarkable renaissance of non-Chris-
tian religions, especially the World religions, has taken place, and particu-
larly the Islamic resurgence and missionary movement has become a close 
competitor of Christianity in its missionary efforts. Thus the situation of 
Christianity with relation to other World religions is significantly different 
now than it was at the tum of the century. 
Wolfhart Pannenberg is professor of systematic theology at the University of 
Munich. This material was presented at Asbury Theological Seminary during the 
annual Theta Phi lectures (Spring 1991). 
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At the same time, the powers of secularization in their alliance with eco-
nomic affluence in the West made dramatic progress, even in the course of 
the last decades, in alienating the mind of the people, especially in the Euro-
pean nations, from the Christian origins of their cultural traditions. The 
Christian churches are rapidly becoming a minority in regions where they 
had their strongest roots in former centuries. In this situation, the most seri-
ous problem is that, to a large extent, the churches continue to adapt to the 
mentality of the secular culture in their preaching and teaching, in the life of 
their congregations and occasionally even in their liturgical life. The strategy 
of adaptation to the secularist world is followed as if in this way the 
churches would get attention and even a public hearing for the gospel and 
for their religious teaching. The contrary is true. Adaptation to the secular 
mentality is usually taken as indicating the weakness of the religious agen-
cies, and in fact there is quite often a loss of confidence on the part of the 
churi:hes and their ministers behind their craving for relevance to the secu-
lar world. This may very well be the main reason why mainline churches 
decline and conservative churches grow. Evangelicals and fundamentalists 
deliver the religious message more unabashedly as a challenge to the secular 
mentality and lifestyle. Unfortunately, a loss of openness to the human situ-
ation and to the unprejudiced search for truth is often the price paid for con-
servative growth. But there can be little doubt that, ironically, "relevance" in 
religious matters seems to be bound up in the secular world with the nerve 
to challenge the principles of secularism that are generally taken for granted 
in modem Western societies. If religion comprises much of what human life 
in these societies is lacking, which seems to be indicated by widespread feel-
ings of dissatisfaction and indeterminate longings, then a religious message 
has to challenge the spirit of secularism rather than adapt to it. 
Secularism can be opposed in different ways. Sometimes, such opposi-
tion erupts in irrational reactions to the system of secular society, but it can 
also become articulate in the form of considered criticism. It can occur in the 
form of fundamentalism that forecloses the minds of people against all criti-
cal probing of their own set of beliefs. But it can also display a more open, 
rational attitude in relation to the roots of modernity as well as to the con-
tent of the Christian tradition itself and even of the biblical writings. 
A rational attitude always involves critical reflection, but such critical 
reflection should be applied not only to the content of the cultural tradition, 
but equally to its modem critics. If done in such a spirit, a critical reassess-
ment of the biblical tradition as well as of the tradition of Christian doctrine 
need not be done under the spell of secular modernism. It may be done for 
the sake of the Christian message itself, in the service of a faithful recon-
struction of its content together with a radical critique of basic assumptions 
of modem secular society and culture. It is this kind of critical rationality 
that continues the alliance of faith and reason which has been a distinctive 
mark in the history of Christian culture, notwithstanding occasional criti-
cism of the abuse of reason and of the ways it sometimes lends itself to 
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abuse. The alliance of faith with reason began in the second century, if not 
earlier, on the assumption that there can be only one truth for all human 
persons as there is only one God, the creator of all, who revealed Himself in 
Jesus Christ, and only one world of creation that is shared by all human 
beings and saved by Jesus Christ. The early alliance of faith with reason lies 
at the roots of the dynamics of universal mission in early Christianity, and 
the confidence that each particular truth must finally be consonant with the 
one God and with His revelation continues to be a condition of the forma-
tive and transforming power of the Christian faith in the totality of our per-
sonal, social and cultural life. 
The fact that the formative and transforming power of the Christian 
faith has been fading in recent Christian history may be largely due to the 
common assumption that reason and faith belong to different realms or rep-
resent different layers of the human reality, if they are not regarded as con-
flicting forces. While modern secular culture struggled for the emancipation 
of reason from faith, modern Christian theologians often found it conven-
ient to make their peace with the separation of faith and reason. But it was 
not only the fault of modern Christian theology and subjectivistic piety that 
the rift between faith and reason deepened and broadened. The origin of 
that rift goes back to the breakup of the Western church in the sixteenth cen-
tury in consequence of what I consider the failure of the Reformation move-
ment. The continuing conflict between confessional churches and their the-
ologies was not easily reconcilable to the assumption of a basic consonance 
of faith with reason, since rational truth can be only one, while Christianity 
presented itself to the emerging modern world in a disrupted state of con-
flicting alternatives. When the zeal of their antagonism waned, it could seem 
plausible that the one truth might be in neither of those confessional alterna-
tives. Thus, the history of Christian division and of confessional warfare in 
early modern history may be at the root not only of the rise of a secular cul-
ture that increasingly emancipated itself from its religious past, but also of 
the dissolution of the old alliance between faith and reason and of the re-
sulting loss of the transforming power of the Christian faith in shaping our 
individual, social and cultural life. 
I hope that by now it is evident that I am talking about the Church to-
day. The trend toward adapting the content of the Christian tradition to 
secular standards looks like a substitute for the lost consonance of faith and 
reason. But adaptation to secular standards is a poor and dangerous substi-
tute, because it works only one way: by purging the contents of the Chris-
tian tradition of everything in tension with secular principles, while depriv-
ing thereby the Christian message of its challenging and transforming 
power. By contrast, reason in alliance with faith can serve not only to reas-
sess critically the content of the tradition, but also to reconstruct its interpre-
tation of reality at large in such a way as to produce viable alternatives to 
the secular interpretation of reality. Faith in alliance with reason can chal-
lenge even the principles of modern secular culture \Yithout violating or dis-
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missing whatever truth they may contain. 
The first thing the churches need, then, is confidence in the message 
they have to convey in distinction from the agenda of the world. It is the 
message of the kingdom of God as the indispensable condition of a mean-
ingful human life in its social setting as well as in our individual way of life. 
The kingdom of God is not something that we could bring about by our 
human efforts, nor is it identical with the existence of the Church, but it 
stands as the criterion of our individual life, of our society and also of the 
Church itself which is called to exist as the sign of the kingdom. It is the con-
tent of our eschatological hope that is expected to transform our perishable 
lives into participation in God's eternal glory through the power of His 
spirit in the resurrection of the dead. And the pledge of this hope is the cru-
cified and risen Christ. In communion with Him we shall overcome the 
shortcomings of this provisional form of existence and participate in the 
new life that has entered this world in His resurrection. 
The Church is called to exist as sign and instrument of that eschatologi-
cal hope. How this constitutes the nature of the Church was admirably de-
scribed in the first chapter of the Second Vatican Council's constitution on 
the Church. This description of the nature of the Church was adopted in 
1968 by the World Council of Churches, though without the notion of "in-
strument" and by emphasizing exclusively the function of the Church as 
"sign" of the kingdom. What the Church is called to signify by its existence 
as sign was expressed by the council in terms of unity with God and com-
munion among human beings. In combining these two dimensions of unity, 
the council interpreted the Christian hope for the kingdom of God which 
means that people enjoy communion with God and thereby also a truly 
human communion among themselves. Of these, unity with God occupies 
the first place in our human destiny. Communion with our fellow men and 
women comes as a consequence of our common destiny to communion with 
God. During the years after the Second Vatican Council this emphasis has 
often been changed as if the unity of humankind were the aim in its own 
right regardless of what the basis of such unity might be. It was the time of 
what was called "secular ecumenism." The Church could · then be taken as 
an agency that should serve the unity among human beings in terms of po-
litical or social peace. But the Vatican Council rightly emphasized the unity 
with God as basis of the communion among human persons. Only in this 
way is the social predicament of human existence part of the Christian vi-
sion and hope. In this way it also becomes manifest in the life of the Church 
in distinction from secular forms of community. For the Church is essen-
tially a communion of those who share the same faith in Jesus Christ, the 
Son of God, and are united in Him through the one baptism and through 
His eucharist. 
It is precisely in its form as a liturgical, worshiping community, then, 
that the Church exists as a sign of the ultimate destiny of every human 
being and of humanity at large, because that ultimate destiny of all human 
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beings is to be united to God and thereby-thereby!-among themselves. 
Human beings can associate in many ways. Even a gang of criminals is a so-
ciety of some form. But it is certainly not the kingdom of God. In the king-
dom of God human beings will be united by their communion with the one 
God, and the Church in its liturgical life exists as the image of destiny. 
There is an important consequence from this basic structure of the na-
ture of the Church: The historical churches live up to their nature and des-
tiny as sign of the kingdom to the degree they incorporate in their existence 
the paradigm of their liturgical life as worshiping congregations-unity 
among the members on the basis of their unity with God in one faith, one 
baptism, one eucharist. If the regional and worldwide associations of Chris-
tians were structured according to that paradigm, they would exist as com-
munions of communions, communions of local congregations that are gath-
ered around the celebration of the liturgy. To some degree the churches, as 
they exist today, actually manifest that basic structure, but only to a degree; 
they are too easily mistaken for regional or even worldwide institutions like 
other social institutions, with a bureaucratic structure and discipline of their 
own. Furthermore, the separate existence of church organizations, even on a 
world level, gives the picture of a plurality of religious parties, sometimes in 
conflict and certainly presenting themselves as competing parties rather 
than a worldwide communion of local communions united through one 
faith and eucharistic fellowship as testimony to the human destiny of com-
munion through unity with the one God. 
The so-called communio-ecclesiology that has been developed in recent 
decades primarily by the efforts of orthodox and Roman Catholic theologi-
ans offers a model for reinterpreting and restructuring the life of the 
churches that should be basically acceptable to all confessional traditions. It 
corresponds to the emphasis in the Protestant churches upon the local con-
gregations "where the pure gospel is preached and the sacraments are cele-
brated according to their institution," to quote from the description of the 
Church in the Augsburg Confession of 1530. Thus, in principle, the com-
munio-ecclesiology provides a common basis for an ecumenical doctrine of 
the Church. There are, of course, a number of problems that have to be 
solved on the way toward an ecumenical consensus on the nature of the 
Church. I shall confine myself to just two of these problems. 
The first problem concerns the term "local church" as referring to the 
basic units of ecclesial life. The term "local church" seems to indicate the lo-
cality of the worshiping congregation, so that the worldwide Church could 
exist as a communion of local congregations. But in Roman Catholic ecclesi-
ology the term "local church" means the dioceses of an episcopal see, and 
while in the ancient Church such a diocese was in fact a rather small geo-
graphical unit organized around a center of worship, later on dioceses 
tended to become larger and today usually represent regional rather than 
local tjlurch organizations. These regional organizations owe their unity to 
the jurisdiction of one bishop rather than to the unity of one place of wor-
12 Pannenberg 
ship. This issue is related to the image of the bishop as presiding at the cele-
bration of the eucharist, where the communion among the members of the 
congregation through their communion in the one body of Christ is cele-
brated and enacted. Usually it is the priest, not the bishop, who is in fact 
presiding at the eucharistic celebration in a local liturgy, and this raises the 
question of how the ministries of priest or presbyter and bishop are related 
to each other. It is an issue of great ecumenical importance. If the episcopal 
dignity is rooted in presiding at the eucharistic celebration, it would be ap-
propriate and would clarify the communio-structure of the church to em-
phasize the episcopal character of the ministry of the presbyter, wherever 
the bishop is not present. If, on the other hand, the episcopal ministry is 
conceived in terms of supervision of local churches, it must have its criterion 
in the eucharistic unity as it is celebrated locally. 
The need for clarifying the concept of the local church is closely con-
nected with the problem of hierarchical authorities in the church's life. This 
is the second problem that is to be addressed here. There certainly must ex-
ist some form of supervision of the local congregations in order to preserve 
their unity with each other in the one faith of the church, but also within 
each congregation the mutual communion of the members and their minis-
ter in that one faith. This need for supervision once exercised by the apostles 
themselves explains the emergence of hierarchical forms of ministry in the 
church, a ministry exercised by the migrating prophets of early Christianity, 
later on in the transformation of episcopacy into an office of regional au-
thority, and furthermore in the formation of the metropolitan and patriar-
chal authorities. 
However, the emergence of hierarchical forms of ministry does not have 
its only justification in the need for supervision of local congregations in or-
der to preserve them in the unity of the one faith. In addition, the hierarchi-
cal minister fulfills a representative function: He represents to the people the 
unity of the apostolic faith; and in relation to others, especially to other local 
or regional churches, he represents the church of the particular region of his 
assignment. But, unfortunately, hierarchical authority entails the tendency 
toward developing forms of government that are not consonant with the na-
ture of the Church according to Jesus' own word: "You know that the rulers 
of the Gentiles lord it over them, and their great men exercise authority over 
them. It shall not be so among you; but whoever would be great among you 
must be your servant" (Matt 20:25f.). In the history of the Church, the be-
havior of its hierarchs was not always distinguishable from that of the rulers 
of the Gentiles. Each person who carries such an authority should at least be 
aware of the temptation of exercising power to the effect of molding the 
church according to his or her own ideas. To avoid this, it is not enough to 
call oneself a servant. In the history of the Church, the most important rem-
edy in assisting the hierarchical authorities against the temptation of per-
verse exercise of power has been the development of conciliar structures on 
all levels of the church's life. Though this is not a perfectly safe remedy, it is 
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actually the only one, and it is necessary to reemphasize the accountability 
of hierarchical authorities to conciliar institutions on all levels of the 
church's life. This may help to make hierarchical ministries more representa-
tive of the constituency that is represented by the minister. The representa-
tive function of the Christian minister, of course, is twofold. He not only 
represents the constituency of a local or regional or even worldwide church, 
but also, and more importantly, the apostolic gospel and thus the authority 
of Jesus Christ Himself. The two aspects of representation do not always co-
incide, and that poses the most difficult problem in the exercise of authority 
within the Christian Church. The minister must not be content to represent 
the mind of his constituency, he sometimes has to oppose their opinions and 
moods for the sake of the gospel of Jesus Christ. But even in situations like 
that the minister should not enforce his judgment upon the constituency, 
but simply give testimony to the word of God as he perceives it in contrast 
to his people. 
One of the functions of representative institutions of the Church is that 
of authoritative teaching. It belongs to the ministry on all its hierarchical lev-
els as well as to the conciliar bodies of the Church. Such teaching is authori-
tative in that it is representative in both ways, in representing the authority 
of Christ on the one hand, but also the communion of the Church on some 
level, be it the local parish, the dioceses, the Christians of a province or na-
tion, or finally the worldwide community of Christians. Authoritative teach-
ing always represents the authority of Christ in concrete ways and therefore 
in a particular historical situation where the one body of Christ becomes 
manifest as represented by the teaching authority of the Church. Except on 
the local level, such teaching authority is little developed in most Protestant 
churches, although at the time of the Reformation certain approaches were 
made in the direction of that end. In the long run, however, most Protestant 
churches did not succeed in developing procedures and institutions neces-
sary to secure within their confessional families a sufficient consensus on 
the continuation of representative teaching. Therefore, some Protestant 
churches, especially the Lutheran churches, have become quite traditionalist 
in elevating the authority of their confessional writings from the sixteenth 
century while showing themselves unable to adapt such teaching, represen-
tative of their confessional family, to changed circumstances and to scrip-
tural insights of a later time. The Roman Catholic Church, on the other 
hand, was considerably more successful in securing the continuing exercise 
of authoritative teaching, but with a rather rigid conception of authority. If 
the teaching of the Church is authoritative in being representative, it is al-
ways related to processes of reception in the Christian community. The 
claim to being representative is not sufficient in and of itself. The commu-
nity of Christians addressed by the exercise of teaching authority will re-
ceive or not receive the teaching in the light of their faith in Jesus Christ and 
of the witness of the Scriptures to God's revelation in Christ. In the course of 
such a process of reception it will turn out in what sense the teaching so re-
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ceived has in fact been representative. Furthermore, such teaching is always 
related to historical conditions of language and thought. They function as 
limitations of its form of expression. Thus the teaching may be representa-
tive of the church at a particular moment in history, but perhaps not of the 
entire church and not in such a way that it retains its importance in later pe-
riods of Church history. It may not be final in the form by which it expresses 
the intended truth. Thus, the teaching will be authoritative to the degree it 
actually turns out to be representative of the Christian community as well as 
of the word of God. But it is not exempt from critical examination by com-
parison with the gospel of Jesus Christ as witnessed by the apostolic Scrip-
tures. On the other hand, the teaching on behalf of the church on different 
levels of representative Christian ministry or council need not claim exemp-
tion from critical examination, as if in such a case it lost its authority. If its 
authority is based on its representative character, then there is a sufficient 
claim to authority connected with any teaching in the ecclesial community. 
Since the function of such teaching is to witness to the content of the revela-
tion of God in Christ, its purpose can never be destroyed by subsequent ex-
amination and discussion in the light of the Scriptures, even if it may turn 
out that the form of the teaching has to be modified as a result of such ex-
amination. The continuing exercise of authoritative teaching is necessary in 
the Church in order to express on a representative level the one faith of the 
Church and thereby preserve the unity of the Church (the sense of being 
united by faith in the one Lord Jesus Christ). Therefore, it should be possible 
to reach agreement on this difficult issue ecumenically along the suggested 
lines. The more an undue rigidity of claims to incorrigible teaching authority 
can be avoided, the more a growing consensus on this issue can be ex-
pected. Historically, cases of undue rigidity in enforcing decisions of teach-
ing authority sometimes entered a fatal combination with an abuse of eccle-
sial ministry under the impact of the arrogance of power. Therefore, the ecu-
menical discussion of this subject is particularly sensitive. But there is no 
reason why solutions should be impossible, since the community of Chris-
tians on all levels of its life needs the unifying effect of some continuing ex-
ercise of representative teaching authority. 
The representative function of the ministry, but also of conciliar events, 
is of particular importance in the life of the Church, since the Church itself 
exists as a sign, i.e., an anticipatory representation of the destiny of all hu-
mankind. In its eucharistic liturgy, the Church represents in each local situ-
ation the ultimate destiny of humankind to communion with God and 
among human beings themselves. The Church is an instrument for salvation 
of individuals precisely by fulfilling this function as sign to all humanity. It 
must not allow the clarity of its nature as sign to be blurred or tarnished, 
and that clarity depends on its communion-in so many places-with the 
one Lord, and on its expression in the communion among the members of 
the Church, in the situation of a local congregation as well as in the solidar-
ity of all the Christians in all places and through the centuries. 
The Church Today 15 
In historical actuality, however, the clarity of the sign is broken. It is 
marred wherever congregations and their members let themselves be se-
duced by the spirit of secularism so that the difference of the new life in 
Christ from the lifestyle of the secular world is no longer discernible. The 
clarity of the sign that the Church is called to be is stained particularly by 
the misbehavior of its ministers, since they represent the Church. Finally, 
and most painfully, the sign is broken by the divisions of the Church. Since 
in the contemporary situation of Christianity the churches are separated, in 
each particular church the fullness of the nature of the Church is impaired. 
In the past, each of the separate churches declared itself to be the only 
true Church, and precisely from that pretension the conflict resulted that 
marred the credibility of each one of them. The situation has become even 
more difficult in the contemporary scene, since Christians of different con-
fessional traditions recognize each other as Christians, even officially, but 
still remain separate and even continue the old condemnations that the 
churches threw at each other's faces when they separated. In the contempo-
rary scene these separations are no longer plausible. This is rightly felt by 
most Christians across all confessional barriers. In this situation the continu-
ing division of the churches destroys their credibility as sign of God's king-
dom in a reconciled world. Each church's credibility is affected by this situ-
ation, and particularly so if it affirms itself to be the only true Church. Cer-
tainly each of the churches should try to be true to its vocation by the Lord, 
but this can never mean to be the only true Church, since He is the Lord of 
all who confess to His name, and communion among Christians and among 
their churches is mandatory as a consequence and as evidence of their com-
munion with the one Lord. Thus, to be true to the nature of the Church, is 
irreconcilable to the claim of any particular church to be the only true 
Church. It is certainly correct that ecclesial communion presupposes unity 
of faith in dedication to one and the same Lord. But that need not mean 
complete unanimity in the understanding and interpretation of that one 
faith. There will always remain differences in our understanding of the 
faith, since-as the apostle assures us-our knowledge is imperfect and will 
remain so until the second corning of our Lord. Ecclesial communion re-
quires the mutual trust that it is the same Lord whom we confess. Therefore, 
we confess our faith together. But even the common confession of our faith 
will always be connected with different interpretations. This need not im-
pair ecclesial communion, but it is an inescapable element of our human and 
historical situation of plurality not only in our existence, but also in our 
understanding. Unity is necessary, since it is the one Lord who unites us. 
But as long as dedication to the one Lord is mutually recognizable, com-
munion is mandatory, and it is an indispensable requirement of being the 
Church. 
Therefore, in the present situation, the ecumenical issue is of paramount 
importance in the life of the churches. The recovering and resumption of ec-
clesial communion on the basis of the one faith in one and the same Lord is 
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the fundamental requirement for restoring the worldwide credibility of the 
Christian Church as sign of the kingdom in faithful obedience to her Lord. 
The different confessional traditions may continue to enrich the historical 
self-consciousness of all Christians. They may continue as resources for re-
formulating the faith of the Church, which has to be done again and again. 
But the different confessional traditions must no longer separate Christians 
from each other who recognize each other as Christians. With remarkable 
success, the ecumenical movement of this century specified and broadened 
the necessary basis for such mutual recognition, especially in the Lima 
document on baptism, eucharist and ministry and in the more recent com-
mon explication of the apostolic faith as summarized in the symbol of Nicea. 
If the leading authorities of the churches are duly aware of the fact that com-
plete unanimity in these matters is neither possible, nor needed as a precon-
dition of ecclesial community, and if they remember the mandatory charac-
ter of communion between churches as resulting from the mandate of our 
Lord himself, they should now decide to enter into negotiations about the 
concrete conditions of resuming ecclesial communion. Since these condi-
tions will be slightly different between different church bodies, it will be 
necessary to spell out their details in bilateral negotiations. What is most 
important in this process, however, and will determine decisions about 
what is necessary and sufficient, is the spirit of urgency that arises from the 
awareness that in our contemporary situation no church can be true to the 
mandate of the Lord and to its own nature as sign of His kingdom, unless it 
meets the ecumenical challenge. 
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Wood: We welcome Professor Pannenberg to our noon luncheon and panel 
discussion. We also welcome our panelists, and this overflow crowd of stu-
dents and faculty. I believe you will find this discussion to be intellectually 
and spiritually rewarding. 
Our procedure will be to allow each panelist to address a question to 
Professor Pannenberg, and he will respond to each question in the order in 
which it is given. 
During his presentation of the annual Theta Phi lectures at Asbury Theological 
Seminary, Woljhart Pannenberg responded to these questions posed lly a 
distinguished panel. Dr. Pannenberg is professor of systematic theology at the 
University of Munich. 
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Stone: I have two questions regarding Professor Pannenberg' s development 
of the doctrine of the Trinity. These questions derive specifically from the 
suggestion that we should not regard the unity of God as a person or a sub-
ject but rather in terms of Spirit, understood under the metaphor of a field of 
power. First of all, in the Old Testament Yahweh is clearly presented as one, 
a unity, and yet clearly as a personal subject, an agent. How do you under-
stand the Old Testament presentation of Yahweh's personal agency in the 
light of your suggestions about the unity of God? And, second, the Old Tes-
tament presents Yahweh as a sovereign person over against the widespread 
belief in ancient religions in an impersonal field of power beyond the gods 
from which the world and the gods emerge. How would you respond to the 
fear that your metaphor of a field of power, of spirit, is possibly a revival of 
an ancient pagan concept which the Bible is opposed to? 
Pannenberg: Well thank you for your provocative question. I'm sorry that I 
didn't present my lecture on the Trinity before you had a chance to ask that 
question. 
The answer to your first question is that the Yahweh of the Old Testa-
ment is, of course, the Father of whom Jesus Christ spoke in His message. 
Thus, the first person of the Trinity is identical with the God of the New 
Testament although the way of addressing the God of the New Testament in 
the language of Abba is a little different from the Old Testament usage of 
addressing God. Although God is sometimes referred to as Father-be it of 
the king, be it of the people of Israel-still the nuances of Jesus talking about 
the God of the Old Testament, the God of Jewish faith, in terms of Father are 
different from what is the general basis of the Jewish tradition in talking 
about God. It is the same God. And it's really important that the Father 
whom Jesus Christ talked about and addressed as God is the God of the Old 
Testament. But we also think that only in the way Jesus talked about God is 
the God of the Old Testament revealed in His true reality. So, in some way, 
we do not yet find the ultimate character of the God of Jewish faith in the 
Old Testament. I think this must be the test of faith. Otherwise Jesus would 
be just one in the number of prophets of Israel among others. It is this es-
chatological claim to ultimacy which also means that the way that the one 
God was experienced and addressed before was not yet coming to us in ulti-
mate form of understanding of whom the people of the old covenant were 
talking about. Thus, the Father of Jesus Christ is identical with Yahweh. 
But now the difference, and I will come back to this in my lecture: the 
way the God of the Old Testament is revealed as Father by Jesus Christ is 
inseparable from this form of manifestation so that this form of manifesta-
tion belongs to the Eternal Being of the God of the Old Testament as He is 
addressed as Father by Jesus. And thus what I think has not been achieved 
in the tradition of Jewish interpretation based on the Old Testament preced-
ing Jesus Christ, and maybe after the history of Jesus Christ, is to express the 
identity of the transcendent reality of God, the God of Israel, with His mani-
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festation-with the ultimate form of this manifestation. That is what the 
doctrine of the Trinity does. 
Then the question arises as to what is the unifying issue that binds to-
gether the Father, the Son, and the Spirit in the concreteness of the divine 
reality in its manifestation which is not different from the eternal being of 
God. And then one can say, "Well, God is love. God is Spirit." Both answers 
come from the Johannine writings. Perhaps one can also say God is His 
Kingdom. The Kingdom of God and God Himself are not to be separated 
and I will say tomorrow something about how Father, Son and Spirit are 
united in relation to the issue of the Kingdom of God. When we speak of 
God as spirit, of course, then the question comes up as to what is meant by 
the term spirit. And I would call upon your competence as an Old Testa-
ment scholar when I say that spirit is not mind in the Old Testament. Ruach is 
not mind. Ruach is wind. Ruach is breath, but it is not mind. Now the same 
connotations are present in the origins of the Greek word, pneuma. I will not 
address this tomorrow so I may say it right away. The word pneuma and the 
history of pneuma is the basis of the field concept of modem physics. This 
has been asserted by Max Jammer, who is the leading authority in the study 
of the key concepts of the natural sciences in the history. He has studied the 
concept of space and Albert Einstein wrote a famous preface to that book on 
the history of the concept of space by Max Jammer. He has also studied the 
concept of mass in physics and also the concept of field, and produced some 
evidence, that the pneuma theory of especially Stoic philosophy was the im-
mediate predecessor of the field theories of modem physics. Therefore, I 
happen to think that the field concept stands closer to the biblical term 
pneuma than the concept "mind" does. It was only the Platonist Origen who 
succeeded to identify definitively mind and spirit. And we should be open 
to revise our understanding a little bit. 
Of course, to say that God is spirit is not all that can be said about God. 
In the first place God is Yahweh, or God is the Father-and the divine Spirit 
is concrete only in the person of the Father or in the way the Spirit is going 
out from the Father. Then of course a Christian peculiarity, again, is that in 
relation to the Son, the Spirit is manifest as a distinct person of its own, 
which we don't find in the Old Testament, but it is part of our Christian 
faith. 
So, my answer to the main point that you made is that the divine reality 
which has the character of a field rather than of an anthropomorphic kind of 
mind, is concrete only in the persons-first of all the Father, the God of the 
Old Testament, but inseparably connected with the Son and the Spirit. 
Peterson: Professor Pannenberg, as one who is interested in the philosophi-
cal problem of evil, I'd like to know your thoughts along those lines for the-
ology. As you undoubtedly know, there are many who believe the problem 
of evil is the central problem for Christian theology. I'm thinking of my 
question particularly in terms of your emphasis that theology should not be 
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detached from history, and I wonder if that emphasis doesn't make it par-
ticularly important for Christian theology to engage actual historical evils, 
such as the horrors of the holocaust. Would you care to comment? 
Pannenberg: Well, that's not the easiest question. You could have held back 
a little bit in the polite American way before challenging me to the bottom of 
my Christian faith in this way! 
I would like to say first that the reality of evil is certainly the most seri-
ous argument against the existence of God in this world. It is not the most 
serious intellectual argument, but it is the most serious argument in terms of 
the evidence of feeling and experience. Intellectually, it is not very conclu-
sive. But on the more basic emotional level, it is the major evidence against 
the existence of God. And so it will continue until the last day. We learn 
from the Bible that this is so. Thus, this issue will be definitively solved, not 
by our theoretical arguments, but only by the action of God Himself in the 
future of His Kingdom. We must, of course, say more than this, because we 
live in this world and, as Christians, we also have to struggle with this issue 
in our present lives. 
Now, if you believe in God, the problem of evil-the reality of evil-
does not put you to shambles. It is not the believer who is afraid of the prob-
lem but it is the unbeliever who thinks he cannot believe because of it. The 
moment you believe, the situation is quite different. If you read the book of 
Job, which is, of course, a book on this theodicy question in the Bible, Job 
never comes to the point of doubting the existence of God, does he? He 
complains about the situation. He charges Yahweh with treating him un-
justly. But he never doubts the existence of God. And in the end of the book 
of Job it is the glory of God's work as the creator in nature which eventually 
makes Job aware that, after all, he is but a finite being left to death and who 
is he to ask questions like that of God? That's the attitude of the believer, 
even in view of his or her own suffering. Thus the situation of the believer is 
quite different when considering the question of theodicy than the situation 
of the non-believer. 
To the non-believer, it may be the main obstacle to embracing faith in 
God. But on the other hand, to believe in God is the way to deal with this 
situation. There is no other way to deal with it. 
You mentioned the Holocaust. Now I don't know whether you know 
Theodore W. Adorno, who was an atheist. (A Jew can never be an atheist, 
really. And if a Jew is an atheist, this is a way of keeping the second com-
mandment!) I've never met a Jew who, deep down in his heart, is an atheist. 
And certainly Adorno was not. But he said after Auschwitz one can no 
longer talk about God. I always felt that you can say that only if you are in a 
position of watching a tragedy in theater. You cannot say that, if you think 
of yourself in the place of those who had to go into the gas ovens, because 
those who had to walk that way had their only hope in singing psalms. You 
perhaps know about that. The only power to deal with experiences like that 
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is not in simply observing them in others, but if one has to go through them 
oneself. Therefore, I don't think it is a very convincing argument really. The 
moment you believe in God you get hold of the only power that enables you 
to face experiences of terror like that. You get deprived of the best ally we 
have in fighting the power of evil when you let go of the faith of God. 
Well, the question remains, how is it reconcilable with the power and 
goodness of God that He created the world such as we experience it? And 
then, in addressing this rather limited question within the broad range of 
the question you posed to me, considerations gain the force that have been 
raised in this history of dealing with the problem of theodicy, and especially 
in its classical Leibnitzian form. Because Leibnitz not only argued that evil 
was admitted because of freedom-of having freedom-but he argues that 
evil is bound up with the very existence of independent, finite reality. If one 
wants to have independent, finite reality, one cannot at the same time avoid 
evil in all its forms. One has to have the patience-and a Creator, if you al-
low me to say so, may have the patience-to deal with His creation, seeing, 
watching it being tempted by evil, without, however, being finally over-
whelmed by it. Augustine once said a very beautiful word about this issue, 
different from Clement of Alexandria whom he otherwise often followed. 
Clement said evil comes from the free will of the creature, so God is not re-
sponsible for the evil in this world. Augustine was too intelligent a man to 
be content with this kind of answer because, after all, God had created that 
creature that is going to bring about evil, moral evil, by the abuse of its free 
will. And so Augustine said that even in creating Adam, God knew very 
well that this Adam would abuse the freedom he had been given. But God 
knew even more than that: He also knew that Jesus Christ would come and 
save Adam from the consequence of death that would result from his sin. 
And I think this is a very beautiful word because it entails, on the one hand, 
God the creator bought the independent existence of creatures at the price of 
admitting evil in His creation. But on the other hand, He also had in view 
what His aim for His creation is: the rescue of the creation by the death and 
resurrection of His Son and by the final eschatological overcoming of evil. 
Anderson: Professor Pannenberg, your criticism of the doctrine of the Vir-
gin Birth is well known. For those who may not be familiar with it, I'll 
briefly summarize. You consider the Virgin Birth to be an atheological leg-
end (based on historical critical concerns, I believe) and you think that the 
doctrine was only later conceived by the early church to support the idea of 
incarnation, unaware of the contradiction inherent in that-that the Virgin 
Birth says that Jesus is God's Son from His beginning and the Incarnation 
refers to His preexistence. You believe that the doctrine of the Virgin Birth 
has been mistakenly accorded the same status as the Resurrection in support 
of the idea of incarnation. Also, interestingly, you level a criticism against 
those who use the doctrine to promote piety, particularly with regard to 
Mary. I think that may have something to do with your criticism of Karl 
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Barth, perhaps-Mariolatry in Protestantism. In spite of these criticisms, you 
wrote in the Apostle's Creed and Jesus-God and Man, that Christians should 
retain the creedal affirmation in the Apostle's Creed-not affirming the his-
toricity of the Virgin Birth but affirming the motivation that went into the 
formulation of the Creed. 
Based on this, I have three related questions. Why would it not be pos-
sible to affirm the historicity of the virginal conception of Jesus based upon 
the historicity of the Resurrection as that event casts light backward upon 
the events of Jesus' life? Second, could we say, without resorting to pietistic 
solutions, that in terms of salvation history, the virginal conception was not 
comprehendible as an historical occurrence until after Pentecost? And third, 
how do you respond to Oscar Culhnann' s criticism that you have not taken 
sufficient notice of the events and their Spirit-directed interpretations by 
later believers? 
Pannenberg: Well, you reported correctly on my position concerning the is-
sue of the Virgin Birth and I think it is, indeed, a historical question-as, of 
course, the question of the Resurrection is. You cannot settle, however, the 
historicity of the Virgin Birth by referring to the historicity of the Resurrec-
tion. These are two different events, and you cannot solve questions of his-
toricity in general by affirming the historicity of just one event. Of course, in 
terms of miracles, the Resurrection of Jesus is by far the more mysterious 
miracle than the Virgin Birth. So some people have asked me why I accept 
the greater miracle and not the lesser one. Well, in the case of the Virgin 
Birth, even current biological ideas need not be challenged, certainly not in 
the same way as in the case of the Resurrection. But my criticism of the his-
toricity of the Virgin Birth is not based on a disbelief in miracles. I think that 
reality as such is miraculous. And I don't agree with David Hume that the 
mere fact that something is unusual-even if it is uniquely unusual-is suf-
ficient reason to reject a claim to historicity. There have to be other reasons. If 
it could be shown that the traditions of the early Christians were late leg-
ends as a whole, I think it would be very difficult to go on with the Christian 
faith. But this is not the case so far-so far, we have to say. We should not 
make infallible judgments, even in this central part of our faith. This is pre-
cisely the point where faith involves a risk. We are not safe as Christians at 
this point. We are not safe. But we may leave it to God to take care of the 
truth of His gospel. We certainly cannot protect the gospel and the truth of 
the gospel. 
That's my criticism of fundamentalism, of those who want to draw a 
fence around the Scriptures in order to defend them from the application of 
critical reflection. This is an indication of too little faith. Too little faith in 
God. If His revelation is true, He will take care of that Himself. Not we. 
Then, of course, I may tum out to be wrong in my historical judgment 
on the story of the Virgin Birth. But given the situation and the arguments as 
they stand, given the nature of the text that we have, I cannot escape a criti-
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cal judgment here. This may tell you that I don't postulate the inerrancy of 
every word in Scripture just on principle. We couldn't do that unless this is 
a kind of works righteousness, I think. We shouldn't do that. We should 
leave it to God. In this case, there are legendary elements in the Scriptures. 
And, of course, it is clear why this is so. Most professional exegetes would 
concur with the conclusion that the message of the angel in Luke is in fact 
an answer to the question of why this man is called Son of God. And the 
answer in the message of the angel is that He is called the Son of God be-
cause he is to be born by the virgin from the Holy Spirit: It is at this point 
where the original version of the legend and belief in the preexistent Son of 
God is not reconcilable. When we ask, "What's the basis of confessing Jesus 
to be the Son of God?" we have a number of different answers in the early 
Christian writings. We have the answer in the very old text, quoted by Paul 
in the opening sentences of the letter to Romans, that Jesus is the Son of God 
on the basis of his Resurrection. We have the answer in the baptism story of 
Jesus where the voice from heaven declared effectively this man to be the 
Son of God with the adoption formula (if it is an adoption formula) of Psalm 
2:7. We have the Virgin Birth story in but two of the New Testament writ-
ings, while the idea of preexistence is much more widespread generally in 
the New Testament. (And preexistence is actually the basis of the trinitarian 
doctrine. I'm going to say something on that tomorrow.) If one realizes this 
situation, one also has to realize one cannot have everything at the same 
time. We can affirm all these different witnesses by understanding how they 
are related to each other in the process of giving reasons for the faith in Je-
sus Christ being the Son of God; but we cannot conceptually merge what 
Luke and Matthew say on the basis of that predication of Jesus as the Son of 
God, with what Romans 1 says on it, or with the idea of preexistence. The 
Church's later doctrine of the Incarnation has been a combination of the Vir-
gin Birth with the idea of preexistence and precisely in this form of combi-
nation the doctrine of incarnation is not completely biblical. 
You will find the new version of my Christological argument in the sec-
ond volume of my systematic theology, where I argue that the notion of the 
incarnation relates not primarily to the birth of Jesus, but to His whole his-
torical existence. In the main texts about 8 (God sent 
His son into the flesh) and Galatians 4 (God sent His son to be born by a 
woman and put under the law) and explicitly in John 1-we don't have this 
idea related primarily to the event of birth. So, I call upon you to be more 
biblical! 
Anderson: Your criticisms are very strong. They are difficult to address. 
Still, in terms of salvation history, we can think of events which occur in his-
tory that are not comprehendible historically, but are still events in history. 
Then, as Cullmann points out in his book Salvation in History, the Holy Spirit 
later on may direct believers into greater understanding of those events. 
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Pannenberg: I didn't answer that part of your question, I admit. Well, what 
do we really comprehend of history? It is different from case to case, but 
usually not very much. And certainly even though we affirm the historicity 
of the Resurrection of Jesus we don't comprehend very much of what actu-
ally happened. We comprehend best that which is reported to be historical 
and isn't. That's what we comprehend best. And so we comprehend com-
paratively better the legendary character of the Virgin Birth than those 
events that really happened in history because reality is not exhausted by 
our understanding. Our understanding is very provisional. 
Now you say, with Cullmann, the real understanding may have come 
afterward-after Pentecost. Well, there are some obvious questions, includ-
ing whether Mary had forgotten about what happened to her until after 
Pentecost. But I'll not be addressing this question now. It is true that in the 
course of our history we usually understand differently later what had oc-
curred to us earlier. And the difference may be more or less incisive. Some-
times the difference can be very incisive so that we understand in a com-
pletely different way what happened to us earlier than we did then. Some-
times the difference is simply that we come to see our earlier experiences in 
a broader horizon. But, in any event, the actuality of the events is already 
presupposed in that process of hermeneutical change of meaning. Thus, one 
cannot argue from later experiences to the historicity of earlier events. That 
is not sound historical argument in any case of historical judgment, and thus 
we have to accept it in the case of biblical information also. 
Wood: I'd like to ask one question. You have particularly criticized your 
teacher, Karl Barth, for trying to establish the truth of faith from the stand-
point of faith and not critical historical reason. And yet you say that the Res-
urrection of Jesus as an event in history is discernible only to believers. Is 
there any difference between you and your teacher? 
Pannenberg: I have to tell you I like that question because most of the time I 
am taken as somebody who has completely forgotten about his teacher or, 
worse, who is so dependent upon that teacher that he has to follow him 
blindly for most of life. That is not my relationship with Karl Barth. I owe 
him a great deal of gratitude in the formation of my own theological 
thought-and continuously so. But I'm not completely identical with Karl 
Barth. 
I was especially impressed by Barth's emphasis on the sovereignty of 
God which was, of course, his Calvinist heritage to a large extent. But I drew 
different conclusions than Karl Barth did. I concluded that if God is sover-
eign as the Almighty Creator of everything, there should be no animal, no 
human being, and certainly not human nature, there should be no stone on 
this earth that could be adequately understood without this God. In other 
words, we don't need some prior decision of faith, we only need to remove 
our prejudices and look on reality as it presents itself. If God exists, that will 
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be enough. Therefore, I follow another theological method than Karl Barth 
followed. If we establish a prejudice of Christian faith and then go on to ra-
tionalize that prejudice, we act in a manner unworthy of the God we be-
lieve. If we really believe in God, we may ask for His truth in the reality of 
the history that we believe is the history of His manifesting Himself. We 
should remove every prejudgment in the judgment of faith. 
This also applies to the Christian Easter tradition. I don't believe be-
cause of the faith of the apostles. I should say belief in God is not solely de-
pendent on our judgment of the factuality of the Easter story. It is a more 
complex matter. But I believe in the Resurrection of Jesus because I am con-
vinced that all of the criticism against the historicity of this tradition does 
not succeed. It is true that the Resurrection has been attested to only by 
those who became believers. Being a Jew, you cannot at the same time af-
firm the Resurrection of Jesus and continue to be an unbeliever. It is an im-
mediate consequence: If Jesus had been raised by the God of Israel, belief is 
the immediate consequence. And that is the reason why we have only be-
lievers attesting to the Resurrection of Jesus. The story is true, and is re-
ported; rather than the story being a product of the individual faith of those 
who reported that story. To get this backward is to pervert the Christian 
message. Because then we could invent other stories. We could invent a 
story that would be more appropriate for our time. We could invent another 
God with female rather than male features, and so on. Thus, faith should be 
considered as a consequence, a result, of God's action and not to be the pre-
condition that we have to embrace first in order to be able to see the content. 

The Christian Vision of God: 
The New Discussion 
on the Trinitarian Doctrine 
BY WOLFHART PANNENBERG 
One of the most significant decisions in accounting for the content of the 
Christian faith is about the appropriate place of the trinitarian doctrine: Is 
this doctrine at the basis of the Christian understanding of God' s revelation 
in Jesus Christ, or is it rather to be considered a later product of doctrinal 
development in the climate of Hellenistic thought in the ancient church, 
while Jesus knew only of one God, the Father? There are important argu-
ments in favor of the second position, which has been embraced in modern 
liberal theology. The first serious doubts about the trinitarian doctrine of the 
church, after the Arian controversy of the fourth century, had arisen with 
antitrinitarians in the sixteenth century on the basis of their reading of the 
gospels where they found nothing on the Trinity. Although there was an in-
creasing tendency in the early Christian writings to speak of Jesus in the 
closest connection with God, the argument for the trinitarian doctrine has to 
be based mainly on the implications of the biblical witness about Jesus 
Christ and of the story of Jesus Himself. The two strongest points counting 
in favor of the liberal position are, first, that the God whose imminent king-
dom Jesus proclaimed was obviously the God of Jewish faith, who can be 
only one, and furthermore that Jesus did not claim anything like a divine 
status for Himself, but rather submitted to the Father as every creature 
should do. If there is any sound argument in defense of the trinitarian doc-
trine of the church, it has to do justice to and even incorporate both of these 
points. 
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Nevertheless, I think that the trinitarian conception of God has a good 
claim to be considered the specifically Christian idea of God. It is not a doc-
trine of only secondary importance in addition to some other basic concept 
of the one God: If the issue is considered in terms like that, the case for trini-
tarian theology is lost. It can be defended only on the condition that there is 
no other appropriate conception of the God of Christian faith than the Trin-
ity. In that case we cannot have first a doctrine on the one God and after-
wards, in terms of some additional supernatural mystery, the trinitarian 
doctrine. Rather, if the trinitarian doctrine is sound, Christian monotheism 
can only mean that the three persons of the Trinity are not three gods, but 
one God only. Everything that is said in Christian theology on the one God 
has to be predicated, then, on the three persons of the Trinity in their com-
munion. 
If a case can be made for trinitarian theology, the decisive argument 
must be that the trinitarian doctrine simply states explicitly what is implicit 
already in God's revelation in Jesus Christ and basically in Jesus' historical 
relationship to the Father whom He proclaimed to be the one God. If Jesus' 
relationship to the Father could be adequately described and accounted for 
in terms other than those of trinitarian doctrine, the case for that doctrine 
would be lost. It can only be defended if the trinitarian concept of God can 
be shown to be the only adequate and fully explicit expression of the reality 
of God revealed in Jesus Christ. 
This is precisely the line of reasoning, or at least the underlying assump-
tion, in the exciting renaissance of trinitarian doctrine in contemporary theo-
logical discussion. In a certain sense this renewal of trinitarian theology 
started with Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics, and it was soon joined by a 
number of Catholic theologians, especially by Karl Rahner. It has been fur-
ther developed by Jiirgen Moltrnann and Eberhard Jiingel in Germany and 
by Robert Jenson in America. It has been in the center of my own project of 
developing a systematic presentation of the Christian doctrine. 
At the same time, by coincidence, there emerged in British theology a 
tendency or even a trend to dismantle the christological and trinitarian 
dogma of the ancient church. This trend is represented by Geoffrey Lampe' s 
criticism of the ancient Logos-Christology in his influential book on God as 
Spirit (1976), and especially by the volume The Myth of God Incarnate, edited 
by John Hick in 1977. While Anglican theology traditionally held the doc-
trines of the ancient church in particularly high esteem, these doctrines have 
now come under attack. The arguments used in that attack remind a Ger-
man observer time and again of the discussions in Germany a century ago, 
at the time of Adolf v. Harnack. Anyone familiar with the work of Harnack 
will recognize his view of a Hellenization of the Christian faith in the devel-
opment of trinitarian doctrine and already in the identification of the con-
cept of a preexistent Logos with the person of Jesus Christ. In the overall 
picture there is not so much new in the arguments of the critics in the recent 
British discussion except perhaps the notion of myth that did not play a ma-
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jor role at the time of Harnack, but entered the scene later on in the history-
of-religion school, culminating in Bultmann. It is used, however, in a very 
vague form by those who consider incarnational language as mythical. This 
contention is basically meant to qualify such language as metaphorical 
rather than literal. But, in a technical sense, the idea of incarnation is not a 
metaphor. It is not an expression that was transferred to religion from some 
other usage. 
The new discussion of trinitarian doctrine moves on a different level of 
thought and argument than that addressed by the recent critics of the Logos 
Christology and of incarnational language. The earlier restatements of the 
trinitarian doctrine were based on the idea of God's revelation in Jesus 
Christ. This is especially the case with Karl Barth who argued that God in 
His eternal being must be conceived to be the same as He is in His historical 
revelation, since otherwise His revelation in Jesus Christ would not reveal 
Him like He is. The consideration that the content of God's revelation in his-
tory and His eternal being must not be separated, returned in Karl Rahner' s 
famous statement that the economic Trinity and the eternal or immanent 
Trinity are identical, which is to say that like God revealed Himself as Fa-
ther, Son and Holy Spirit, so He is to be understood in His eternal life. 
Rahner's particular concern was that the act of incarnation cannot be consid-
ered to be something accidental in relation to the eternal life of God. 
In the task of accounting for the biblical basis of a trinitarian concept of 
God, an idea was taken over and expanded that was first developed in the 
post-Bultmannian discussion with reference to the development of early 
Christian Christology. Bultmann himself remarked as early as 1929 that the 
historical Jesus, though He did not claim any of the christological titles later 
on ascribed to Him, nevertheless in His call for eschatological decision im-
plied a Christology. Thus, after Bultmann, the history of early Christian 
Christology could be presented as making explicit what had been claimed 
by Jesus Himself implicitly. It was no longer of primary importance, then, 
what the historical origin of the different titles and ideas was, which the 
early Christians in the light of their Easter faith now ascribed to Jesus. 
Rather, the decisive issue was whether the content of those titles and ideas, 
as they were accommodated to Christian usage, corresponds to the claims 
implicit in Jesus' teaching and history. This approach is methodologically 
superior to the kind of argument that has been used in modern liberal theol-
ogy and by the British critics of the myth of God incarnate to the effect that 
the christological language used by Paul or John does not occur in the mes-
sage of Jesus. Today everybody knows that Jesus did not speak of Himself 
as divine Logos or as preexistent son of God. But the real question is 
whether there is a correspondence between such language and the implica-
tions of Jesus' message and activity. In order to answer questions like that 
one has to reconstruct first the framework of Jesus' message and activity 
and then to argue on that basis. 
If evaluated in such a perspective, the idea of preexistent sonship and its 
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attribution to Jesus seems to correspond to the eschatological claim, which 
was implicit in Jesus' teaching and was understood among the early Chris-
tians as being confirmed by God Himself in raising Jesus from the dead. The 
future of the Kingdom that Jesus proclaimed was said by Himself to become 
a present reality already in His activity and in the faith of those who re-
ceived His message. This presence of the future Kingdom of God in Jesus 
forms the basis of all later Christian language about the incarnation of God 
in His person. It was said to be the incarnation of the "son" of God, how-
ever, corresponding to the subordination of Jesus Himself to the God whom 
He called the Father. It is not certain whether the historical Jesus used the 
word /1 son" with reference to Himself in His subordination to the heavenly 
Father as well as in His intimate relationship with Him. But even if the word 
"son" was used first by the early Christians in speaking of Jesus, it serves as 
an exact expression of how Jesus related to the Father. And since the iden-
tity of God as Father, in the specific sense that word assumed in Jesus' lan-
guage, is only revealed through Jesus, because it is reflected in the way He 
acted as son, the consequence is that the precise meaning of the name "Fa-
ther" in Christian language about God and in addressing God depends on 
its relationship to Jesus. If Jesus' language about God has eschatological va-
lidity, the very identity of God's being the heavenly Father is inseparable 
from His relationship to Jesus as His son. This, however, entails that the re-
lationship to the son belongs to the eternal being of God as Father, and con-
sequently the Son Himself is to be understood as eternal as well. But Jesus 
as a human being was not eternal. He had been born like all of us in a par-
ticular moment of time. So, in some way, the Son as eternal correlate of God 
the Father precedes Jesus' human existence. Hence, Jesus' identity as son of 
His heavenly Father is to be accounted for in terms of the manifestation of 
the eternal Son in His human life. And the definitive character of that mani-
festation, corresponding to the eschatological claim of Jesus, leads to its ex-
pression in terms of the affirmation that the eternal Son of God had become 
incarnate in the human life of this particular man. 
The idea of preexistence of the Son of the eternal Father is crucial in the 
process of explication of the meaning inherent in Jesus' historical teaching 
and activity, if the trinitarian doctrine is to be considered the final result of 
that process of explication. Without the preexistent Son who became incar-
nate in Jesus there would be no trinitarian concept of God. Therefore, the 
idea of preexistence is the connecting link in the process of explication from 
the historical Jesus to the doctrine of the Trinity. It is, of course, an idea that 
had its prehistory in Judaism, before it was applied to Jesus. Especially wis-
dom had been conceived as an entity that was in God's presence already 
when He created the world, and this preexistent wisdom was sometimes 
identified with the Torah and sometimes interpreted by the Greek idea of 
Logos, which also corresponded to the Word of creation. But this back-
ground of conceptions of preexistent entities is of only secondary impor-
tance in explaining the Christian belief in a preexistent son of God who be-
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came incarnate in Jesus. The background of Jewish ideas about a preexistent 
wisdom explains some of the language that has been used in early Christi-
anity to express the belief in a preexistent Son of God who became incar-
nate. It does not explain the rise of that belief itself. The emergence of that 
belief, however, can be accounted for as a consequence of the inseparability 
of Jesus' teaching about God the Father from His own person in His way of 
relating to that God. It is finally the eschatological consciousness of Jesus 
that in His proclamation and activity the eschatological future of the King-
dom of God becomes a present reality, which underlies the inseparability of 
His way of talking about God as heavenly Father from its relationship to His 
own person: "No one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows 
the Father except the Son and any one to whom the Son chooses to reveal 
him" (Matt 11:27). As this relationship transcends the limits of time, it also 
precedes. the time of Jesus' life and ministry. 
The idea of preexistence, as such, does not entail the full divinity of the 
preexistent entity. Therefore, it is understandable that it took the church 
three centuries of theological discussion before the council of Nicea could 
assert the identity of the Son's divine nature with that of the Father. But im-
plicitly that idea had been around all the time in the affirmation of the in-
separable relationship of the Son to the Father as well as of the Father to the 
Son. The Spirit was always included in that relationship, since, according to 
the New Testament witnesses, the Spirit was given to the Son without meas-
ure and was the medium of the Son's communion with the Father. Thus the 
Spirit is inseparable from the eternal communion of Father and Son, though 
the personal distinction of the Spirit in relation to Father and Son came to 
unambiguous expression in what the Gospel of John said about the Spirit as 
Paraclete and as glorifying the Son and the Father in the hearts of the faith-
ful. 
In this sense, then, the doctrine of the Trinity is indeed the explicit ar-
ticulation of what was implicit already in Jesus' relationship to the Father 
and His behaving as Son of this Father in the history of His earthly mission. 
If the historical relationship of Jesus to the Father in fad provides the basis 
of the trinitarian concept of God, however, the traditional form of trinitarian 
doctrine in Christian theology has to be reinterpreted and modified in many 
details. I shall confine myself to just five points of necessary change in the 
traditional form of the doctrine. 
The first point is a negative one. The Trinity cannot be deduced from a 
general concept of God as spirit or love. Both these descriptions of the es-
sence of God come from the Johannine writings, and they have been used 
particularly in the Christian West as starting points in deriving a threefold 
differentiation within the one God. Especially the concept of spirit-taken in 
the sense of mind-served that purpose from Anselm to Thomas Aquinas 
and others, and all the way down to Hegel and even to Karl Barth' s doctrine 
on the Trinity: If the mind is considered as self <onscious, it is its own object 
and thus distinguished from itself while at the same time knowing its iden-
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tity with itself. Augustine used this structure of the human mind as illustrat-
ing the trinitarian dogma, but Anselm took it to prove the trinitarian dogma 
by deriving it from the idea of God as spirit or mind, and, notwithstanding 
certain reservations, Thomas Aquinas followed and refined this procedure. 
But there is a basic deficiency in this approach, because it presupposes the 
essence of God to exist as a unified subject, while the three persons of the 
Trinity tend to be just modes or aspects in the unfolding of this one subjec-
tivity. On the other hand, if they were taken as persons in the strict sense, 
there seems to be a fourth personal subject, namely the one God as such. In 
either case the argument ends up in conflict with the affirmation in the trini-
tarian dogma of one God in three persons. Eastern Orthodox theologians 
have rightly criticized the Christian West at this point for treating the one 
essence of God as somehow prior to the three persons. 
Trinitarian theology should rather start with the three persons-Father, 
Son and Spirit-as they are manifest in the story of Jesus and witnessed to 
in the biblical writings. There the Father is presented to be God in the em-
phatic sense and primordially, while Son and Spirit derive their share in His 
Godhead from Him, because they are inseparably united to Him. In this 
sense the Father, according to the biblical witness, is the source of the divin-
ity of Spirit and Son. But this must not be taken in the sense of a causal de-
pendence of Son and Spirit on the Father as being brought forth by Him. 
Such an interpretation was suggested by the Platonic philosophy which in-
fluenced the Eastern Fathers, but it tended to subordinate ontologically the 
Son and the Spirit to the Father who would then be the only true God, while 
Son and Spirit were not God in the full sense of the word, but only in some 
derivative way. This was the issue of the Arian controversy in the fourth 
century. 
Contrary to Arius, the churches at Nicea and Constantinople affirmed 
that the Son and the Spirit are of the same nature (homoousios) as the Father 
is. But as long as Son and Spirit were conceived primarily in causal terms as 
being brought forth by the Father, a tendency towards ontological subordi-
nations continued, because, according to the then prevailing metaphysical 
conception of cause and effect, the cause is always of superior ontological 
dignity than the effect. The remedy is provided by Athanasius' s thesis that 
the Father was never without the Son, because "father" is a relative term 
that makes no sense except in relation to the person whose father He is. 
Thus, in some way the identity of being Father depends on the Son, and vice 
versa. 
This leads to the second point I want to emphasize: the mutual character 
of the personal relations in the Trinity. In the tradition, the dependence of 
the Father's identity on the Son (and on the Spirit) has been conceived in 
terms of only a logical dependence inherent in the personal names, espe-
cially of Father and Son, while not so clearly in the case of the Spirit. It was 
not really conceived of as a mutuality of actual relations. Rather, on the on-
tological level, there was the assumption of causal dependence in but one 
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direction, from the Father to the Son and to the Spirit. This came to expres-
sion in the fact that the personal relations within the Trinity were conceived 
of only in terms of relations of origin, the Son as generated by the Father, the 
Spirit as proceeding from the Father. The doctrine expressed the important 
idea that the identity of the persons was constituted by their relations, but in 
the light of the biblical witnesses those relations have to be conceived of in a 
richer way and, most importantly, in terms of concrete mutuality. They 
must not be reduced to relations of origin. When it is said that the Father has 
begotten the Son (Luke 3:22, with the word of Ps 2:7 at Jesus' baptism) or 
that Jesus is the only-begotten Son of the Father (John 1:14), such statements 
do not belong to a different ontological level than that the Son is beloved by 
the Father or that the Father has given Him "all authority in heaven and on 
earth" (Matt 28:18), or that the Son honors the Father and obeys His mission. 
The traditional doctrine assumed that the words about the origin of the Son 
as begotten by the Father refer to the immanent and eternal life of the Trin-
ity, while those other words belong to the divine economy of sending the 
Son into the world or were taken to refer to the relationship of Jesus to the 
Father according to Jesus' human nature. But no such distinction is war-
ranted by the biblical reports. The words about the Son as being begotten by 
the Father have their place in the reports about the baptism of Jesus or are 
connected with His resurrection (Acts 13:33) and thus belong in the context 
of the divine economy of the Son's mission in the world, just as much as all 
the other words about the Son's relation to the Father do. The same is true of 
the Spirit: When the Spirit is said to "proceed" from the Father (John 15:26), 
this is to be taken to be always the case in distinction from His being sent to 
the faithful through the Son. But it does not refer to the immanent life of the 
Trinity in distinction from everything else that is said about the Spirit, espe-
cially that the Spirit glorifies the Son (John 16:14) and in Hirn the Father. By 
the way, this action of glorifying the Son and the Father provides the clear-
est indication of the Spirit's personal distinction from and over against the 
Son and the Father. 
Thus, the trinitarian relations must not be reduced to relations of origin, 
but include the concrete mutuality of interpersonal relationship. It is pre-
cisely in terms of this concrete mutuality that the identity of the trinitarian 
persons is constituted by their relations to each other. These relations are 
eternal because the Father, in His eternal identity, is no other than He is re-
vealed to be in His relationship with Jesus Christ by the glorifying work of 
the Spirit. 
This leads to my third point of modification of the traditional doctrine: 
Regarding the begetting and sending of the Son by the Father, the mutuality 
in the trinitarian relations consists in the corresponding self-differentiation 
of the Son from the Father. This self-differentiation on the part of the Son is 
crucial in the argument for a trinitarian conception of the one God of Jewish 
faith on the basis of the historical proclamation, activity and history of Jesus. 
As Jesus called His audience to be first concerned for the imminent King-
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dom of God, to love and honor God beyond everything else, in the same 
way He submitted Himself to the Father in obedience unto death concern-
ing the mission He had received from Him. Contrary to the suspicion of 
those who rejected Him, He did not arrogate divine authority to Himself, 
but let the Father be the one who alone is good (Matt 19:17). Precisely in His 
obedience, in submitting Himself to the Father like every creature is re-
quired to do, but usually fails to do, Jesus demonstrated Himself to be the 
son of this eternal Father, and because of this obedience He was confirmed 
to be the Son by the Father Himself in raising Him from the dead. Jesus cor-
responded to the Fatherhood of God precisely by distinguishing Himself 
from God, which meant to subordinate Himself to God, and in doing so He 
was and is in communion with the Father, in contrast to the first Adam who 
wanted to be like God and thereby separated Himself from God. Jesus is one 
with God precisely in distinguishing Himself from God and in subordinat-
ing Himself to Him. This self-subordination is sharply to be contrasted to 
the ontological subordinationism that was discussed in the early church on 
the basis of the superiority ascribed to the cause in comparison to its effects. 
In the case of Jesus, there is no ontological inferiority, but self-subordina-
tion, which is a condition of being of the same essence of the Father. Jesus is 
one with God precisely in distinguishing Himself from God. By submitting 
Himself to the Father He is the eternal Son of the Father, the eternal corre-
late of His Fatherhood without which the Father could not be father. Hence, 
the self-distinction of Jesus from God the Father is inseparable from His 
eternal unity with Him, and consequently, there is personal distinction 
within the eternal unity of God. The same form of personal distinction can 
then be discovered in the sending and "begetting" of the Son by the Father 
and in the way the Spirit does not talk of Himself, but glorifies the Son and 
the Father in the Son. 
This leads to the fourth modification of traditional trinitarian doctrine: 
The traditional doctrine, especially in the East, emphasized the monarchy of 
the Father as the source of all divinity. But in terms of the restriction of trini-
tarian language to the relations of origin this meant only that the Father dif-
fers from Son and Spirit in having no origin, but has His divine nature by 
Himself. On the basis of the mutuality of personal relationship, however, as 
it is evident in the New Testament witness, the monarchy of the Father is 
conditioned by the obedience of the Son and by the glorifying work of the 
Spirit. Through the proclamation and activity of Jesus, the Kingdom of the 
Father becomes a present reality with those who believe. Thus the Father 
entrusted His Kingdom to the Son, and the Son returns it to the Father, 
which happens and is continued and completed through the work of the 
Spirit. When Paul said that in the end the Son will return the Kingdom to 
the Father (1 Cor 15:28), then this will be the completion of what He has 
been doing all the time in fulfilling His mission, and therefore it does not 
contradict what the symbol of Nicea affirms with Luke 1:33, that His King-
dom will have no end. There is no competition between the Kingdom of the 
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Son and that of the Father, because the Kingdom of the Son consists of ush-
ering in the Kingdom of the Father so that He be acclaimed by all to be the 
one God. 
The one Kingdom of God corresponds to what the doctrine of the 
church talks about in terms of the one divine essence of the three persons. 
And here there is the fifth modification of the traditional form of the doc-
trine in light of the biblical witness to the revelation of God in Christ: Son 
and Spirit share in the divine essence of the Father not just by being begot-
ten and by proceeding from the Father, but by contributing to the Kingdom 
of the Father that is entrusted to the Son and returned to the Father by Him-
self through the Holy Spirit. It is in this concrete dynamics of perichoresis 
that the three persons share the same Kingdom and the same essence which 
nevertheless remains to be primarily the Kingdom and divine nature of the 
Father. Thus the one divine being becomes manifest in the three persons, 
but in different ways, the Kingdom and the divine essence being always pri-
marily the Father's, but effective through the Son and the Spirit. Athana-
sius's insight that the Fatherhood of God is conditioned by the Son (and by 
the Spirit) takes on a very concrete meaning. At the same time, it becomes 
evident that the trinitarian doctrine of the church does not necessarily stand 
in conflict with Jewish monotheism, which after all had been the faith of Je-
sus Himself. 
In conclusion, this leads to some remarks on the impact of the trinitarian 
doctrine on the concept of the one God as such. In the doctrine on the Trin-
ity, the unity of the one God is conceived in terms of a differentiated unity. 
This enables the Christian teaching to do justice to the unity of transcen-
dence and immanence with regard to God's relation to the world of His 
creation. God could not be conceived as truly infinite in distinction from His 
finite creatures, if He only were transcendent. In that case He would be lim-
ited by His being separate from the world, and precisely by its distinction 
from God the world would then become constitutive of the very identity of 
His being God. Rather, the infinity of God has to be conceived in terms of 
being transcendent as well as immanent in the reality of the world-tran-
scendent in terms of existing in the person of the transcendent Father and 
creator of the world, but immanent and present within it through His Son 
and Spirit. The issue of transcendence and immanence had a prelude in pre-
Christian Jewish thought, in terms of speculations about God's presence in 
the world of His creation through His name and glory as well as through 
His wisdom enshrined in the Torah. The Christian trinitarian doctrine can 
be considered as determining the question of how these forms of God's 
presence in the world are related to His transcendent existence. The answer 
is that they cannot be different from God Himself, if the unity of the one 
God is to be preserved. 
A second remark concerns the personal and impersonal elements or as-
pects in our human conceptions of God. This issue is of particular impor-
tance in the Christian dialogue with the Eastern religions, especially Bud-
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dhism. The great Buddhist philosopher Nishitani Keiji from Kyoto charged 
Christian theology with overemphasizing the personal aspect of the divine 
reality while underestimating its impersonal aspect. While Keiji admitted 
that the divine mystery does have a personal aspect, he was concerned that 
the neglect of its impersonal aspect would dissolve the mystery into anthro-
pomorphism. Now the trinitarian concept of God does in fact include an 
impersonal element. That is the divine essence as such. This one divine es-
sence that makes for the unity of God is not personal by itself, but personal 
only as it becomes manifested in each of the three persons. Correspond-
ingly, each of the personal manifestations is characterized by a movement 
beyond itself, and this is constitutive of the personal mystery in each of 
them. 
Thus the trinitarian doctrine functions as a key to a profound concep-
tion of the life of the one God and enables the Christian to cope confidently 
with other conceptions of the divine reality. 
Is the trinitarian concept of God, then, of only intellectual importance in 
the performance of Christian teaching? Or does it also have an impact on 
our spiritual life? Can one pray to the trinitarian God? Occasionally, this is 
done in Christian worship, as there are prayers that specifically address the 
Son or the Spirit. But most of Christian prayers are directed to the Father, 
albeit through the Son and the Spirit. This is understood by many Christians 
as evidence for the Father alone being God in the most emphatic sense, and 
the consequence is that they think they don't have much use for the Trinity. 
But, in fact, it is not so self-evident to address God as our Father. According 
to Paul, it is only because of our baptism that we are entitled to address God 
like Jesus did as our Father, because we are united to Jesus Christ and there-
fore put in the place of the Son in His relationship with the Father. It is the 
Spirit of Christ received in baptism who encourages us to relate to the Fa-
ther in such a way (Rom 8:15). Thus, in addressing God as Father we partici-
pate in the trinitarian communion of the Son with the Father through the 
Spirit. We not only address God, but we are lifted up into the eternal life of 
the trinitarian God and surrounded by Him on all sides. Taking our trinitar-
ian faith seriously does not require spectacularly new forms of Christian pi-
ety, but deepens our awareness of what we actually do in Christian wor-
ship. When we realize its profound depth, we will no longer feel much im-
pulse to look for alternative forms of spirituality, but may become aware 
that we are already granted access to a profound, mystical experience that 
bears comparison with every alternative. 
Theta Phi 
Talkback Session 
with 
Wolfhart Pannenberg 
Question One: I understand you to be saying that the oneness of God is 
"impersonal" and that this oneness is the basis of defining the coming king-
dom of God, whereas the "personal" character of God is the three persons 
(Father, Son, Holy Spirit) whose history is to be actualized in the world in 
relationship with the history of finite persons. If I heard you correctly in this 
tegard, does this help to explain that difficult statement in your book, Theol-
ogy and the Kingdom of God (p. 56), where you say, "In a restricted but impor-
tant sense, God does not yet exist"? 
Pannenberg: Well, of course this was sort of a daring statement. At the time 
when America was moved by that fad of death of God theologians, some of 
them thought, after all, I might be one of them. Of course, the process theo-
logians also thought that I might be one of them because obviously I was 
thinking that God was not yet quite complete. But this was not what I 
wanted to say actually. I wanted to express that in the present situation of 
the world the issue whether God exists is debated. And there are serious 
reasons for this-especially the reasons of the presence of evil in the world, 
but also others-serious reasons that speak against the affirmation of the re-
ality of God in the experience of the world we live in. And we have to know 
as Christians that this is not just a theoretical matter. This situation that the 
reality of God is debated and debatable in this world will go on to the end of 
time. It will be solved only in the eschatological completion of the second 
coming in the ultimate arrival of the kingdom of God in its fullness. We can-
During his presentation of the annual Theta Phi lectures at Asbury Theological 
Seminary, Woljhart Pannenberg responded to these questions posed by listeners. 
Dr. Pannenberg is professor of systematic theology at the University of Munich. 
THE AsBURY THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL VoL. 46No. 2 FALL 1991 
38 Pannenberg 
not separate the eternal reality of God and the status of the reality of God in 
our world. Because if there is a Creator of the world and the world is not 
dependent on Him, that is contradictory. If there is one God who created the 
world then nothing can be completely independent from that God, even the 
very independence of creatures, as such, has to be dependent on that God. 
And we are not now experiencing this in an unequivocal way. Only by an-
ticipation we do. Thus the kingdom of God has not yet fully arrived and 
thus the being of God has not yet fully arrived. Of course God could have 
not created a world. But if He created a world, and since He did, the divine 
identity of God, the existence of God, is inseparable from His kingdom in 
His creation. And therefore questions of the reality of God in our present 
world also include that only in the end will we know that God has been God 
all along the way and we can confess to this only by anticipating the es-
chatological completion of the kingdom of God in this world. And that is to 
say, by faith. 
Question Two: I came here this morning to ask you a question about Chris-
tology from below in relationship to Barthian Christology from above-but 
I'm impressed to ask you a personal question. Please share with us a bit of 
your personal spiritual travel and what you consider to be the hallmark of 
your life of faith in relationship with God. 
Pannenberg: I could talk about that at length and I have to be very brief 
now. I may refer you to the volume on my theology that has been edited by 
Carl Braaten and Philip Clayton. I wrote a biographical introduction there 
where I refer in some way to what you ask for. 
I was raised as an atheist in the time of nihilism during the years of the 
Nazi regime. I was nourished on Nietzsche's philosophy. But shortly before 
the end of the war, shortly before we had to become refugees from Eastern 
Germany when the Russian Army was moving swiftly into East Germany, I 
had an experience. It was January of 1945, and I took the long way home 
from my piano lessons to the place where we were living. The sun was set-
ting and, though I had experienced many sunsets before, there was a mo-
ment when there was no difference between myself and the light surround-
ing me. This is not easy to describe. It may be the kind of experience that 
young people at the age of sixteen have otherwise (I don't claim uniqueness 
to that experience), but it made me think. It opened me to the mystery of re-
ality. And I experienced this as a kind of vocational call. I didn't know what 
I was called to at that time, but I started to concern myself increasingly with 
philosophy and searching for answers. This is also why, later on, I came to 
be interested in Christianity-largely in order to find out what finally it was 
all about, because I had learned from Nietzsche that Christianity is to be 
charged with everything that went wrong in history. This was how I de-
cided to start studying theology in addition to philosophy. For a long time I 
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wasn't sure whether I would finally end up in philosophy or theology. But 
then the sheer profundity of the content of Christian doctrine kept me 
aboard. So I didn't make a decision of faith in some way, although I had an 
experience of vocation. Later on I came to think that it was not accidental 
that it happened on the sixth of January-the feast of Epiphany. And I came 
to understand the vocation as the vocation to witness to the glory of Jesus 
Christ. And that's what my theology is all about. 
Question Three: My question deals within the context of your lecture on the 
Trinity. I'm interested in hearing you explain to me your concept of God as 
person. 
Pannenberg: The main point is God is not one person. The most widespread 
heresy in modem Christian thought is that God is one person, one personal 
God. That language is at least very misleading, because God is one personal 
God only in terms of existing as three persons. And there is no one personal 
God besides the three persons of Father, Son and Spirit. Those who start 
with the idea of one personal God and consider Father, Son and Spirit as as-
pects of that one personal God consistently end up in modalism. And Barth 
quite frankly said so. There has been a tendency to modalism because one 
wanted to derive the three-foldness of God from the concept of one God 
who was conceived of as mind-and mind is easily understood as personal. 
But that is contrary to the trinitarian dogma. According to the trinitarian 
dogma, the God we believe in is one God in three persons-the one God 
being complete only as Father, Son and Spirit (the Father through Son and 
Spirit as I tried to indicate in the end of my lecture). But this is the way God 
is completely personal. Not just by being one personal God out there some-
where. That is an anthropomorphic idea of God and it rightly fell to the at-
tacks of atheism. 
Question Four: Professor Pannenberg, the Trinity has always been a diffi-
cult doctrine for me and your lecture was really helpful although I'm still 
rather confused. Coming from a Hebrew Christian perspective, it is espe-
cially difficult for me to explore these concepts with other Jewish people 
who do not accept Christ simply because they cannot accept the Trinity. You 
said the trinitarian doctrine includes an element which is impersonal. Is this 
what you mean by the impact of the trinitarian doctrine on the concept of 
God as one? "The impersonal element," the kingdom "transcending each of 
the persons in the Trinity" and also the use of the kingdom and the "divine 
essence" are very abstract concepts for me. Could you clarify this? 
Pannenberg: Well, when I speak of an impersonal aspect in the life of the 
trinitarian God, you must not understand that as if that was some reality in 
itself to be set apart or even prior to the personal But the one God is 
concrete only as Father, as Son, as Spirit. That is, the one God is concrete 
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only in the personal reality of Father, Son and Spirit. But precisely in that per-
sonal reality (and it belongs to the personal reality as we conceive it on the 
basis of the Christian tradition even in application to the human person), 
there is something transcending the person, each individual person, that is 
constitutive of personality itself. This aspect of transcending the individual 
person is at the same time what makes for the communion of the three per-
sons of Father, Son and Spirit. 
And now coming back to the start of the question. In talking to in-
formed Jews, I would always start with the God of Jesus. The God of Jesus is 
the God of Israel. And it is the God of Israel whom Jesus addressed by the 
name Father. And so the God of Israel was understood in a somewhat dif-
ferent way than perhaps ordinarily in Jewish tradition. There is something 
specific in Jesus talking about and addressing the God of Israel as Abba. We 
need to refer to Jesus to explain what this way of addressing God implies. 
Thus, addressing God as Abba is inseparable from the one who addressed 
God that way. Therefore, the one who addressed God that way is insepa-
rable from the very eternal identity of the Jewish God, the Father of Jesus. 
And further, the way Jesus addressed God is not to be understood other 
than through the medium of the Spirit of God-and that according to Jewish 
tradition. It's not an exception, not in every respect an exception, in Jewish 
tradition that the person who is close to God received the Spirit of God in 
order to enable that person to be close to God. So the communion of Jesus as 
the Son with the Father is always already involving the Spirit. But the Spirit 
becomes manifest as a third entity only after the death and resurrection of 
Jesus, after his ascension, by glorifying Jesus as Son in the hearts of the 
faithful. It's not only we as human beings who are recognizing Jesus to be 
the Son of God. It is something that elevates us beyond our finite reality in 
the act of glorifying Jesus to be the Son of the Father and glorifying the Fa-
ther as having sent His son into the flesh in order to save the world through 
the person of Jesus. And that's the work of the Spirit, not just of ourselves. 
And this is the point where the Spirit becomes manifest as an entity of its 
own. But it is always related to the Father as the one God. Thus we can have 
the Jewish God as the one Jesus addressed as Father, not in separation from 
the one who addresses God in this ultimate way. And this is what the doc-
trine of the Trinity is all about. This had a prehistory in Jewish thought. You 
could tell your Jewish friends this. Because the more the one God of Jewish 
faith became transcendent during the time after the exile, the more impor-
tant became those realities that were believed to represent that transcendent 
God within the people of Israel. That is to say within this world. And that is 
the "name" dwelling in the temple, the "glory" dwelling in the temple but 
leaving the temple before the destruction of Jerusalem according to Ezekiel, 
that is the presence of God was leaving the temple to destruction. The 
temple couldn't be destroyed as long as the glory of God was residing in it. 
Therefore, according to Ezekiel it was leaving before the temple could be 
destroyed by the Babylonians. So the glory. Then later on the Shekinah was 
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thought to represent the transcendent God in this world. 
Now the question how do these modes of representing the transcendent 
God in this world relate to the identity of the transcendent God Himself? Is 
it that transcendent God that is also present in His name, in His glory, in His 
wisdom, and so on? Or is it something inferior to the transcendent God? If it 
would be the latter then it is no longer God who is present. And I think this 
issue, which is an issue of Jewish faith itself, has been resolved in some de-
finitive way in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. But it is an issue, a con-
cern that must be a concern of Jewish faith itself and was in fact always a 
concern of Jewish faith itself. How is the transcendent God in His utter tran-
scendence from this world nevertheless present? What are the forms of His 
presence in this world? But then the core point is: the forms of His presence 
couldn't be the form of His presence in reality if they were not identical with 
His divine essence. So in some way the doctrine of the Trinity is implicit al-
ready in the history of Jewish thought. 
Question: Let me follow up on just one particular thing. You said that in 
addressing God as Abba, Jesus is identifying Himself, but not identifying 
Himself as God. 
Pannenberg: That Jesus is not identifying Himself with God is precisely the 
condition of being one with the Father. 
Question: I don't understand that. It seems so paradoxical. 
Pannenberg: Yes, it is somewhat paradoxical. But of course being one with 
the Father is based upon the inseparability of Jesus as the place of address-
ing God as Abba from the definition of what that term actually means. The 
inseparability of the identity of that address from the person of Jesus is the 
basis for affirming the unity of Jesus with the Eternal God, the inseparability 
from the affirmation of God the Father. Now a condition for that is that Je-
sus did not identify Himself with the Father. Because if He had identified 
Himself with God, that would have amounted to the utmost degree of idola-
try. He would have been rightly put to death by his Jewish opponents. The 
utmost degree of idolatry is self-idolization. And we learn especially in the 
Gospel of John that Jesus was understood to identify Himself with God in 
allocating to Himself an authority that could be only God's. And therefore 
this was the basic ambiguity surrounding the earthly ministry of Jesus. And 
only in the solving of that ambiguity could Jesus be confessed as being con-
firmed by the Father over against accusations to that point. And that is the 
precondition of His being in communion with the Father, of His being one 
with the Father. 

Above, Within or Ahead Of? 
Pannenberg' s Eschatologicalism 
as a Replacement for 
Supernaturalism 
LAURENCE W. WOOD 
Supernaturalism became the philosophical assumption of Christian the-
ology during the thirteenth century A.O. The term supernatural was specifi-
cally developed and widely used by Thomas Aquinas and the Scholastics as 
a technical term to describe God as eternally, self-subsistent and hence dif-
ferent in essence from the created, natural order. The term lost its technical 
meaning as it was more generally used outside the classroom and it eventu-
ally became more popularly understood to designate something as beyond 
the normal.1 Because of this secondary meaning, some prefer to use the 
term supra-natural instead of super-natural since supra more precisely con-
veys the original, technical meaning of "above."2 
The Latin term supernaturalis first appeared in the ninth century. John 
Scotus Erigena used it in his translation of the works of pseudo-Dionysius 
from Greek into Latin. He coined this Latin term as a translation for the 
Greek adjective huperphues. The prefix huper (beyond) was used in inference 
to phusis (the nature or essence of reality) to denote something as transcend-
ing the ordinary, visible world.3 Thomas Aquinas featured this term promi-
nently and is largely responsible for its widespread technical use in Chris-
tian theology.4 
If Augustine is credited with providing the standardization of the vari-
ous Christian doctrines for Western Christianity in the fourth century A.o.,5 
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Aquinas in the thirteenth century A.O. is credited with providing a Christian 
metaphysical framework for these doctrines.6 1his distinction between the 
various doctrines of Christian faith on the one hand, and a systematic 
worldview on the other hand, is important to keep in mind because the two 
are not necessarily connected. As Etienne Gilson points out, Thomas Aqui-
nas never intended to alter the essentials of Christian theology itself as inter-
preted by Augustine, but he did intend to change the "bad" philosophy of 
Augustine into a "true" philosophy consistent with Augustine's own theol-
ogy. In fact, Gilson shows that for Aquinas "it is not even necessary for the-
ology to resort to philosophy, but, if it does, the philosophy it uses should 
be the true philosophy."7 
Aquinas accepted Augustinian theology, but he disagreed with its 
largely Platonic trappings. Consequently, he adapted Augustinian theology 
to an Aristotelian ontology.8 The distinction between the natural and the 
supernatural worlds became the fundamental categories for describing the 
relation of God and the world. The purpose of this supernaturalism was to 
provide a more philosophically reasoned worldview in which all the doc-
trines of the Christian faith could be housed and thus they would have an 
intellectual unity supporting them. 
The term supernatural is not found in the Septuagint, nor in the New 
Testament, nor in the early Church Fathers.9 Yet the term is standard cur-
rency in Roman Catholic, Anglican and Protestant theology. Even those the-
ologies which reject supernaturalism depend upon its terminology for ex-
pressing its alternative forms of Christian naturalism. For example, Paul Til-
lich's theology was devoted to providing "ecstatic naturalism" as an alterna-
tive to the supernaturalism of Protestant Orthodoxy.10 In his last public lec-
ture in Chicago, Tillich admitted that his own apologetic theology was too 
heavily dominated by his attempt to provide an alternative theology to su-
pranaturalism.11 It could be argued that all modem and contemporary theo-
logical movements are unintelligible without the supernaturalism which 
they attempt to refute or embrace.12 
THE FAILURE OF SUPERNATURALISM 
The question is whether or not supernaturalism should now be aban-
doned in spite of its venerable history. Until recently, the two basic models 
for defining God's whereabouts have been "above" or "within." The 
"above" model led to supranaturalistic deism and finally to a secularistic 
naturalism which dropped "the aboveness" of God and spiritual realities al-
together since the world "below" was allegedly adequate within itself. The 
supernatural hypothesis was declared irrelevant for modem thought. 
Paul Tillich's critique largely focused on the artificiality of, as well as the 
logical incoherence, of two separate realms. To postulate the idea of a God 
above the world who interferes with, and breaks into, the lower realm below 
would involve the demonic destruction of the created order itself.13 His al-
ternative proposal was a naturalism in which God is located "within" the 
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world as the ground of being. 
The "within" model leads inevitably to pantheistic mysticism in which 
the distinction between God and the world is blurred. Since Schleiermacher, 
all forms of modem theology which reject supernaturalism in favor of natu-
ralism have been hard-pressed to defend themselves against the charge of 
blurring the difference between God and creation. 
Barth attempted to rehabilitate supernaturalism, but his tendency was to 
make God "permanently transcending time,"U and hence rationally inacces-
sible. The further dilemma of Barth's supernaturalism was its excessive 
revelationism, and consequently the relation of reason and faith was seri-
ously damaged. In effect, Barth conceded the point of the atheistic critique 
(expressed by Feuerbach and Nietzsche) which had declared the world de-
void of any rational justification for belief in God. Pannenberg asks: 
But is Feuerbach really overcome in this way? Is it not instead 
merely a case of withdrawing from controversy with Feuerbach and 
his disciples if theology, unperturbed, begins to speak about God as 
if nothing had happened; without establishing any basis, or offering 
any justification for this concept except by referring to the fact that 
Christian preaching about God actually goes on? Is that not 
senseless renunciation of all critical discussion, and thus an act of 
spiritual capitulation to Feuerbach?15 
Pannenberg recognizes the value of taking seriously the critique of mod-
em atheism. Barth's approach of pursuing theology "from above" is like "a 
blind alley" and endangers "the truth of the Christian faith itself and its 
speech about God."16 What is now needed is "a philosophical anthropology 
worked out within the framework of a general ontology" in order to address 
the legitimate concerns of secularistic naturalism.17 
An Anglo-Catholic theologian/philosopher who impressively at-
tempted to rehabilitate supernaturalism is E. L. Mascall. His brilliant exposi-
tion of the classical doctrine of God is found in He Who ls. Yet Mascall ad-
mits that the tendency of the supernatural/ natural distinction is to make the 
two realms only artificially related. He specifically recognizes that "imagery 
of levels .. .is quite inadequate, for it fails to do justice to the intimacy of the 
relation" between the supernatural and natural. He especially criticizes the 
Catholic textbooks for fostering this misunderstanding.18 
With the help of all the intricacies and sophistication of modem sym-
bolic logic, many contemporary analytical philosophers in the Anglo-Ameri-
can tradition have impressively attempted to resolve the ambiguities and al-
leged contradictions of the traditional, supernatural view of a personal 
God.19 However, whether or not the logical tools of analytical philosophy 
can repair the damage done by the atheistic critique is problematic. It may 
be that the atheistic critique too simplistically dismisses and distorts a super-
natural view of God, but the complicated arguments of modem logic used to 
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defend supernaturalism may indirectly serve to reinforce the atheistic 
charge that belief in a personal God is only contrived. 
The supernatural/ natural ontology is a hierarchical/ monarchical/ feu-
dalistic model. Even before Thomas Aquinas featured supernaturalism, clas-
sical theology tended toward Monarchianism in spite of its rejection of this 
heresy.20 For example, Augustine clearly articulated the three persons of 
God, but for all practical purposes he (as well as the Western Church in gen-
eral, as opposed to the Eastern Orthodox tradition) tended toward Mon-
archianism because his primary interest was the unity of God rather than 
the three divine persons.21 
With the subsequent development of a supernatural ontology in Latin 
Scholasticism, the oneness of God became even more specifically interpreted 
in a hierarchical/ monarchical/ feudalistic manner. For God's oneness as a 
feudalistic lord over His subjects was featured rather than the Three Per-
sons. Yet, even so, theology in the Middle Ages did not define God as a per-
son. That would have been considered what we call today a Unitarian her-
esy.22 
Yet this monarchical tendency to exclude the trinitarian persons resulted 
in the heretical, modern redefinition of God as a Person rather than three 
Persons. Tillich points out that this happened /1 only in the nineteenth cen-
tury" with Kant's deistic supernaturalism.23 In this respect, Pannenberg 
points out that in Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant's redefinition of person 
as an independent being with a radically individualized self-consciousness 
became determinative for the modern understanding of person. This abso-
lute understanding of person is anticipated in the fourth century A.D. in 
Boethius' s definition of person as rational individuality, but with Kant the 
ideas of self-consciousness and autonomy became the constitutive element 
in the meaning of person. 24 
The pre-modem view, on the other hand, assumed that the decisive 
component of person was one's capacity to experience community and to 
develop intimate relationships with others. This relational understanding of 
person was decisive for the theological development of a Christian under-
standing of God as three Persons in the fourth and fifth centuries. 
As a result of the absolutizing of individual self-consciousness as the 
meaning of person in the modern world, Tillich says that /1 ordinary theism 
has made God a heavenly, completely perfect person who resides above the 
world and mankind." Tillich agrees with /1 the protest of atheism against 
such a highest person."25 
Pannenberg has traced the development and rise of the modern under-
standing of personhood from the christological and trinitarian doctrines of 
the third and fourth centuries to its culmination in Hegel's philosophy.26 Of 
course, the ultimate source lies in the history of ancient Israel where God 
discloses Himself to Abraham as the personal Lord of history.27 The Old 
Testament idea of God's spiritual transcendence and difference from nature 
was a necessary prerequisite for the development of the understanding of 
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human self-transcendence associated with the meaning of personhood in 
the modem world, as secularist philosophers and psychologists generally 
recognize.28 
Pannenberg has shown how modem atheism in the nineteenth century 
developed as the logical conclusion of Kant's definition of personhood as 
absolute subjectivity. In this respect, Kant, not Descartes, was the father of 
modem subjectivity. For Kant was the first thinker to make individual self-
consciousness not only the basis of our certainty of knowledge (as Descartes 
had done), but also the actual creator and source of the world which we 
know.29 Kant's deistic supernaturalism allowed for both God and humans to 
be autonomous persons and creators. Instead of a relational understanding 
of persons as classically expressed in the doctrine of the Trinity, Kant intro-
duced a new element into the concept of personhood which made self-con-
sciousness the absolute basis of reality itself. The consequence was that the 
practical Monarchianism of Western theology became actual Monarchian-
ism in the deistic supernaturalism of Kant's concept of God. God was now 
defined as an infinite Person. 
Hegel continued and deepened this new idea of God as the Supreme 
Person, and he more specifically replaced the classical terminology of one 
divine substance with one divine subject.30 God is the Absolute Subject, but 
whereas Kant deistically polarized God and the world, Hegel attempted to 
reconcile God and the world through his philosophy of history. Unlike 
Kant, Hegel would not accept the idea of a lifeless Supreme Being who 
dwells outside the sphere of the world. For Hegel, those modem theologi-
ans who accused Spinoza of atheism because he did not believe in a Su-
preme Being had embraced a worse kind of atheism because they affirmed 
the existence of the Supreme Being but denied that human beings could 
really know Him. Hegel rejected Spinoza's pantheism also, and he did so 
precisely because Spinoza's concept of the divine substance did not include 
the idea of God as "the absolute Person ... which constitutes the content of re-
ligious consciousness in Christianity," as Hegel pointedly says.31 Hegel's 
emphasis, then, was that God is a personal Subject, not an impersonal Sub-
stance. 
Hegel also sought to include the Trinity within his doctrine of God's 
personality. So Hegel combined the absolute and the relational understand-
ing of personhood. This culmination of the modem development of person-
hood in Hegel's philosophy is a legitimate extension of the Christian doc-
trine of the Trinity,32 but its primary application to the unity of God instead 
of His Trinity is where the difficulty lies.33 
Moltmann has shown that Barth's concept of God as the divine Subject, 
as opposed to Tertullian' s definition of God as divine Substance, is largely 
borrowed from Hegel's modem redefinition of God as Absolute Personal-
ity. 34 Pannenberg has also shown that Barth's idea of God's revelation as a 
self-revelation is borrowed from Hegel's philosophy of religion where this 
idea first appeared.35Previously, revelation had been largely defined tradi-
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tionally as propositions and information contained in the Bible. 
Though an abstract monotheism which culminates in the idea of God as 
a personal Subject can be traced back to the monarchical tendencies of West-
ern theology, deistic supranaturalism was the penultimate culmination of 
this trend, with modem atheism as the final product. Barth's theology re-
stored an emphasis upon the doctrine of the Trinity, but he so strongly em-
phasized the oneness of God's being that his otherwise proper restoration of 
the Trinity to its rightful place in theology was undermined. This can be 
seen in the way that Barth preferred to speak of God's oneness as a Person 
and to downgrade the Trinity impersonally as modes of being. Moltmann 
calls Barth's abstract monotheism "a late triumph for the Sabellian modal-
ism, which the early church condemned."36 
To summarize, classical theology since Tertullian had defined God' s 
unity as a substance, not as a person. The concept of person was reserved 
for the three persons of God. Yet, the subsequent development of Western 
theology tended, for all practical purposes, to treat the oneness of God con-
cretely as "person" instead of the Trinity as persons. With the rise of Kant's 
rationalistic philosophy of religion, God was specifically defined as a super-
mundane Person. How to reconstruct this supematuralistic, monarchical 
interpretation has been the preoccupation of modem theology from 
Schleiermacher to Barth. 
MODERN ATHEISM AS THE LEFT-OVER REMAINS OF 
SUPERNATURALISM 
The atheistic critique by the left-wing Hegelian, Ludwig Feuerbach 
(1804-1872), focuses upon the arbitrariness of a God who alone possesses all 
the qualities which humans desire but are destined to do without. Beginning 
with Kant's and Hegel's new definition of personhood as the creative, au-
tonomous self, Feuerbach' s projection theory explained that human beings 
created God in their own image rather than God creating human beings in 
His own image. He especially attacked Lutheranism because it pits God as 
" the highest being" against the natural world as if God dwells above us in a 
supernatural world with an air of superiority, while human beings are to-
tally bereft of any goodness or worth. Supposedly our only hope for a 
meaningful life comes as a gift when this angry God is appeased. This con-
descending attitude of a supernatural God whose superiority places Him 
above us destroys the foundation of human happiness, according to Feuer-
bach.37 
Previous to Feuerbach, modem atheism was merely an unproven asser-
tion which grew out of the development of modem natural science and its 
mechanistic picture of the world, as seen in eighteenth-century France. For 
example, Laplace developed a mechanistic system of finite causes which 
were said to be self-sufficient. The mechanistic worldview of classical phys-
ics discarded the idea of a creator and, as such, the supernatural world was 
eliminated. Now, with Feuerbach's critique, modem atheism was provided 
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with its rationale.38 
A further critique of secularistic naturalism, first advanced by Fichte 
(1762-1814) and subsequently reinforced by Feuerbach, was that the idea of 
a God above the world means God is simply another Person who co-exists 
alongside (or above) us.39 If God is a Person who co-exists with us, then He 
is necessarily finite, which is a contradiction to the doctrine of divine perfec-
tion-for personhood means having a specific self<onsciousness, and what-
ever is spedfically present is necessarily finite and limited. 
A further criticism proposed by secularistic naturalism is that the idea of 
a supernatural Person who co-exists above us in another world would mean 
the elimination of human freedom. If God is the present reality and meaning 
of our world, then we are not free to decide what we will make of our lives. 
If God's being is the goal of human destiny and He is totally present in this 
moment as the one who co-exists above us, then there is no room for human 
action based on free choice, since God is totally present as the one who has 
already actualized all potentiality of being.40 In order for human freedom to 
exist, the future must be a decisive component of reality, but the supematu-
ralistic model makes the "present" the essence of reality, and God is thus 
defined as the Timeless, Eternal Now. 
Pannenberg takes seriously the critique of modem atheism. He believes 
it would be "premature" simply to dismiss modem atheism as "hatred of 
God."'1 Its criticisms are acute and must be addressed thoughtfully. In fact, 
Pannenberg is in agreement with the substantive arguments of secularistic 
naturalism. He admits, /1 A being presently at hand, and equipped with om-
nipotence, would destroy such freedom by virtue of his overpowering 
might."'2 
The way out of modem atheism is not "to retreat into a supranaturalistic 
wildlife sanctuary,"63 as Barthian theology does with its divorce between 
faith and reason. Pannenberg sees Barth's theological subjectivism to be a 
surrender to the nihilism of Nietzsche (1844-1900). 
Modem atheism must be understood as the outcome of the rise of hu-
man subjectivity as the criterion of truth, as developed in the philosophy of 
Descartes (1596-1650):" Finally, the atheistic outcome is due to the idea of a 
supematuralistic Absolute Subject (Person) who coexists /1 above" us. The 
atheistic critique of Fichte, Feuerbach and Nietzsche is based on this concept 
of a supramundane Person.45 
Secularistic naturalism refuted the idea of this supematuralistic Subject 
(a divine Person) and replaced it with the autonomous subject (a human 
being). Not God but humans choose what is the truth! This atheistic self-af-
firmation is the inevitable consequence of a metaphysic of the will which 
Barth's subjectivism presupposes.46 
Actually, it is not the subjectivism of Descartes' rationalism and Locke's 
empiricism, or the deistic supernaturalism of Kant, which can be blamed for 
the rise of modem atheism. The seeds were sown in Medieval scholastic the-
ology with the development of a contrived compartmentalization of God 
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above the world who superimposed His will upon the world below. Pan-
nenberg writes: "It is just supranaturalistic thought which turns out in the 
last analysis to have already presupposed Nietzsche's grounding of the 
truth upon the will."47 
"The only way to overcome" modem atheism, Pannenberg observes, "is 
by means of a more radical inquiry into being."" "For theology, this means 
that its concept of God must be thought out in connection with the philo-
sophical question about being if it is to be a match for the atheism of 
Nietzsche."'9 
THE IMPASSE OF THE GREEK AND BIBLICAL IDEAS OF TRUTH 
Pannenberg shows that classical theology defined God's being primarily 
in terms of one who is eternally present at hand, a self-contained Being 
alongside other beings.50 This concept of a transcendent Being was devel-
oped from Greek philosophy with its emphasis that true being is hidden be-
hind the flux of sense-appearances. For the Greeks, true being is that which 
has no beginning and no end and is not affected by the flux of time and his-
tory. This unchanging truth of true being is not subject to the contingent 
events of sense-appearances, and thus true being guarantees the unity of 
truth and the dependability of the world.51 True being is thus timeless and 
without a history, according to Greek thought. 
Pannenberg points out that it is understandable that Christian theology 
combined the true being of Greek thought with the God of the Bible. God is 
absolutely unchanging and reliable because He is the all-embracing truth. 
Yet there are significant differences between the Greek philosophy of true 
being and the biblical view of God. 
First of all, the "Greek dualism between true being and changing sense-
appearances is superseded in the biblical understanding of truth. Here, true 
being is thought of not as timeless but instead as historical, and it proves its 
stability through a history whose future is always open." God is known as 
the all-embracing truth because of the "trustful self-surrender of faith" to 
God who has disclosed Himself in the contingent events of history.52 
Another distinction in the biblical view is that God is personal, in con-
trast to the Greek idea of true being which is an abstract principle. Further, 
the Greek understanding assumes that truth is universally accessible to rea-
son, whereas in the Hebrew understanding the unity and dependability of 
truth is experienced as one trusts in God's faithfulness as He has revealed 
Himself in the contingent events of their history. 
It was not until modem times that the impasse between the Greek con-
cept of truth as timelessness and the biblical understanding of truth as his-
toric was recognized as a serious problem.53 The rise of historical thinking in 
the modem world is the outgrowth of the growing consciousness of the ten-
sion between these two understandings. Pannenberg has shown how the 
idea of truth in the West started with the Greek concept of the timelessness 
of truth which is fully and universally accessible to human reason. Accord-
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ingly, cultural and historical differences are presumably irrelevant to the 
makeup of truth. With the rise of the modem historical consciousness 
(which is itself the outgrowth of a biblical understanding of reality), the 
Greek concept of a timeless truth existing independently in its own right 
was called into question and refuted by secularistic thought. 
The irony is that the penetrating critique developed by modem, atheistic 
secularism is largely indebted to the biblical understanding of reality as his-
tory instead of the Greek understanding of truth as a rational penetration 
into the nature of true being. For example, modem atheism called into ques-
tion the reality of a supramundane Being who lives in a timeless reahn of 
perfection on the grounds that truth-claims are made from the standpoint of 
our historically-conditioned situation. One is not able to simply leap out of 
this world rationalistically or through suprahistoric revelation and make 
truth-claims which are not historically and culturally conditioned. Truth is 
not a matter of timeless, static propositions. 
Equally ironic is that the idea of a supramundane Being who stands 
above or behind the world as the eternally present reality is derived from 
the Greek idea of true being and timelessness rather than from the biblical 
understanding of God as the Lord of history and the power of the un-
bounded future, whereas the atheistic insight that all truth is historically 
conditioned and contingent is ultimately derived from a biblical under-
standing of God who made Himself known through the contingent events 
of history. 
Both the Greek and Hebrew ideas of truth have determined the under-
standing of truth in the West until the present day.54 For the Greeks, truth is 
something that lies under or behind things and is discovered by rational 
probing into their interior depths. For the Hebrews, Hans von Soden has 
shown that "reality is regarded as history" and "truth is that which will 
show itself in the future."55 Ernst Cassirer has also demonstrated that the 
rise of the modem historical consciousness is the product of Christian faith 
itself.56 The irony is that secularistic naturalism has used the biblical insight 
concerning the historicality of truth to criticize and refute the Greek-inspired 
doctrine of supernaturalism. 
Pannenberg points out that the Greek understanding prevailed until the 
modem world, and since the Romantic movement and the rise of the mod-
em historical consciousness the biblical understanding of truth as history 
has been featured. It is no longer possible "rationalistically to separate the 
truth from its historically diverse forms."57 Reason and history together 
form the essence of truth. So the dilemma of the Greek and biblical under-
standing of truth has been highlighted in the modem world with the conse-
quence that the biblical perspective has become more determinative than in 
the pre-modem world. What is true emerges out of our personal and social 
relationships and is thus conditioned through the events of our history. 
This personal/ relational aspect of truth as conditioned by history was 
exaggerated in the subjectivism of Nietzsche, but it demonstrates that the 
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biblical motif of history and its emphasis on the personal character of reality 
has prevailed in the modern world.58 This shows that modern atheism has 
used the insights of the biblical understanding of the decisiveness of histori-
cally conditioned events as a basis for critiquing and refuting classical theol-
ogy's Greek-derived view of God as a supramundane Being. 
Pannenberg has shown that the significance of Hegel's philosophy was 
his penetrating insight into the historical development of truth and reality 
itself. Hegel's philosophy was developed largely as a refutation of Kant's 
deistic supernaturalism.59 It brought into focus a consciousness of the his-
torical development of truth and of the relativity and contingency of history. 
His philosophy of history marked the culmination of the historical move-
ment in the modern world.6() Hegel showed that truth is not something 
which is a finished product existing behind or within the world, but rather 
truth is history, a process. Only at the end of history does the unity and 
wholeness of truth become known.61 His point is that the meaning of each 
event is determined, not by the present or past, but by its future .62 
The shocking thing about Hegel's philosophy was not pantheism. Pan-
nenberg, like many other Hegelian interpreters, believes Hegel affirmed the 
personality of God. Rather, the staggering idea in Hegel was that he defined 
the end of history with his own present situation! Hegel had no open future. 
His eschatology was "radically contemporanized."63 
Pannenberg' s admiration for Hegel lay in his understanding of the his-
torical character of all truth as defined by the future instead of the present or 
past. Pannenberg finds it regrettable that no one since Hegel has posed the 
question of the unity of truth "with a comparable depth."64 Yet modern 
thinking is determined by the consciousness of the historical conditioning of 
all truth-a consciousness which stems from a biblical understanding of 
truth and reality. However, the search for the unity of truth has largely been 
given up by contemporary philosophers since it is apparent that its unity 
could only be seen from the standpoint of the future, and since no one has 
this eschatological perspective, any talk about the unity seems superficial. 
BEYOND THE IMPASSE 
Pannenberg' s theological efforts have been devoted to the development 
of a theology of history which uses Jesus' eschatological message of the fu-
ture of God's reign as a basis for showing how the unity of truth can be af-
firmed and known. He believes the biblical-Christian understanding of truth 
provides the solution to the problem raised by the Greeks concerning the 
unity of truth. Unlike classical theology which defined God's true being ac-
cording to the Greek notion of the timeless present, Pannenberg draws from 
the biblical tradition as the basis for defining God as the power of the 
unbounded future . 
Pannenberg develops the eschatological message of Jesus to show how 
the Greek idea of truth as true being-which is characterized by unity and 
unchangeableness-and the biblical understanding of truth as historical-
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which is characterized by the contingency of events and the openness of the 
future-become one.65 
What has now emerged in recent theological reflection is Pannenberg' s 
new model for perceiving the relation of God and the world. Instead of God 
being "above," or "within" the world, God stands "ahead of" us as the 
power of the unbounded future. God's specific transcendent being and oth-
erness from the world is still affirmed, but His "space" is not above us, or 
within us, but in front of us. He is the attracting, magnetic power of the un-
bounded future who shapes our present. The being of God is not above us as 
an object which we could bypass or overlook; He is not the inner essence of 
all beings as if He were the background within nature. The mode of God's 
being is the unbounded future. The "above" and the "within" model is 
flawed because it pictures God's space as timeless. The "ahead of" model is 
able to do justice both to the specificity of a particular, independent Being 
who is other than this finite world and at the same it is able to picture God's 
space as the unbounded future for whom time is real. 
The idea of history as the sphere of development-along with the 
understanding of the progressive revelation-of God's self in the contin-
gency of events, stands in contradiction to the timelessness of the super-
naturalistic and the pantheistic models. Pannenberg writes: "The idea of the 
future as a mode of God's being is still undeveloped in theology despite the 
intimate connection between God and the coming reign of God in the es-
chatological message of Jesus."66 
Pannenberg has now developed such a model. Pannenberg proposes 
this eschatological worldview as a replacement for supernaturalism. It is not 
an alternative to supernaturalism in the sense that most forms of naturalism 
are attempts to reconstruct Christian theology according to a non-miracu-
lous interpretation which eliminates the activity of a personal God in his-
tory. Rather, Pannenberg's eschatologicalism is an entirely different model 
from the supernatural/natural dichotomy. 
Pannenberg has explained that his "approach to the ontological ques-
tion takes into account the concerns of supernaturalism (in contrast to a self-
sufficient secularist concept of nature), while not yielding to the temptation 
of dualism that is not very well reconcilable to the biblical faith in crea-
tion."67 
Pannenberg thus proposes a new way of thinking about the relation be-
tween God and the world, while maintaining the essential distinction be-
tween an infinite personal Being and the created world. Indeed Pannenberg 
says that any use of the word God which eliminates the idea of a personal 
reality independent from the created world is meaningless.68 
Pantheism dissolves divine personality into a timeless space as an . im-
personal power "within." Supernaturalism elevates God into a space far 
"above" the finite world and depersonalizes the world by alienating human 
beings from their true essence; it suggests that this world is devoid of God 
because God is "above" us. Hence we dwell alone-except as God superim-
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poses Himself from above and enters into relationship with us. Because of 
the unnaturalness of God's presence in the world "below" which this model 
entails, the relationship which He develops with us in this god-forsaken 
world seems forced and unnatural as well. Consequently, the biblical doc-
trine of the divine condescension degenerates into a feeling that God takes a 
condescending attitude toward us, just as the biblical understanding of 
God's transcendence (as the Lord of history) takes on the non-biblical idea 
of a spatial separation of God from us as if He coexists above us. Biblically 
speaking, our aloneness is not due to God's spatial transcendence over us, 
but to the brokenness of our relationship with God as reflected in our dis-
obedience (Genesis 3). It is sin which separates us from a proper relation-
ship to God, not God's cosmologically superior location. 
An eschatological perspective locates God "ahead of" us, leading us to 
our true destiny. Pannenberg writes: "Man participates in God not by flight 
from the world but by active transformation of the world which is the ex-
pression of the divine love, the power of the future over the present by 
which it is transformed in the direction of the glory of God."69 God is really 
present in our world because He relates to us through His Son Jesus whose 
Spirit indwells us. God is not an absentee landlord who has abandoned us. 
Eschatologicalism avoids the schizophrenic split of two worlds to which 
supernaturalism easily succumbed, while at the same time it avoids the flat 
and impersonal (autistic) one-storied world of naturalism. An eschatological 
perspective rejects the idea of different stories or separate realms of being, 
and it further rejects a naturalistic assumption of one static reahn. 
The eschatological model also avoids the charge that human freedom 
cannot be affirmed simultaneously with belief in a personal God, for God is 
not totally present at hand in a timeless reahn. Such a timeless, supramun-
dane Being necessarily excludes the idea of temporal development and 
stands in contradiction to the biblical view of God as the Lord of history. 
The biblical understanding leaves the future open for us as an opportunity 
to participate in the history of God's coming kingdom. Without an open fu-
ture where reality is not yet decided and formed, there can be no freedom. 
But if God is "ahead of" us as the unlimited future, this means time is real 
for God as well as for finite persons. 
The eschatological model also avoids the condescending attitude of the 
monarchical/ supernatural model in which human beings feel the ultimate 
put-down (notice the double meaning of this term) of reality, as if human 
beings are totally depraved and worthless because of their finite humanity. 
It was this perception which led to Nietzsche's ethical refutation of God-
that such a dehumanizing God ought to be killed. Contemporary theologi-
ans, such as Paul Tillich, Thomas Altizer and John Cobb have embraced 
Nietzsche concerning the death of a supernatural/monarchical God.70 Yet 
their alternative to the supernaturalism which they reject is a naturalism 
which obscures God's relation with His creation. 
This atheistic criticism is effectively met in Pannenberg' s eschatological-
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ism with its proposal for a new paradigm concerning God's being which at 
the same time preserves the concerns of supernaturalism. Pannenberg' s 
emphasis is on the trinitarian persons who are presently inviting us to share 
in the fellowship of the coming kingdom of God. God as Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit is actively involved in this temporal process. For this world is 
God's world, not something inherently alien to His true being, and history is 
the field of His action.71 This means God endures the pain of our world and 
through His sufferings we are being reconciled and restored to Himself. 
This is to say, God comes to our situation and gets involved with us in order 
to establish a relationship with us. For it is God's very Self which saves us. 
As Pannenberg puts it, "The salvation that God promises is himself ."72 This 
emphasis that God reveals Himself, not merely useful information about 
Himself, is the significant contribution of Karl Barth to modern/ contempo-
rary theology as Pannenberg has often acknowledged.73 It is knowledge of 
God Himself, of being personally acquainted with God in Jesus through the 
indwelling Spirit, which restores to us our sense of human dignity and feel-
ing of personal worth. 
However, Barth's emphasis on God's Self-disclosure is weakened by the 
notion of a supranatural Being who stands over against this godless world. 
For Barth, this finite, natural world is so different from God that not even 
human language is fit to speak of God's reality. Barth says God has to "com-
mandeer" human speech to say what it is totally unprepared and inade-
quate to say.7' Hence Barth's theology makes excessive use of paradoxical 
language, divorces reason and faith, and labels any type of analogy between 
God and the world as unchristian.75 
The doctrine of the Trinity as formulated in classical theology really 
supports the view that God's being is to be defined in terms of futurity 
rather than in terms of a supramundane Being. For the historical, progres-
sive revelation of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit points us to the fature 
of God who is already enabling us to participate in His coming Kingdom. 
This unbounded future is the place where history will finally become one 
with the essence of God-not pantheistically, but in the sense that God's 
kingdom will be complete. The Book of Revelation described this future 
event as a perfect relationship with God whose immediate presence makes 
everything whole, and God is described in historical terms as "the alpha and 
the omega," "the beginning and the end" (Revelation 20-22). Pannenberg 
thus links the Greek idea of true being, not with "a mere beyond contrasting 
with man's present," but with "the pure futurity of God."76 
In developing his eschatologicalism, Pannenberg is integrating the 
Greek emphasis on truth as a rational understanding of true being with the 
biblical emphasis on truth as a relational understanding of reality as history. 
Unlike the classical Christian tradition which allowed the Greek under-
standing to dominate theological thinking about God's being, Pannenberg 
wants to reassert the priority of the biblical understanding and, more impor-
tantly, Jesus' own teaching as the basis for thinking about God's being. Pan-
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nenberg' s use of the Greek understanding of truth can be seen in the way 
that he seeks rationally to give Jesus' teaching an ontological structure, but 
the substance of that ontological structure is the biblical understanding of 
reality as history. 
AN ESCHATOL(X;ICAL DOCTRINE OF CREATION 
Pannenberg' s eschatological ontology is exegetically based in Jesus' 
message on the imminent Kingdom of God. He takes seriously the well-
known tension between the "already" and "not yet" aspects of the Kingdom 
of God. Pannenberg sees this tension to mean both future and present are 
"inextricably interwoven." 77 God's Kingdom is not merely some future cos-
mic event while human beings simply wait and endure for its arrival. 
Rather, the present is pregnant with meaning because God, who is the 
power of the future, extends His rule in the present. This means the present 
is the effect of the future. God, as the power of the future, has acted deci-
sively in His Son whose message, life and destiny have eschatological sig-
nificance for all people. 
This presupposition of the coming Kingdom for theological reflection 
holds in utter seriousness the cosmic and historical implications of Jesus' es-
chatological message. This eschatological future cannot be simply narrowed 
down existentially to mean that one should appropriate the possibilities of 
human existence, as Bultmann does. Nor must it be reduced to the idea of a 
mere ethical attainment on the part of human beings as though they could 
bring about the Kingdom of God on earth by the means of their own initia-
tive, as classical liberal theology maintained.78 Jesus' teaching on the immi-
nent kingdom of God means "this future is expected to come in a marvelous 
way from God himself; it is not simply the development of human history 
or the achievement of God-fearing men," Pannenberg insists.79 
Furthermore, the uniqueness of Jesus' eschatological message consisted 
not in His mere preaching concerning the coming of God's Kingdom on 
earth, but rather that the presence of this coming Kingdom was now already 
happening in His person, thus showing that the present is to be seen in the 
light of the future and that Jesus Himself as God's Son is the pre-actualiza-
tion of the future . 
This brings us to Pannenberg' s idea of an eschatological doctrine of 
creation.80 The ontological implication of Jesus' eschatological message sug-
gests a reversal in the traditional understanding of the time sequence. Crea-
tion does not simply stand at the opposite pole of eschatology within the 
time spectrum. Rather, theology should speak of a "creative eschaton," 81 
thereby showing that the temporal beginnings of the history of the world 
eventuate from the future and that God as the power of the future is crea-
tively directing the course of history toward the ultimate inauguration of 
His Kingdom. 
This means creation should not be seen from the perspective of a mere 
primordial beginning. Both creation and eschatology are "partners in the 
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formation of reality."82 This means the future provides the basis for inter-
preting the meaning of every event in the present. "At present a being is 
'something,' a unity in itself, only by anticipation of its unifying future. The 
future interprets the present and the past; all other interpretations are help-
ful only to the degree that they anticipate the future." 83 
This eschatological understanding is the "resounding motif of Jesus' 
message."" To speak of the Kingdom of God is to speak of the rule of God. To 
speak of the rule of God is to speak of the being of God, since His rule cannot 
be thought of apart from His existence. To speak of the being of God in con-
nection with the rule of God is to speak of the power of God, for it is through 
the power of His being that He rules. And, since Jesus' eschatological mes-
sage proclaimed both the "already" and the "not yet" aspects of the King-
dom of God, it can be said "in a restricted but important sense, God does 
not yet exist. Since his rule and his being are inseparable, God's being is still 
in the process of corning to be."85 In this way, Pannenberg is showing that 
the oneness of God's being is linked primarily with the corning Kingdom of 
God in history, while the three persons of the Trinity are the concrete reali-
ties of the one God (as opposed to the abstract oneness of God). History is in 
process of moving toward its goal in the being of God (that is, we will be in-
corporated into the life and being of God), but of course we will not become 
pantheistically one with the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. In this way, Pan-
nenberg points out that it is in the eschaton that God's rule shall be univer-
sally established at which time it can be said that the goal of history will be 
attained, thus showing the end of history will be one with the essence of 
God. 
To speak of the eschatological future of the kingdom of God is not to 
eliminate the reality of God's presence and rule in the present. Present es-
chatological existence is available to human beings because the eschatologi-
cal future has proleptically occurred in Jesus of Nazareth, whose redemp-
tive life effected our reconciliation with God. Or, to put it otherwise, salva-
tion is available to us today because the future of God's Kingdom in which 
God reigns supremely and universally has been unveiled in Jesus' eschato-
logical message and person, and those who accept His message of forgive-
ness also accept Hirn. It is through His cross and resurrection that Jesus' 
person and message are seen to be interrelated. Thus, those who believe in 
Jesus already participate in the corning Kingdom of God.86 
To speak of the corning Kingdom of God is not to degrade the past. For 
God as the power of the future rules the past as well as the present. This 
means to speak of God as the power of the future is to speak of His eternity. 
To be sure, eternity is not a timeless reality. It is not the unchanging, primor-
dial and eternal present of Platonic philosophy. Neither is God "the concept 
of a timeless ground of being in the depths of reality, in the background of 
the realm of being."87 Rather, time is implicit in the very essence of God.88 
This means that only in the actualization of the future-i.e., in the eschaton 
when God's Kingdom shall become a concrete and universal reality-will 
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history be one with the essence of God. Only then will God's self revelation 
be direct, for both His will and purpose will be communicated in an unbro-
ken and direct manner. In philosophical terms, this means subject and object 
will be identical, that what-is will be fully revealed in what-appears, that the 
one who communicates and what is communicated will be identical. 
In contrast to Whitehead, who posits the idea of a development in God 
because of His involvement in time, Pannenberg sees the futurity of God's 
Kingdom to mean that what truth is in the present will be decided from the 
standpoint of the future. But this does not mean that God undergoes a de-
velopment in His essence. Rather, when the goal of history has been accom-
plished, it will be seen that what is true then was true throughout the move-
ment of time.89 
Pannenberg is not suggesting that God merely relates Himself to finite 
human beings as the power of the future, but that God is in Himself the 
power of the future. This means God is pure freedom.90 However, without 
the concept of the future there can be no concept of freedom or personhood. 
In this respect, only if human beings have a future do they have freedom. 
Openness to the future is a fundamental feature of freedom and individual-
ity. This means we are free to the extent that we can transcend ourselves 
and thus transform and go beyond the present. In contrast to us, God is 
pure freedom because there is no future beyond Him. He is the unbounded 
future. 
This idea of the personality and freedom of God is distinguished from 
Paul Tillich's belief that God is not a being or a person but Being itself, the 
Ground of Being and "the ground of everything personal."91 However, Pan-
nenberg points out that unless God is thought of as an independent Being 
with personality, the concept of God is meaningless.92 Pannenberg shows 
that God is the power of Being because He is the power of the future and 
thus pure freedom. "Being is itself to be thought of from the side of the fu-
ture, instead of as the abstract, most universal something in the background 
of all beings."93 Since God (as Being) is the power of the future, this suggests 
His eternity. 
In this respect, Pannenberg calls for a revision of the Greek idea of eter-
nity (as the eternal present) . Since God exists as the final future, then the 
idea of eternity may be defined as "the totally comprehensive present."94 In 
this way, the concept of eternity includes the element of change and time in-
stead of static permanence and timelessness. 
From our finite perspective it can be said that "the eschaton is eternity in 
the fullest sense."95 Eternity refers to the existence (or Being) of God. And 
since in the eschaton it is the essence of God to exist, the past, present and 
future are merged into one. This means the eschaton is the arrival of the 
Kingdom of God. To be sure, God's existence has been from eternity and He 
has always remained the same because in His pure freedom He exists as the 
final future. But for finite man, God's essence does not yet fully exist. It is 
only in the eschaton that God's essence will be directly seen to exist. 
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By emphasizing the futurity of the Kingdom of God which will disclose 
the essence of God, it should be reiterated that this does not devalue the 
present. Nor does it adopt any form of theological agnosticism. To be sure, 
our knowledge of God's revelation can be ascertained historically as it is re-
ported in the biblical tradition, and thus our relationship to God through Je-
sus of Nazareth is no pious self-delusion. But, our objective knowledge (in-
sight) of God's self-revelation is only indirect and partial, and can only be 
direct and complete in the eschaton. On the other hand, our experience of 
God through faith in Jesus is direct and immediate, for fellowship with Je-
sus "really mediates and assures salvation," Pannenberg writes.96 
He further writes: "He who believes in Jesus has salvation in Jesus 
whom he trusts, without regard to the question how it stands with his his-
torical and theological knowledge of Jesus," though of course one must at 
least presuppose the message of Jesus is true.97 
The distinction between God's indirect and direct self-revelation (or 
stated otherwise, the distinction between the "already" and the "not yet" of 
the kingdom of God) can be further illustrated in the philosophical distinc-
tion of appearance and reality. The unity and difference between appear-
ance and reality has been a subject of considerable debate in the history of 
philosophy. Without developing all the problems and issues connected with 
this debate in this article, it is evident that Pannenberg' s epistemology is a 
realism (as opposed to idealism and positivism) because he defines appear-
ance as a truthful disclosure of what is real. What-appears is what-is, 
though at the same time it must be said that what-is is not exhausted in 
what-appears. Reality appears in more than one event, and yet reality is 
more than its appearances. This does not suggest that appearance is mere 
semblance. Rather, what-is really appears. Pannenberg writes: "Connected 
with the possibility of manifold appearance of one and the same eidos is the 
fact that it exhausts itself in none of its appearances. There always remain 
other ways in which 'the same' eidos could appear."98 
Insofar as the kingdom of God is concerned, it has already appeared in 
the ministry of Jesus. In His person, the coming Kingdom of God has al-
ready commenced in the world, though at the same time the present appear-
ance of the reality of the Kingdom of God does not exhaust its futurity. This 
is to say, the reality of the kingdom of God has already made its appearance, 
even though this appearance is to be differentiated from its reality. Only in 
the eschaton will the reality of the kingdom of God be identical with its ap-
pearance. 
This distinction between the present appearance and the future reality of 
the Kingdom of God corresponds to the distinction between God as Father 
and Jesus as Son. That the Kingdom of God has appeared means that the 
reign of God was begun on earth in the person of Jesus. This means "that 
God himself had uniquely and definitely appeared in Jesus without the dif-
ference between Jesus and God himself being thereby dissolved."99 Thus, 
the arrival of the future reality of the Kingdom of God in the present means 
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that God joined Himself to the finite by making His appearance in Jesus, 
though without restricting the reality of Himself to His appearance in Jesus. 
Pannenberg writes: "The distinctive characteristic of the message of Jesus is 
that the future of the rule of God is not separated from the present as still 
outstanding, but that precisely as the future it becomes the power that deter-
mines the present and thus comes to appearance in the present."100 Stated 
philosophically, this means appearance is the partial arrival of the future. 100 
It is this combined unity and difference in appearance and reality that 
places the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation at variance with the ancient 
oriental religions in which any certain form of the deity's appearance was 
inconsequential because its appearance constituted no essential unity with 
the god. Because of this separation of appearance and reality, the mythical 
god could "appear" in as many forms as it wished, for its appearance was 
nonessential to its being. Likewise, in Platonic philosophy appearance was 
nonessential to true being. Such is not the case with the idea of the Incarna-
tion. The appearance of God in Jesus of Nazareth means His essential unity 
with God, thus suggesting that appearance and essential presence coincide. 
This inseparable interaction between appearance and reality illustrates the 
doctrine of the Incarnation in which there is the inseparable connection be-
tween Jesus as the appearance of God and the reality of God.102 
Thus, the significance of the appearance of God in Jesus is that His ap-
pearance is an enduring present appearance because it is the essential pres-
ence of the unlimited future. Theologically stated, the reality of God as the 
unbounded future has appeared in Jesus of Nazareth, and this appearance is 
a permanent and enduring present because it is the appearance of the ultimate 
reality of the future (i.e., God). 
The obvious implication of such an "enduring present" is that in Jesus 
of Nazareth we have the finality of God's revelation so long as history is still 
hastening toward the eschaton. This is to say, if the reality of God has ap-
peared in Jesus, then He is the anticipation of the ultimate future which is 
God. And, if the appearance of Jesus is the arrival of what is the ultimate 
future, then no other event can surpass the Christ-event without involving 
itself in a logical contradiction. To be sure, God continues to work in history, 
but He does not reveal Himself in any fundamentally new manner (i.e., if 
the appearance of Jesus is really the arrival of God as the power of the fu-
ture).103 
Pannenberg thus offers an ontological perspective which (1) identifies 
reality with the comprehensive .whole of history rather than with the un-
changing, primordial, eternal present of Platonic philosophy; (2) interprets 
the transcendence of God eschatologically rather than supernaturally; and 
(3) understands the being of God socially rather than monarchically. 
ANSWERING OBJECTIONS 
Pannenberg, in responding to some of his critics, shows that to affirm 
"that reality is history hastening toward an End" does not mean that history is 
' 
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merely the external exhibition of a logically fixed Idea (as in Hegel), for this 
in effect would reduce history to the nonessential insofar as anything really 
new occurring.104 Rather, history as it moves toward its goal in the eschaton 
in fact undergoes further development which includes modifications and 
transformations of present reality.105 Despite this contingency and inconclu-
siveness of history, to think in terms of the whole of reality is an inescapable 
fact of life, even though it is usually done unreflectively.106 
Pannenberg does not assert, however, that one can attain absolute 
knowledge as though he would be able, on the basis of present experience, 
to comprehend the whole of history.107 But he does argue that the whole of 
reality can be historically mediated provisionally and proleptically on the 
basis of God's activity in the world. 
Pannenberg acknowledges his indebtedness to Hegel's insights concern-
ing the idea of a universal history, but he denies that he is a Hegelian be-
cause Hegel failed to appreciate the biblical understanding of an open fu-
ture which has been provisionally and proleptically revealed in the history 
of Jesus. He further insists that the origin of the idea of universal history is 
in the biblical tradition itself.108 
In asserting that it is history as the whole of reality that reveals the es-
sence of God, Pannenberg does not intend to suggest that the infinite is re-
duced to the finite or that God is identical with the process of history itself. 
But neither is God to be thought of as a timeless, static Being. Rather, He is 
creatively active in the process of history. He is the power of the future who 
works in the present in order to usher in His Kingdom. This is not to local-
ize the infinite in the finite. Neither is it to adopt "an exclusive immanence" 
(which is itself a contradiction in terms)109 as opposed to a transcendency. 
Pannenberg explains that "history is not the field of a finitude which is en-
closed within itself, an 'immanence' to which one could and indeed would 
have to oppose a 'transcendence.'" Instead, Pannenberg shows that history 
is "the ongoing collapse of the existing reality which is enclosed in its own 
'immanence' (because centered on itself). The power of the infinite is active 
and present in this collapse of the finite." 110 Thus, history is not merely the 
sum total of what human beings have done and suffered. Neither is history 
merely the creation of human beings. What human beings are and what 
they create is finite, but history in this sense is not finite. "Rather, it accom-
plishes the crisis of the finite throughout time. Hence man shows himself to 
be finite in his history."111 
Pannenberg further points out that history is not itself self-explanatory 
apart from the transcendent reality of God who chooses to make Himself 
known in history. If history were thought of as being "wholly other" from 
the reality of God, then there would be no purpose in speaking of God, if 
history in this respect · were complete and comprehensible without Him. 
"Only because the infinite reality, which as personal can be called God, is 
present and active in the history of the finite, can one speak of a revelation 
of God in history. For it is thereby concretely shown that the finite is not left 
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to itself ."112 
nus is not to say that history reveals God as an inference, as though this 
would constitute a cosmological proof for the existence of God correspond-
ing to the Greek idea of a timeless cosmos from which one infers the exis-
tence of one God. Rather, God is "immediately perceptible to men" because 
He makes Himself known, and thus this knowledge "is not first discovered 
upon reflection by means of an inference."113 
SOME FINAL PERSONAL COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
Most Evangelicals have appreciated Pannenberg' s theology of Jesus' 
resurrection, but they have also been skeptical of his historical/ critical 
methodology because of its apparent anti-supernaturalism. Daniel Fuller 
was one of the earliest American Evangelicals to embrace Pannenberg' s the-
ology, but he disagreed with its non-supernatural worldview.114 
What Fuller and others fail to appreciate is that Pannenberg is not an 
anti-supernaturalist in the sense which many theologians are (like Paul Til-
lich), but rather he wants to preserve the essential truth of supernaturalism 
with its emphasis on God's transcendence and divine otherness. Further, 
Pannenberg' s replacement of supernaturalism with eschatologicalism is not 
linked to any hesitancy to embrace miracles. Rather, he objects to the idea 
that miracles are interruptions from above. In this respect, Pannenberg is 
closer to Augustine's view of miracles than Aquinas's. Augustine inter-
preted miracles as a normal result of God's presence in creation as opposed 
to Aquinas who saw miracles as superimposed on the created, natural order 
from above.115 For Pannenberg every event is a miracle because of God's per-
sonal and intimate involvement with His creation. Pannenberg will not al-
low for a supernatural/ natural dichotomy. 
Some Evangelical theologians in America describe themselves as Prot-
estant in their theology, but Thomistic in their metaphysic.116 Some find little 
in Thomistic theology or Thomistic metaphysics which they like,117 but con-
tinue to use the supernatural/natural categories of Thomism. In fact, almost 
no one in conservative, Evangelical circles would question the validity of 
supernaturalism-a situation for which they really have Thomas Aquinas 
largely to thank. 
I find myself thankful for the clarifying function of the supernatural 
model, especially during my own seminary student days. With no alternate 
model available which could help put the biblical doctrines into a meta-
physical framework, supernaturalism has been a most important intellectual 
tool for enabling me to appreciate the mystery and reality of a transcendent, 
self-sustaining God who created the world ex nihilo. And I have found 
supernaturalism helpful as a teaching aid for enabling my students to grasp 
the difference between a biblical understanding of God and the various sub-
biblical views which obscure God's difference from creation. It also pro-
vided for a more sophisticated way of interpreting the figurative language 
in the Bible of a three-storied universe of heaven above us with God in the 
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"highest heaven" (2 Chron 6:18) and hell beneath us. 
Yet my students repeatedly found it difficult to understand how we 
could speak of God's revelation if He is really separated from the world in 
another world above us. To qualify God's "aboveness" as not really mean-
ing that He was entirely above us leaves unanswered the question of what is 
meant by the difference between God and the world. To appeal to the 
analogical nature of religious language (of Thomism) as a basis for explain-
ing the relationship was to admit we should not seek for an answer, but just 
take it on faith! Of course God is ultimately mystery and incomprehensible, 
and our explicit knowledge of His reality is limited. (That is why in worship 
our language becomes doxological!) So our tacit knowledge of God exceeds 
our explicit knowledge. But the supernatural model obscures our under-
standing of how God can be known as a real presence in our world, if He 
dwells cosmologically above us. 
Instead of a Thomistic doctrine of analogical language, Pannenberg be-
lieves that Michael Polanyi' s distinction between tacit and explicit knowl-
edge, along with his emphasis on the personal/ religious nature of human 
language in general, is a more fruitful way of explaining the nature of theo-
logical language.118 This avoids the logical difficulty associated with the doc-
trine of the analogy of being-that our words are forced to speak of two 
separate realms at the same time. Analogical language is vulnerable to the 
charge that its speech is equivocal and artificial, whereas Polanyi' s analysis 
of the tacit dimension suggests a model which maintains that human words 
are inherently religious ("user friendly") and readily facilitate an under-
standing of spiritual realities. The theological task of developing a more ex-
plicit understanding of our tacit knowledge of God does not require an arti-
ficial linkage between the supernatural and the natural. Human speech is 
first and foremost religious in its essence and can be further refined by phi-
losophers and theologians to accommodate a more precise and explicit un-
derstanding of the religious dimension. On the other hand, a Thomistic con-
cept of analogical language, with its assumption that human words must be 
lifted beyond their natural meanings and given a supernatural denotation, 
resulted in the secularistic rationalization of language-as if words are in-
herently secular. Pannenberg' s early research into the history of religious 
language convinced him of the essentially religious nature of human 
speech.119 
I must express my appreciation for the Thomistic doctrine of analogical 
language. It has been a helpful model for my students to avoid fundarnen-
talistic literalism. I have used it along with Polanyi' s tacit/ explicit model of 
knowing. Only recently has it occurred to me that the two models are in-
compatible because they assume different ontological models. 
The reason for the virtual demise of classical orthodox teaching in major 
centers of learning today is often attributed to the rationalistic presupposi-
tions of Enlightenment thinking, but it can be argued that the apparent logi-
cal contradiction of supernaturalism-which both its and oppo-
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nents have defended and assailed-may in part be the real culprit. Father 
Henri De Lubac even admits that secularism is a consequence of the dualis-
tic tendency of supernaturalism itself.120 
As a creative response to Kant's rationalism, Schleiermacher, the father 
of modem theology, has been blamed for charting the future course of the-
ology down the road of self-destruction,121 but clearly he was seeking to find 
a way of interpreting the doctrines of Christian faith which did not succumb 
to the inherent logical conundrums of supematuralism.122 His reformulation 
of Christian doctrine seriously wounded orthodoxy, and it has never recov-
ered. Perhaps if Schleiermacher had worked from a different model than his 
"pantheistic" one, and if he had focused his attention on the need to revise 
an ontological model which was more in accord with the biblical under-
standing of God, then the subsequent course of modem and contemporary 
theology might have been quite different. 
Is it right for us to blame the rationalistic presuppositions of Kant and 
Enlightenment thought in general for the demise of orthodoxy? To be sure, 
theology since Kant cannot be understood except as an attempt to come to 
terms with his bifurcated metaphysic which polarized the relations of God 
and the world. But perhaps the blame for the demise of orthodox Christian 
doctrines may be more directly related to the supernaturalism in which 
orthodoxy was enmeshed and less to the actual assaults of Enlightenment ra-
tionalism. Kant was only attempting to work out more consistently the 
philosophical implications of his own pietistic/ orthodox training, and in the 
process of doing so he sought to replace the logical incoherence of orthodox 
supernaturalism itself with his deistic supernaturalism. 
Unfortunately, the orthodox doctrines of classical Christianity and the 
supernaturalism which eventually came to surround those doctrines have 
not been sufficiently distinguished with the consequence that orthodox doc-
trines have often been thrown out along with supernaturalism. What has 
thus emerged, as a result of confusing a supematuralistic ontology as the 
necessary presupposition for understanding the major doctrines of the 
Christian faith, have been largely ineffective or unduly complex rehabilita-
tions of supernaturalism, or various forms of so-called Christian naturalism 
which eliminate the essential doctrines which make Christianity truly Chris-
tian. 
The final implication of supernaturalism may well itself be secularistic 
naturalism which denies the spiritual dimension altogether. And so long as 
supernaturalism is still the inherent intellectual framework of Christian doc-
trines, the secularistic and atheistic critique of Christian faith will continue 
to hold. 
But the collapse of supernaturalism into secularistic naturalism may not 
prove itself to be the final word. While the secular critique of supernatural-
ism has validity, secular naturalism may inevitably collapse under the 
weight of its own critique of supernaturalism. For secular naturalism may 
Above, Within or Ahead Of? Pannenberg's Eschatologicalism 65 
be able to survive only in reference to the supernaturalism which it cri-
tiques. 
Paul Tillich points out that modem atheism is not paganism; rather, it is 
"anti-Christian in Christian terms."123 In this respect, modem atheism is re-
ally a Christian heresy. 
Perhaps the next step beyond secularistic naturalism (if supernaturalism 
were wiped out) is a revitalized paganism? For the humanistic values which 
secular naturalism wants to preserve cannot be intellectually substantiated 
on the same grounds that it says belief in God cannot be accepted-namely, 
such secularistic values are a mere illusion based on mere psychological 
need. 
The point here is that perhaps supernaturalism may not be an essential 
component of the orthodox doctrines of Christian faith. In fact, it may be an 
artificial imposition which Christian faith should dispense with. Perhaps the 
critique of supernaturalism by secularistic naturalism has performed a use-
ful service for Christian faith by exposing the logical-theological incoher-
ence of a bifurcated worldview. 
There may be some truth then to the Death-of-God theology of the 
1960s, as well as process theology which has praised Nietzsche for his bold 
declaration that the God of supematuralistic theism is dead. Nietzsche's in-
sight was his perception that a personal God who is so totally other from the 
world cannot be taken seriously by human beings whose daily concerns are 
related to personal survival and existential meaning. Such interference by an 
alien authority only stifles human happiness and leads to a negation of the 
importance of this world. In defense of human dignity and worth, Nietzsche 
opposed an unethical concept of a tyrannical God who arbitrarily superim-
posed His will on frail human beings dominated by fear and guilt. 
Of course, supernaturalism did not intend to imply such a truncated 
and bifurcated view of God and the world. Yet, inadvertently, it did lead 
(perhaps inevitably) to such-an extreme dualism. The doctrine of the Trinity 
with its emphasis on the temporal development of a historical revelation of 
God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit who are intimately involved in a loving 
and redeeming way in the affairs of this world stands in contradiction to a 
supematuralistic distancing of God from the world. -
What creates spiritual distance from God? Is it God's spatial transcen-
dence above us in another, alien world? Is this natural world to be despised 
and downgraded because it is totally depraved and devoid of any inherent 
goodness? Is it God's spatial distance from us that defines His holiness and 
our sinfulness? This misconception of God's relation to the world, which 
supernaturalism fosters in spite of itself, is what causes Schubert Ogden to 
say that "supematuralism. . .is in principle an inconsistent and self-stultifying 
position."124 
It is significant that the concept of a supernatural distancing of God 
from the world emerged in the feudalistic society of the Middle Ages where 
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landowners (lords) lived in isolated and well-protected castles, separated 
from the rest of the human community. In contrast to the self-serving, tyran-
nical power of a feudal lord is the shepherding concept of the Lord in the 
Old Testament (Ps 23:1). Also, the Medieval development of a supernatural 
ontology which implies tyrannical loftiness over the world is essentially 
contradictory to its own theology of the God of history whose lordship en-
tails friendship with His subjects ("I will dwell among the people of Israel, 
and will be their God," Exod 29:45). The biblical imagery of God being high 
and lifted up (Isa 6:12) expresses God's moral, qualitative difference from 
sinful humanity, rather than a literal, spatial separation of God above the 
natural world. The history of salvation was the overcoming of this distance 
in Jesus of Nazareth. 
The spatial imagery in Scripture is largely relational in meaning. For ex-
ample, Jesus' ascension to His Father is a figure of speech to indicate that 
Jesus would take up a new relationship with His people through the Pente-
costal outpouring of His Holy Spirit. The interpretation of Jesus' ascension 
which implies that God resides above or outside the natural universe in a 
supernatural realm contradicts the relational intent of the biblical spatial im-
agery. The essential meaning of the ascension is not God's removal of Him-
self from us, but rather that a deeper and closer relationship to God is now 
possible because He dwells "within" His people ijohn 14:17, Acts 1 and 2). 
The spatial imagery of the "descent" of the Holy Spirit is a corollary to the 
imagery of Jesus' "ascent" to heaven. Of course, this spatial imagery implies 
divine transcendence, but a supernatural ontology is not the only way to 
interpret it. 
This concept of God dwelling "within" us through the giving of His 
Spirit to the Church is, of course, not a pantheistic mysticism, for God is 
other than the world. He transcends us as the power of the unbounded fu-
ture, but He is immanent because He, as the Future, determines the present 
course of history. He is infinite; we are finite. We are not distant from God 
because He is too lofty for us and has to separate Himself from us on a 
higher plane. Rather, what creates spiritual distance from God whose pres-
ence (space) no one can escape (not even in hell, Ps 139:8) is our sinfulness 
and rebellion against the only possible Source of our being and meaningful-
ness. It is spiritual distance, not spatial distance, which creates fear and 
makes us sinners. 
That we "feel" distance from God proves that our problem with es-
trangement from God is a spiritual separation, not a spatial absence of God. 
If God's absence was spatial, we would not feel it as such. We would simply 
be ignorant of His reality. This is the problem with Barth's supernaturalism: 
that the natural world is so spatially empty of God that any religious feeling 
is tinged with human arrogance and is the product of an anthropocentric at-
tempt to create God in our own image.125 Hence Barth's capitulation to 
Feuerbach! 
To be sure, God in His triune being is ontologically different from hu-
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mans. God alone is self-existent. This is the insight which supernaturalism 
rightly seeks to capture, but as a model of what is true being, supernatural-
ism fosters an inherent, self-deprecating attitude as if we are unworthy hu-
mans because we are spatially isolated from God in a lower level of 
(un)reality. 
During my doctoral studies, Wolfhart Pannenberg was just beginning to 
make headlines as a young, contemporary theologian who defied labels and 
who was calling for a new way of doing theology which would provide for 
a better understanding of the significance of the God of Jesus. I particularly 
was impressed with his historical defense of the resurrection of Jesus of 
Nazareth. Most Evangelicals have welcomed his closely reasoned and bril-
liant argument for the empty tomb and the reality of the appearances of the 
risen Lord.126 
I was also particularly impressed with his eschatological worldview, 
though I was not sure what to think about his apparent anti-supernatural-
ism. It was clear that he believed in the distinctly personal character of a 
transcendent God and he affirmed the reality of the miracle of the Resurrec-
tion. I was aware that his remarks against supernaturalism were mostly di-
rected against its two-story approach which pitted each against the other. 
And I concurred with his rejection of that particular form of supernatural-
ism. 
So I found myself using both a Thomistic model of supernaturalism and 
Pannenberg' s eschatological ontology as if they could both be incorporated 
as supplementary views. What suddenly dawned on me (following Pannen-
berg' s visit to our Asbury Theological Seminary campus) is that the two 
views are mutually exclusive, even though Pannenberg' s interpretation of 
Christian doctrines are indeed largely, though not completely, compatible 
with classical orthodoxy. My growing conviction is that all the major doc-
trines of traditional Christianity (including the doctrines of biblical inspira-
tion and the Virgin Birth, in contrast to Pannenberg' s own views on these 
doctrines) are best understood from an eschatological perspective rather 
than a supernaturalist one. 
To understand the implications of Pannenberg' s bold, provocative, crea-
tive and apparently biblically based model of reality will require much more 
time and careful attention by Evangelicals. For now, we can be grateful for 
his considerable theological contribution. Process theologian John Cobb has 
said: "It is doubtful that there is another thinker alive today who is as com-
prehensive in the command of wide-ranging disciplines as Wolfhart Pan-
nenberg." Cobb thinks Whitehead was the greatest philosopher who ever 
lived, and "on the process side, only Whitehead himself can compare with 
Pannenberg." Cobb further comments: "The single most sustained and thor-
oughgoing embodiment of this theological response to the decay of moder-
nity is that of Pannenberg. Pannenberg has rethought the relation of Christi-
anity and the Enlightenment profoundly and brilliantly."127 
We can look ahead (to use a good Pannenbergian concept!) to his sys-
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tematic theology which is just now being translated into English. 128 My per-
sonal expectation is that his eschatological model as a paradigm shift from 
supernaturalism may well serve as a new beginning for theology (not unlike 
the new beginning which Schleiermacher' s liberal theology initiated). If so, 
then we can expect a resurgence of the importance of systematic theology 
which has been slighted by neglect or disdained by our pietistic traditions 
both among those who are conservative and liberal. 
More importantly, this new model for understanding the reality of God 
is an opportunity for Evangelicals in particular to seize the theological mo-
mentum and take the leading role in shaping the way the Church thinks and 
believes. Evangelicals now have had developed for them a more appropri-
ate onto-theological framework in which the orthodox beliefs can best be 
understood. The time has come to get off the see-saw of supernaturalism/ 
naturalism and affirm with theological and biblical integrity the coming 
kingdom of God! Instead of a defensive posture of attacking our past ene-
mies who have compromised the faith, we have before us a challenge to re-
think our theology in ways which may prove to be more intellectually com-
pelling and spiritually renewing. 
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Wolfhart Pannenberg: 
Reason, Hope and 
Transcendence 
STANLEY GRENZ 
In the 1960s, the German systematic theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg 
was hailed as a proponent of the emerging theology of hope. Pannenberg 
has never been keen on accepting that label for himself. His aversion is cor-
rect, in that his program moves beyond the original intent of that theology; 
nevertheless, the inclusion of Pannenberg within this historical movement 
remains appropriate. His rise to theological prominence occurred in the con-
text of the advent of the theology of hope, and he shares the central orienta-
tion of the movement, namely, the emphasis on the future or the eschaton as 
the point of transcendence. 
PANNENBERG'S EARLY THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Wolfhart Pannenberg was born in 1928 in a part of northeast Germany 
that now belongs to Poland. The basic outlook that drives his theological 
program came to be shaped quite early in life. A crucial factor in this mold-
ing process was the path he followed in corning to faith, for this was at the 
same time the path that led to his choice of theology as his life's pursuit. A 
series of crucial experiences launched him in this direction.1 
The first occurred when he was about sixteen years old. While browsing 
through the public library, Pannenberg happened on a book by the atheist 
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philosopher, Friederick Nietzsche. Thinking it was a work on music, Pan-
nenberg' s "first love" at that time, he read it. Nietzsche's writings convinced 
young Pannenberg that the influence of Christianity was responsible for the 
disastrous shape of the world. Yet they also sparked his interest in philoso-
phy. 
At about the same time, what Pannenberg has termed "the single most 
important experience"2 of his life occurred. While walking home through 
the woods near sundown one winter afternoon, he was attracted to a light in 
the distance. When he approached the spot, he found himself flooded-
even elevated-by a sea of light. The theologian now views this experience 
as the time when Jesus Christ made claim to his life, even though he was not 
yet a Christian. Over the ensuing years this experience has become the basis 
for Pannenberg' s keen sense of calling. 
His first positive experience with Christianity itself came through his 
Gymnasium (high school) literature teacher, who had been a lay member of 
the confessing church during the Third Reich. In this teacher, Pannenberg 
saw a contradiction to his view that Christianity is responsible for the distor-
tions of human life. Because he was wrestling with the question of the 
deeper meaning of reality, he decided to look more closely at the Christian 
faith by studying theology and philosophy. From his inquiry he concluded 
that Christianity is the best philosophy, a conclusion that launched Pannen-
berg' s life both as a Christian and as a theologian. 
Soon after his experience of light, the Pannenberg family left their home 
in the wake of the Soviet offensive. Two years later he began studies at the 
university in Berlin. His initial fascination with Marxism gave way to oppo-
sition to it, as he subjected the system to intellectual scrutiny. His first-hand 
exposure to the evils of two human social orders-Nazi Germany and Sta-
linist Eastern Europe-forms a part of the background to Pannenberg' s con-
clusion that no human political system can ever fully mirror the perfect hu-
man social structure that one day will come as a divine gift in the kingdom 
of God.3 
While in Berlin, Pannenberg became impressed with the work of Karl 
Barth. He saw in Barth's early writings an attempt to establish the sover-
eignty of God and to claim all reality for the God of the Bible. But study in 
Basel with Barth himself beginning in 1950 resulted in Pannenberg becom-
ing uneasy with what he perceived to be a dualism in his teacher's thought 
between natural knowledge and the divine revelation in Christ. This reac-
tion to Barth spawned another important aspect of Pannenberg' s theological 
program,' the attempt to show that God's revelatory work does not come as 
a stark contradiction to the world, but is the completion of creation. Pannen-
berg seeks to draw out the religious implications found in all secular experi-
ence,5 claiming a continuity between redemption and creation, a continuity 
he came to find in the historical process. 
In 1951 Pannenberg moved to Heidelberg where he studied under such 
scholars as Peter Brunner, Edmund Schlink, Hans von Campenhausen and 
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Gerhard von Rad.6 During the years as a student in this great German uni-
versity, his thinking concerning the nature of revelation took shape, in part 
through ongoing discussions with a group of students from various disci-
plines, which came to be known as the Pannenberg circle. The conclusions 
of the group were subsequently published as Revelation As History.7 
In 1955 Pannenberg completed his academic training. After teaching at 
the Lutheran Church seminary in Wuppertal (1958-1961) and the University 
of Mainz (1961-1968), he moved to the University of Munich in 1968, the site 
of the bulk of his academic career. 
THE INTENT OF PANNENBERG'S THEOLOGY 
Pannenberg is a theologian of both the Church8 and the public sphere. 
His program is directed toward the unity of the Church and the place of the 
one Church in a secularized world. As a result, he has been an untiring sup-
porter of ecumenism. But his understanding of the goals of the ecumenical 
movement have made him no friend of the political orientation that charac-
terized the World Council of Churches for many years.9 Such activities take 
away from what he sees as the central task of ecumenical endeavors, the es-
tablishment of eucharistic fellowship among the churches, leading to Chris-
tian unity. Unity, he believes, is the only way by which the Church's voice 
can speak with credibility in the contemporary secular society.10 
His concern, however, does not end with Church unity, but i;noves be-
yond to include the future of humanity. Pannenberg sees the function of the 
Church in the world as being a witness to the temporality of all human insti-
tutions prior to the coming of the kingdom of God. As it gives expression to 
fellowship among humans and between them and God, especially in the 
Eucharist, the Church becomes the sign of God's eschatological kingdom,11 
which is the hope of the world. Theology is, in part, a servant to this task. 
THEOLOGY AND TRUTH 
Despite this broad intention lying behind Pannenberg' s work, its central 
importance lies in his understanding of the nature of theology itself and of 
the truth to which theology is related. Simply stated, he is attempting to 
change the course of contemporary theology, to combat what he perceives 
to be a widespread privatization of religious belief in general and of theol-
ogy in particular. 
This quest must be put in the context of Pannenberg' s assessment of the 
trajectory of modem theology. In 1975 he indicated his perception of the 
failure of theology in an autobiographical remark given to a group of stu-
dents in Denver: "Perhaps if you have heard anything about my work, you 
have learned that I am accused of being a rationalist by some people. Others 
call me a fundamentalist...But...there is one thing I am certainly not; I am 
certainly not a pietist."12 
Underlying this remark is Pannenberg' s conviction in seeking to 
deal with the Enlightenment, the intellectual revolution which drastically al-
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tered the rmderstanding of the basis of the Christian faith, the theology of 
the last two centuries has, to its detriment, turned to a pietistic emphasis on 
a decision of faith.13 Prior to the Enlightenment, the salvation-historical 
events, which were seen as providing the formdation for faith, were ac-
cepted on the basis of what was claimed to be the authoritative witness of 
God, mediated either by the teaching office of the Church (the Roman 
Catholic view) or by the Bible as the product of the divine inspiration of the 
prophets and apostles (the Reformation position). In keeping with this, the 
Reformers posited a connection between three aspects of faith-noticia 
(knowledge), assensus (assent) andfiducia (trust). 
In the Enlightenment, however, the rmderstanding of an authoritative 
testimony to historical knowledge, taught by Augustine and Luther, was re-
placed by science and a newer historical methodology that sought to recon-
struct past events by employing scientific and critical tools. As a result, the 
historicity of events became rmcertain, and the historical basis for faith was 
called into question. Thus, in the post-Enlightenment world, humanity lives 
without revelation, rmderstood in the sense of a word from beyond history 
by means of which reality can be viewed through the eyes of God. 
To avoid making faith rmcertain and dependent on historical research, 
post-Enlightenment theology moved the formdation for faith away from his-
torical events to the experience of conversion, which is seen as providing its 
own certainty. In other words, a shift has been made from the older view, 
which began with a rational appeal to historical fact, to the modem ap-
proach, which moves from the subjective experience of the believer. 
This modem position has given birth to two distinct, yet equally errone-
ous, alternatives. Some theologians dismiss the historical content of the 
Christian tradition as irrelevant. This is the position of the radical pietists, in 
whose ranks Pannenberg includes Rudolf Bultmann. Others follow the path 
of what he terms "conservative pietism," in which the plausibility of the his-
torical aspects of the faith is grormded in the experience of faith. Thus, for 
example, personal conversion is made the basis for the certainty of the 
events of Jesus' history, such as his miracles and the Resurrection. 
At the heart of Pannenberg' s alternative to this development is Luther's 
thesis that, by nature, faith cannot be derived from itself, but only beyond 
itself in Christ.14 From this Pannenberg concludes that faith is dependent on 
a historical basis. Specifically, the historical revelation of God must form the 
formdation for the act of trust, if faith is to be trust in God and not in itself. 
He admits that the revelation which grormds faith remains contestable in 
this world. But he nevertheless adamantly declares that only the field of ar-
gument, and not a nonrational decision of faith, can meet the philosophical 
and historical challenge to the Christian claim to knowledge of God. 
According to Pannenberg, then, theology is necessary because actual 
truth must rmderlie faith, if faith is to be valid.15 His theology, in tum, is an 
attempt to place Christian faith on firm intellectual footing once again, and 
thereby to provide an alternative to the subjectivist approach of much mod-
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em theology. 
In one sense Pannenberg' s understanding of theology follows the classi-
cal model. As in the older view, he sees theology as a public discipline re-
lated to the quest for universal truth. For him the truth question is to be an-
swered in the process of theological reflection and reconstruction. He criti-
cizes any attempt to divide truth into autonomous spheres or to shield the 
truth content of the Christian tradition from rational inquiry. Theological af-
firmations must be subjected to the rigor of critical inquiry concerning the 
historical reality on which they are based. Theology, in other words, must be 
evaluated on the basis of critical canons, just as the other sciences for, like 
they, it deals with truth. And the truth of the Christian faith must be meas-
ured according to the coherence criterion,16 that is, insofar as it fits together 
with-even illumines-all human knowledge.17 
At one crucial point, however, Pannenberg' s understanding of theology 
moves beyond the classical tradition. He declares that truth is not found in 
the unchanging essences lying behind the flow of time, but is essentially his-
torical and ultimately eschatological.18 Until the eschaton, truth will, by its 
own nature, always remain partial and truth claims, debatable. Therefore, 
theology, like all human knowledge, is provisional. It simply cannot pack 
the truth of God into formulas. The future alone is the focal point of ultimate 
truth. As a result, all dogmatic statements are to be treated as hypotheses to 
be tested by means of their coherence with other knowledge. This, he 
claims, is in accordance with the Scriptures, which declare that only at the 
end of history is the deity of God unquestionably open to all.19 
REASON AND HOPE 
Pannenberg' s understanding of the nature of the theological task gives 
rise to a theology oriented toward two intertwined focal points-reason and 
hope.20 The significance of the term "reason" is obvious from what has al-
ready been noted-theology is a rational undertaking. The term "hope" cap-
sulizes the thorough-going eschatological orientation of his program. In that 
his entire systematic theology focuses on the eschaton, it may be character-
ized as a theology of hope. Foundational to the whole of Pannenberg' s the-
ology is the concept of the kingdom of God understood as the glory of the 
Trinity demonstrated in God's rulership over creation. 
Pannenberg does not follow nineteenth-century theology in under-
standing the kingdom in terms of an ethical community. Rather, his view 
accords with the exegetical discoveries of the twentieth century, which find 
the source of this ' term in the apocalyptic movement and the teaching of Je-
sus.21 The biblical message of the kingdom is thoroughly eschatological in 
orientation, for it proclaims the final lordship of God over creation, a lord-
ship which has already broken into history in the appearance of Jesus. En-
route to the eschaton, the Christian community lives in hopeful expectation 
of the final consummation of the lordship of God over the entire world. 
Only then will the glory and reality of the triune God be fully demonstrated. 
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The theme of hope, however, leads back again to the rational dimension 
of Pannenberg' s theological enterprise. As a public discipline, theology's 
purpose is that of giving a "rational account of the truth of faith."22 This ori-
entation to "rational accounting" is foundational to the mandate of the 
Church itself, as he understands it. As a people of hope whose eyes are di-
rected to the eschatological consummation in the kingdom of God, the 
Christian community dares not retreat into a privatized ghetto of individual 
or familial piety. Rather, it is called to remain in the world, where the 
struggle for truth occurs, and there to engage in the theological task. Be-
cause the theological task is linked with the quest for ultimate truth, the 
truth of God, theology is a public and rational endeavour. 
SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY AND THE DOCTRINE OF GOD 
Following the classical tradition, Pannenberg asserts that the whole of 
systematic theology is essentially the doctrine of God. In fact, God is the all-
inclusive object of theology.23 Even though Christian dogmatics moves be-
yond the doctrine of God to include anthropology, ecclesiology and other 
disciplines, these must be seen as belonging to that one overarching topic. 
The starting point from which we can talk about God is the commonly 
held "semantic minimum" concerning "God," that views God in terms of 
power. God is "the power on which all finite reality depends"24 or "the 
power that determines everything." From this basic premise, however, Pan-
nenberg draws a far-reaching assertion: The deity of God is connected to the 
demonstration of God's lordship over creation.25 
This thesis implies that the idea of God, if it corresponds to an actual re-
ality, must be able to illumine not only human existence, but also our experi-
ence of the world as a whole. In his words, "It must be made plausible that 
all finite reality depends on him, not only human beings and the course of 
their history, but also the world of nature." This can only be done, Pannen-
berg adds, by presenting "a coherent model of the world as God's crea-
tion."26 This is why for him to show the illuminating power of the Christian 
conception of God is the overarching task of systematic theology. 
In addition, however, the thesis that God' s deity is connected to his 
lordship over creation means that only the final salvation of God's creatures 
can ultimately demonstrate the assertion of God's existence. This realization, 
of course, serves to shift the emphasis of theology to history and eschatol-
ogy. "It is only in the event of final salvation," Pannenberg argues, "that the 
reality of God will be definitively established." Consequently, the entire 
process of history climaxing in the consummation constitutes "a self-dem-
onstration of God's existence."27 Systematic theology is an explication of this 
self-demonstration. 
THE STARTING POINT FOR THEOLOGY 
In keeping with his thesis of the debatable nature of the assertion of 
God's existence,28 Pannenberg argues that theology cannot merely launch 
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into the doctrine of God, but must win its starting point. To accomplish this, 
he builds on an anthropological observation which in turn provides a link 
between philosophical and revealed theology, namely, that humans are in a 
certain sense naturally religious.29 By this he means that the structure of the 
individual human person and of corporate human life is pervaded by a reli-
gious component. In theological terms, the destiny of humanity is existence 
in the image of God, a destiny visible in human "openness to the world."30 
This understanding of humanity's basic religious nature builds from the 
early Schleiermacher concept, and a reinterpretation of the Cartesian con-
cept, of the infinite. Its background, however, lies earlier, in the medieval 
discussions of what is first, albeit dimly known to the human mind. Pannen-
berg finds this question illumined by means of two contemporary concepts. 
The first is "exocentricism," the thesis that each human must ground per-
sonal identity outside oneself. Although this concept has been disseminated 
by twentieth-century philosophical anthropology, Pannenberg finds its 
foundation in Luther's understanding of faith. The other concept is Erik 
Erikson's well-known idea of "basic trust." 
Religious awareness, Pannenberg explains, arises out of the rudimen-
tary consciousness of the difference between "I" and "world" found inher-
ently in the act of trust, which is then augmented by one's presence in the 
family. As a person experiences finitude and temporality in everyday life, 
an intuition of the infinite develops. To this, however, Pannenberg adds an 
innovative thesis. The intuition of the infinite does not itself comprise ex-
plicit knowledge of God. Rather, such knowledge is mediated by religious 
traditions. This subsequent knowledge allows the individual to reflect on 
the earlier immediate experience and to conclude that therein lies an "unthe-
maticized knowledge" of God. In other words, that this basic intuition of the 
infinite relates to the theme of God is a conclusion drawn only by reflection 
on the process of religious history. 
In this way Pannenberg connects this basic religious phenomenon to the 
experience of God found in the religions, which come to an awareness of the 
activity and essence of God through the works of creation. This connection, 
in turn, opens the way for him to view the rivalry of the religions as the 
location of the revelation of truth.31 
With Barth, Pannenberg asserts that revelation occurs only as God gives 
Himself to be known. But he argues that the focal point of this revelation is 
the historical process. For Pannenberg this history is the history of religions. 
On the historical stage conflicting truth claims, which are at their core reli-
gious and are ultimately attempts to express the unity of the world, are 
struggling for supremacy. The religious orientation that best illumines the 
experience of all reality will in the end prevail and thereby demonstrate its 
truth value. 
In this context, Pannenberg finds significance in the religious history of 
Israel. In Israel came the breakthrough to monotheism, which allowed for an 
understanding of the world as a unity, and the breakthrough to the future 
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orientation of God's activity in history. These discoveries formed the context 
for the message of Jesus, which Pannenberg declares to be the focus of the 
revelation of the nature of the eternal God. Jesus is the prolepsis-the his-
torical preview-of God's self-disclosure, which ultimately lies at the end of 
history. For this reason, Pannenberg develops the Christian doctrine of God 
out of the life of Jesus.32 
THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF GOD: THE TRIUNE ONE 
At the heart of Pannenberg' s theology is the doctrine of God. And at the 
heart of the Christian conception of God, he argues, is the doctrine of the 
Trinity.33 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that God as the Triune One 
forms the center of Pannenberg's systematic theology. 
In contrast to theological practice since the Middle Ages, Pannenberg' s 
systematic theology moves from the concept of revelation immediately to an 
explication of the doctrine of the Trinity and only then to the delineation of 
God's unity and attributes.34 The traditional attempt to derive the plurality 
of the trinitarian persons from a concept of God as one being, he asserts, can 
only lead to problems, because in such approaches God remains a single 
subject, rather than the three persons. 
In moving away from the older methodology, Pannenberg's doctrine of 
God offers an intriguing proposal for the contemporary question of the link 
between the immanent Trinity (God's eternal essence) and the economic 
Trinity (God as active in salvation history).35 The link he forges arises from 
the foundational thesis that all systematic theology is but the explication of 
what is implicit in God' s own self-disclosure. Consequently, he seeks to 
ground the doctrine of the Trinity on revelation, that is, on the economy of 
salvation-on the way that the Father, Son and Spirit come to appearance in 
the event of revelation-as is presented in the life and message of Jesus. 
Only then does he move to the discussion of the unity of God found in the 
divine attributes. In this way, Pannenberg grounds the doctrine of God in 
the divine economy and, as a result, the understanding of the immanent 
Trinity flows from the economic Trinity. 
Crucial to Pannenberg' s development of this doctrine is his concept of 
self-differentiation.36 The essence of person, he argues, is to give oneself to 
the counterpart; hence, the concept of person includes the idea of depend-
ency. All three trinitarian persons are mutually dependent on the others, he 
asserts. 
In this way Pannenberg offers an alternative to the subordination of the 
Son and the Spirit to the Father which he finds so detrimental to traditional 
theology. He brings this mutual dependency into the process of salvation 
history and emphasizes the eschatological completion of the divine program 
in the world as the focal point for the revelation of the unity of the divine 
being. The unthematicized infinite comes to be named by the purposeful ac-
tivity of the three trinitarian persons in the world. 
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TRANSCENDENCE AND IMMANENCE 
Whereas Pannenberg was noted in the earlier stages of his career for his 
attention to Christology, when he set himself to the task of delineating his 
full systematic theology the importance of pneumatology or the doctrine of 
the Spirit became increasingly evident. In fact, central to Pannenberg' s entire 
dogmatics is his attempt to develop a new pneumatology. He intends to re-
place the tendency in theology to reduce the role of the Spirit to that of of-
fering an explanation in situations in which all rational suggestions fail with 
a much broader and more biblical doctrine of the Spirit. But in so doing, he 
develops the key to an understanding of the divine transcendence and im-
manence. 
Crucial to his pneumatology is Pannenberg' s understanding of spirit as 
"field," a conception related to, but not to be equated with, the field theory 
introduced in nineteenth-century science.37 Actually, the roots of the idea lie 
much earlier in the ancient Stoic philosophers who developed a docVffie of 
a physical pneuma (spirit). This idea, however, was rejected by the theologi-
ans of the patristic era in favor of the conception of God as spiritual mind. 
This new pneumatology of field is central to Pannenberg' s doctrine of 
God.38 In agreement with the atheistic criticism of Feuerbach and others, he 
rejects as a mere projection the classical understanding of God as reason and 
will (i.e., mind). The divine essence, Pannenberg maintains, may be better 
described in terms of the "incomprehensible field" -i.e., dynamic spirit-
which likewise comes forth as the third person of the Trinity, the Holy 
Spirit. 
In addition to field/ spirit as characterizing the divine life, Pannenberg 
sets forth a profound assertion of the Spirit's all-pervasive, creative presence 
in creation and in human life, climaxing in the new life of the believer and 
the Church.39 In this way the same concept that describes the divine essence 
functions as the principle of the relation of God to creation and as the prin-
ciple of the participation of creation in the divine life. 
Crucial here is the connection Pannenberg draws between the Christian 
assertion of the Spirit as the source of life in creation and the biological dis-
covery that "life is essentially ecstatic."40 Each organism lives in an environ-
ment which nurtures it and is oriented by its own drives beyond its immedi-
ate environment toward its future and the future of its species. This is the 
sense in which creatures participate in God through the Spirit, Pannenberg 
asserts. Hence, the Spirit can be understood as the environmental network 
or "field" in which and from which creatures live. 
The Spirit is also the "force" that lifts creatures above their environment 
and orients them toward the future. This work of the Spirit ultimately leads 
to the self-transcendence that characterizes the human person and forms the 
basis for the special life beyond the self in Christ, found in the believing 
community of the Church. 
The concept of field also forms the foundation for Pannenberg' s anthro-
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pology. The human person, he argues, is not to be seen in terms of an "I" 
that preexists experience of the world.41 Rather, he has a more complicated 
understanding of the formation of personal identity. Important for identity 
development is the immediate perception of the totality of a person's exis-
tence,42 which Pannenberg terms "feeling,"C or the "field" in which a person 
lives. 
Because this totality of existence is an eschatological concept related to 
the meaning of reality that only arises when the flow of life is completed, 
Pannenberg views the biblical concept of the image of God as eschatological 
as well; it is realized at the end of human history, not at the beginning. He 
likewise defines sin in terms of the idea of the building of personal identity. 
Sin is "self-love," the "I" as it fixates on its own finiteness, rather than find-
ing its identity from fellowship with God, that is, via existence extra se in 
Christ." 
Lying behind this understanding of God and the world is a specific 
theological interpretation of space and time that parallels the concept of the 
religious nature of humankind outlined earlier.45 Pannenberg argues that it 
is impossible to imagine the parts of space and time without presupposing 
both space and time as undivided wholes that form the background or con-
text for these parts. This intuition of infinite space points to the immensity 
and omnipresence of God, whereas the intuition of time as a whole points to 
God's eternity.46 
God, then, is the "field" in which creation and history exist. In Pannen-
berg's words, "the presence of God's Spirit in his creation can be described 
as a field of creative presence, a comprehensive field of force that releases 
event after event into finite existence."47 
As the comprehensive field, God is both immanent in the world and 
also transcendent over it. His immanence is obvious. All creation and all 
events live from their environment, which is the divine field, the source of 
life. And the immanent Spirit is what animates creatures in raising them be-
yond themselves to participate in some measure in the divine life. Yet in the 
process of life God is not only immanent; he also remains always transcen-
dent. God is more than the chain of the finite parts of time and space. And 
the divine life is more than the sum of the lives of finite creatures. 
Above all, however, transcendence arises from the future orientation 
inherent in the relation between God and the world. As Spirit, God func-
tions as the whole which provides meaning to the finite events of history. 
This meaning is profoundly future, for only at the end of history do we find 
the meaning of history and the connection of each event with that meaning. 
The end, then, transcends each moment, as that glorious reality toward 
which all history is moving. In this way, time and eternity are interrelated, 
for, Pannenberg writes, "it is through the future that eternity enters into 
time."" 
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JESUS AND THE SON 
The doctrine of the Trinity lies at the heart of Pannenberg' s systematic 
theology. It remains, however, to round out the picture by indicating the 
main themes of Pannenberg's doctrine of Christ. For in Jesus, eternity-the 
future-has entered profoundly into time. 
Issues of Christology have always been of central concern to Pannen-
berg. In fact, the first of his works translated into English was the 
monograph, Jesus-God and Man.49 This book contains his controversial de-
lineation of the centrality of the Resurrection for Jesus' history and his im-
portant emphasis on the historicity of this event. In this work, Pannenberg 
argues that the resurrection of Jesus is God's confirmation of the appearance 
and mission of Jesus, for through this event Jesus experienced in the midst 
of history that eschatological transformation to which humanity is destined. 
As a monograph, the earlier work presupposed the reality of God and 
unfolded solely in terms of a Christology "from below." However, Pannen-
berg admits that such an approach is incomplete when Christology is pur-
sued within the context of systematic theology. Such a discussion must oc-
cur in the context of a specifically Christian anthropology, undertaken with 
an awareness of the doctrine of God. 
To accomplish this, in his systematic treatment, Pannenberg reintro-
duces the classical theological concept of logos, understood as the principle 
of the unity of the world. But to this traditional idea he adds an interesting 
twist. The logos represents the order of the world as history. Consequently, 
Jesus is the logos, not as some cosmic abstract principle, but in His human 
life as Israel's Messiah and as the one who brings to light the proper rela-
tionship of the creature to the Creator. 
Foundational to Pannenberg' s proposal is the assertion that the connec-
tion between Jesus and God not be viewed directly in terms of the unity of 
the preexistent logos with humanity, but rather indirectly, via Jesus' relation-
ship to the Father as unfolded in Jesus' own history.50 As the one who was 
obedient to the Father to the point of death, Jesus is the eternal Son, the lo-
gos, for the attitude that humbly differentiates oneself from God and places 
oneself in the service of God is the way to participation in life. 
As the one who was obedient to his divinely-given mission to the point 
of death, Jesus is God's reconciliation. He acted as our substitute, in that Je-
sus shared our situation (death) and thereby altered it. Pannenberg calls this 
view "inclusive substitution." Through faith we can participate in the new 
life brought by Christ. In our voluntary subordination to God we enjoy com-
munion with God and will participate in God's eternal life beyond our own 
finitude and death.51 
PANNENBERG AND HIS CRITICS 
The program undertaken by Wolfhart Pannenberg is perhaps the most 
ambitious attempt since Barth to set forth a complete systematic-theological 
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delineation of Christian doctrine. Not only does he systematize the teaching 
of the Church, He seeks to outline an approach for Christian engagement 
with the philosophical underpinnings of contemporary society's movement 
away from its religious roots. In this bold ·undertaking Pannenberg has re-
fused to be dissuaded by the many voices who reject the mere idea of at-
tempting a truly systematic theology in the contemporary context and by 
those who have sought to shift the focus of the theological task in other, less 
ambitious directions. 
As a result, Pannenberg' s work has been rigorously criticized and at 
times dismissed in toto as no longer relevant. However, when viewed from 
the perspective of theological history as a whole, he emerges as a modem 
heir to the classical understanding of theology viewed in terms of the rea-
sonable demonstration of the Christian truth claim and the Christian con-
ception of God. Whatever problems are present in his proposal, Pannenberg 
ought not to be faulted for attempting to "do" theology. Rather, critical dis-
cussion with his proposal must focus on questions concerning the correct-
ness and adequacy of his theological method. 
REVELATION AND THE BIBLE 
Pannenberg offers an important contemporary restatement of the tradi-
tional attempt to ground theology on revelation. Although not minimizing 
other focal points of revelation, classical Protestant theology emphasizes the 
Bible as the deposit of divine revelation. Pannenberg diverges from this tra-
ditional approach.52 He does not adhere to the older Protestant doctrine of 
verbal inspiration,53 but bases his understanding of the nature of Scripture 
in the relation of the history of religions to revelation. For him the history of 
religions is the location of a dispute among rival religious truth claims. In 
this history, the religion of Israel, leading to the advent of Christianity, is 
crucial because of the insights developed through this process. The Bible is 
the sourcebook for this tradition, and thereby it retains a central importance 
for theology, even in the post-Enlightenment situation. 
Pannenberg' s criticism of the older Protestant doctrine of inspiration 
must be taken seriously. In the contemporary world simple appeal to the 
Bible as an unquestioned authority is no longer possible. Pannenberg rightly 
points out that, in the present context, the doctrine of Scripture can no 
longer simply be set forth at the beginning of theological reflection. There-
fore, his suggestion that the authority of the Bible is to be the goal, rather 
than the presupposition, of theology stands as a valid challenge to the classi-
cal Protestant approach. 
Nevertheless, agreement with his perception of the contemporary loss 
of biblical authority does not require agreement with his appraisal that mod-
em textual criticism destroys the doctrine of inspiration. Nor can Scripture 
simply be set aside for that reason, as even Pannenberg implicitly acknowl-
edges. Pannenberg' s doctrine of reconciliation contains a promising basis 
for a renewed doctrine of Scripture, in the thesis that the apostolic procla-
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mation became the vehicle for the ongoing speaking of the risen Lord. Un-
fortunately the German theologian has not made the step from this idea to a 
full-orbed doctrine of Scripture. 
REVELATION AND THE SPIRIT 
Pannenberg' s emphasis on the historical nature of revelation leads to 
the related question as to how the observer comes to see this revelation, that 
is, to the question of the role of the Spirit in illuminating history. He sees 
himself as attempting to develop an understanding of the unity of revelation 
in the face of the bifurcation of the concept. For this reason, Pannenberg tol-
erates no suggestion that some additional inspired word or some super-
natural working of the Spirit must be added to events; meaning arises out of 
the events themselves.54 
Although he does not mean to suggest that the Spirit has no role in the 
process of faith, at times Pannenberg appears to minimize the place of the 
Holy Spirit in the epistemological process of grasping the revelation of God 
in history. The question therefore, remains. How is it that some respond 
positively to the hearing of the report, whereas others reject the message? 
Whatever that answer may be, Pannenberg refuses to ground the solu-
tion to the problem of faith and unbelief in the mystery of the action of the 
Spirit, an approach often found in traditional theology. Why a person comes 
to faith or remains in unbelief resides in the mystery of human personhood, 
which he sees as a gift of God. 
In his systematic theology Pannenberg comes to a more profound 
understanding of this dynamic than is found in his earlier works. Here he 
acknowledges the brokenness of the knowledge of revelation in the era be-
fore the consummation, with the result that the apostolic proclamation is of 
utmost significance for the understanding of revelation in history. This 
marks a helpful development in his thought. While he continues to maintain 
that no inspired word must be added to events, the acknowledgment of the 
brokenness of knowledge opens the way for an affirmation of the mysteri-
ous aspect in the epistemological process in this era of the contestability of 
truth claims. 
REASON AND PIETY 
The characteristic orientation to the future of Pannenberg' s thought and 
its attendant revision in ontology could appear to call into question certain 
aspects of traditional Christian piety. His theology seems to lay no founda-
tion for the traditional emphasis on God's presence as an existing being in 
the here and now and for talk of current events as in some sense divinely 
preordained before the world was created. 
More problematic than the lack of these themes in his theology, how-
ever, is Pannenberg' s apparent thorough-going rationalism and hard-nosed 
rejection of any attempt to base theological conclusions on a faith decision 
that has not been through the fire of rational reflection and challenged by 
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alternative viewpoints. Before drawing any conclusions concerning this di-
mension of his theology, however, we must place his perceived bent toward 
rationalism in the context of Pannenberg' s understanding of himself as a 
theologian called to serve the church in the setting of the public marketplace 
of ideas. 
Pannenberg' s intent is to articulate a solid intellectual foundation for 
Christian faith in an age in which any religious commitment is often prema-
turely rejected as unreasonable or even irrational. In response to what he 
sees as a wrong tum made by theology at the post-Enlightenment fork in 
the road, Pannenberg is seeking to return to a balanced understanding of 
the role of reason in establishing faith. He readily admits that, in the present, 
truth claims can only be provisional; consequently, the quest for truth must 
orient itself to the eschaton, when truth in its fullness will emerge. Although 
prior to the eschaton only a provisional, controversial answer can be made 
to the question of life's meaning, people of faith can obtain a greater degree 
of certainty than is often admitted. They have good reasons to affirm their 
faith, which need not be based on an irrational decision. 
Although he admits that humans do not only live on the basis of reason, 
and cautions against thinking that through rational arguments people will 
be brought to faith, Pannenberg points out that if the reasonableness of 
Christianity is not indicated, the step to faith is made difficult. In the midst 
of irrational barriers, he sets himself to the task of changing the climate that 
presupposes that Christianity fails the test of reason. 
At the same time, Pannenberg is also convinced that in the public test-
ing of ideas, a rational delineation of the Christian faith, more so than per-
sonal piety, is the chief weapon of the Church. Despite the fundamental cor-
rectness of his intent, he has overstated the case. As important as the ra-
tional discussion may be, the piety of conscious Christians also provides an 
important apologetic for the truth of the faith. 
In spite of this cautionary word, we must admit that Pannenberg' s em-
phasis on the illuminating power of the idea of God for our experience of 
the world as a whole challenges those who would reduce the faith to the 
private world of personal piety. The German theologian invites us to see 
that Christian theology ought to have an impact on all dimensions of life 
and the entire range of disciplines connected with the pursuit of faith . 
ESCHATOLcx:;JCAL ONTOLcx:;Y 
Critics have raised questions about a final central dimension of Pannen-
berg' s theology, namely, his eschatological ontology and its corollary under-
standing of God as Spirit. The German theologian identifies God, the all-de-
termining reality, with the divine field which works upon the world from 
the future . Like Moltmann, he has attempted to reconceive transcendence 
and immanence in temporal rather than spatial terms. God's transcendence 
is his futurity and wholeness, and in this ontology, the future has power 
over every present, not only defining it but also determining it in its depth. 
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This raises the issue of reverse causality. Can the future, which is in 
some sense truly open, have an effect on the present? Is retroactive causality 
conceivable? Does the temporal category of futurity actually solve the prob-
lems of divine transcendence which plagued the traditional spatial imagery? 
Pannenberg' s ontology also raises the question of God's personhood. 
Does the imagery of God as the divine field working upon the world from 
the future allow us to conceive of God as truly personal? Does the language 
of "field," coupled with Pannenberg's aversion to traditional notions of God 
as mind and will, imply an impersonal or suprapersonal God, a God who is 
the whole that is greater than the sum of the world's parts but not a gra-
cious, completely free and self-sufficient divine person? 
Critics who raise questions such as these await the full development of 
Pannenberg's theology for clearer answers. No doubt in the future he will 
address these concerns. In the meantime, however, many readers continue 
to have reservations about Pannenberg' s commitment to God's personhood 
and freedom over the world, as well as about the cogency of his highly crea-
tive ontology of the future. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the reservations stated here, Pannenberg must be lauded as pro-
viding an alternative both to the dominant existentialist bent characteristic 
of German theology throughout much of the twentieth century-with its 
emphasis on an existentialist transcendence-and to the resurgence of im-
manental theology found in much of American theological thinking. He of-
fers a quite different proposal, focusing attention again on the classical quest 
for ultimate truth in the midst of the contemporary, post-Enlightenment 
situation. 
Following the theology of hope, Pannenberg reintroduces the concept of 
the divine transcendence-and this in the mode of the future as standing 
over against the present. Yet, he tempers the radical transcendence deline-
ated in Moltmann' s early writings and the radical immanence which devel-
oped in Moltmann' s later writings. For Pannenberg, God's transcendence 
does not so much contradict. the present as bring it to completion, and God's 
immanence through the divine Spirit does not so much imprison him as 
give opportunity for his love freely to increase the bountiful unity of crea-
tion. More so than Moltmann, Pannenberg has been able to link salvation 
with creation, thereby developing a creative understanding of the relation of 
the world to its transcendent/ immanent Source. 
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hearing in the broader world of learning with his widely-used Handbook on 
the Pentateuch. 
This volume follows the pattern set by previous ones in the series in that 
introductory matters-such as structure, composition, authorship, text, as 
well as a lengthy bibliography-are dealt with in an introduction (here 100 
pages). The commentary then proceeds as usual with a paragraph-by-para-
graph consideration of the text giving major emphasis to interpretation. 
Dr. Hamilton writes clearly and well. The language used is appropriate 
to the topic and to the presumed audience: well-educated, but not having ei-
ther high interest in, nor a high degree of training in, the technical aspects of 
biblical interpretation. There are a few linguistic oddities like "Enter the 
problematic sons of God" (p. 262), and "temerarious" (p. 279), but examples 
like these stand out because they are uncommon. 
Perhaps the greatest strength of the work is its careful discussion of the 
literature on any paragraph or topic. Dr. Hamilton is at his best in reviewing 
the strengths and weaknesses of various arguments. He is able to summa-
rize fully and yet concisely while going to the root issues with generally un-
erring aim. As would be expected in this series, his conclusions almost al-
ways fall with the conservative side, but one does not have the sense that 
positions with which he eventually disagrees are introduced only to be dis-
missed. 
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Another strength closely coupled with this is the careful treatment of 
the exegetical alternatives on any passage. The reader will learn the range of 
possibilities, given the particular morphology, grammar and syntax of the 
phrase or sentence. By and large this consideration will be with the text as it 
now stands. Dr. Hamilton has little patience with those who dissect the text 
according to some critical principle and then interpret the hypothesized 
original. 
In a book which stands out in comparison to many other arid treatments 
of Genesis, one hesitates to point out weaknesses; but, unfortunately, those 
which occur are serious enough to require comment. If Dr. Hamilton's 
strength is his evenhanded review of alternatives, his weakness is his failure 
to adequately support his ultimate conclusions. Too frequently, he will only 
tell which alternative he chooses as though the discussion of strengths and 
weaknesses was self-explanatory. But even more seriously, in some cases he 
ventures no opinion. The most important of these omissions of opinion is of 
critical significance for the book. It is on the question of historicity. How are 
we to interpret the first eleven chapters and indeed, the whole book? Does it 
contain accurate history through which theology is revealed? Or does it rec-
ord theologically significant material couched in history-like sagas? In vain 
we look for Dr. Hamilton to take a clear and coherent stand. It appears that 
he takes such persons as Cain and Noah to have been historic figures, but 
there is no discussion of whether or not that is even important. 
A second weakness has to do with the stated purpose of the series, 
which is to be expositional. Dr. Hamilton gives his readers fine exegesis, but 
almost no exposition. That is, he almost never comments upon the theologi-
cal significance of the text for that time or this, and the comments he makes 
tend not to be very penetrating. His commendable treatments of the New 
Testament's appropriation of the Genesis materials suffer from this same de-
fect. To define the grammatical or syntactic meaning of a statement is only 
to have begun to interpret it. 
Finally, while his treatment of the source-critical hypothesis for the 
structure and sense of the various passages is good, he does not give 
enough attention to form-critical and tradition-historical matters. Certainly 
these could not be the primary focus, given the purpose of the series. How-
ever, there are a number of instances where it is necessary to ask why cer-
tain elements are in juxtaposition with each other in the present text, and 
these disciplines have offered a number of suggestions. Whether they are 
right or wrong, it is important to ask the questions they ask. If it is too sim-
plistic to say that Genesis 1 is the P creation story and Genesis 2 is the J 
story, then how do we explain the origins of the two components? Dr. Ha-
milton apparently does not believe Moses sat down and wrote them in se-
quence (and surely not many do). So how did they get into their present or-
der and why? 
Despite these criticisms, this is an excellent help for anyone who wishes 
to understand the book of Genesis better. For an exegetical treatment of the 
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text as it stands, with careful consideration of any proposed alternatives, it 
would be hard to improve upon it. 
JOHN N. OSWALT 
Professor of Old Testament and Semantic Languages 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Clines, David J. A. Job 1-20. Word Biblical Commentary, vol. 17. Dallas, 
Texas: Word Books, 1989. cxv, 501 pp. $25.95. ISBN 0-8499-0216-9. 
Job 1-20 comprises the first volume of the author's projected two-volume 
commentary on the Book of Job. David Clines is professor of biblical studies 
in the University of Sheffield (England) and serves as co-editor of the Journal 
for the Study of the Old Testament and editor of The Dictionary of Classical He-
brew. He has also published numerous other books and articles, including 
the Ezra, Nehemiah and Esther volumes in the New Century Bible. 
Though shorter and less satisfying than expected, given the size of the 
commentary and the provocative discussions Job has stimulated over the 
centuries, the Introduction provides a readable orientation to the Book of 
Job. Clines has no clear preferences regarding questions of authorship and 
date of composition. And though he seems inclined to affirm the literary 
unity of the prose story and poetic dialogues, he is less certain of the origi-
nal inclusion of the wisdom poem Ooh 28) and the Elihu speeches (32-37). 
An unusual addition to the Introduction is a series of brief discussions on 
how Job might be read by those with distinctive presuppositions (thus, 
"Readings" by the feminist, the vegetarian, the materialist and the Chris-
tian). A far more significant contrast would have been the view of Job from 
the perspectives of the theological determinist and the non-determinist. Is 
Job resigned ultimately to divine providence actualized meticulously in 
human experience, or is the book, in fact, a reaction to such a notion? More 
on this point shortly. 
The "reasonably comprehensive bibliography" compiled in the final sec-
tion of the Introduction may be the most useful this reviewer has seen on 
Job. It includes citations of important sermons and devotions as well as the 
technical studies of scholarly articles. Under the heading "Job and Its Influ-
ence," the bibliography even lists artistic masterpieces (music, visual arts, 
drama and literature) which owe their themes and inspiration to Job. 
The commentary proper, consistent with the WBC series, follows 
Clines's outline of Job and includes five interrelated components: 1) a spe-
cific bibliography for the unit; (2) an original translation, which admirably 
attempts to reflect the Hebrew idiom; (3) notes which justify the author's 
translation and at times give helpful explanation and evaluation of other 
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standard versions; (4) comment consisting of a detailed, verse-by-verse in-
terpretation of the text and an often stimulating exegetical discussion; and 
(5) an explanation which concludes each section with a summary of the 
broad intent of the passage, its theological impact and its relationship to the 
whole book. 
The continual importance of the Book of Job for the community of faith, 
both past and present, is not lost sight of by this worthy contribution to its 
understanding and interpretation. Clines rightly sees the central issue of Job 
as a conflict of faith and experience. It addresses not so much the why of 
suffering but whether there is any moral order in the world. The biblical 
writer raises serious questions about how God's justice is to be understood 
in a world where humans experience tragedy and evil. Those who approach 
Job from the Reformed theological tradition have historically had difficulty 
with the speeches of Elihu and of Yahweh. Commitment to meticulous 
providence would necessitate regarding Elihu's monologues as preparatory 
to the theophany and his arguments against Job as reflecting the "biblical" 
view of divine sovereignty. But a careful reading of Job clearly suggests that 
Elihu's pious pronouncements are actually parallel with those of the other 
counselors whom Yahweh rebukes! God's sovereignty as creator, then, does 
not assume His purposes to be the manipulation of good and evil and of 
reward and punishment in human experience. The believing community 
can benefit immensely from Job's painful journey by recognizing that suffer-
ing is part of the common human experience, that questions of justice and 
order and God's will are complex and cannot be neatly packaged into pat 
answers, that the honest expression of our frustrations and hurts to God is 
theologically and psychologically sound (compare with the psalms of la-
ment), and that compassion for those who suffer is essential to living a life 
that reflects God's character. Fuller analysis of Clines's treatment of these 
matters will have to wait for his second volume. 
There are, however, at least two hermeneutical issues in this volume 
that should prompt discussion among evangelical readers. First, Clines is in 
agreement with other recent evangelical commentators-Andersen 
(Tyndale) and Hartley (NICOT)-in recognizing the literary nature of the 
prologue/ epilogue. Comparisons with other ancient Near Eastern wisdom 
writings as well as scrutiny of its content and purpose suggest that the ac-
count was based on an ancient story about a sage who suffered. One is not 
compromising the integrity of Scripture by correctly identifying the "wis-
dom" genre of the passage and acknowledging that the story was used as a 
springboard for the theological discussions contained in the poetic dia-
logues. 
Second, the familiar passage of Job 19:25-27 has been understood by 
Christian tradition as having strong Christological overtones. "I know that 
my Redeemer liveth," together with the phrase "in my flesh I shall see 
God," have been etched almost indelibly into evangelical proclamation as a 
clear messianic prophecy. Clines is in agreement with both Andersen and 
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Hartley that "resurrection theology" should not be read back into this pas-
sage. But whereas the latter two commentators-using somewhat different 
arguments-hold that Job's redeemer (Hebrew goel) is to be understood as 
God, Clines offers detailed rationale why Job's goel cannot logically refer to 
the Deity. Since the lawsuit context pits Job against God, it would be most 
unlikely that God would appear as a legal attorney against Himself. He ar-
gues, instead, that Job's "champion" ("defender" or "vindicator") is the 
metaphorical expression of his own protestations of innocence. He com-
pares the passage with 16:18-21 where his "cry" is explicitly identified with 
his "spokesman" and, by implication, with the "witness" and "advocate" in 
the same context. While Clines' s treatment of this difficult text seems 
strained at times, his suggestions are worthy of thoughtful consideration by 
evangelical interpreters. A sound hermeneutic always searches for the best 
and most accurate rendering of a passage within its own context. 
GERALD I. MILLER, Ph.D. 
Professor of Ancient Languages and Religion 
Asbury College 
Wilmore, Kentucky 
Andersen, Francis I. and David Noel Freedman. Amos: A New Translation 
with Introduction and Commentary. The Anchor Bible. Eds. William 
Foxwell Albright and David Noel Freedman. New York: Doubleday, 
1989. xiii, 979 pp. Hardback, ISBN 0-385-00773-6. 
Andersen and Freedman's monumental study of Amos is a gold mine of 
information and insight-theological, literary, linguistic, philological, his-
torical, rhetorical and more. The length of the book allows breadth and 
depth of treatment seldom possible, even in full length commentaries. (The 
220 pages of frontal and introductory material exceed the length of most full 
commentaries on the book!). Francis I. Andersen is professor of Old Testa-
ment at the New College for Advanced Christian Studies, Berkeley, Califor-
nia. David Noel Freedman is professor of biblical studies at the University 
of Michigan and the University of California at San Diego. Both Andersen 
and Freedman are students of William Foxwell Albright and obvious heirs 
of "the Baltimore school," though their work shows interest ranging beyond 
Albright' s and immersion in current emphases in biblical studies. 
The Anchor Bible on Amos includes a new translation of the text by two 
of the world's finest Hebraists, each published pioneers in the modem study 
of Hebrew grammar and syntax. Appearing as a whole in the prefatory ma-
terials and integrated with the writers' outline of the book, the translation 
stands again in sections with notes and comments throughout the commen-
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tary. Andersen and Freedman take up customary introductory matters, such 
as method of inquiry in Amos studies, form and genre, the composition and 
development of the book, the text and language of the book, and the ques-
tion of authenticity in Amos. In the introduction they also approach at 
length some unexpected but helpful topics: the historical background of the 
prophet and the work, the God of Israel in Amos, and geopolitical terminol-
ogy in Amos. The Introduction concludes with a 466-entry bibliography, 
rich in twentieth-century resources but poverty stricken in the bare handful 
of pre-1900 references included, one antedating 1772. The body of the work 
follows standard Anchor Bible format of translation, unit introduction, notes 
(textual and exegetical) and comment. After the commentary, extensive in-
dexes to topics, authors, words (biblical and related languages) and scrip-
tural references enhance the commentary's use as a reference tool. 
Proceeding as one might expect from their work on Hosea (The Anchor 
Bible, vol. 24), Andersen and Freedman focus their energies on understand-
ing the book of Amos in the Masoretic text as a coherent literary composi-
tion. Emphasis here is on the work as a literary product with a design and 
life and purpose of its own, something other than the oral ministry of the 
prophet but related with integrity to that ministry. Their meticulous reading 
of the Hebrew text uncovers scores of rhetorical and structural interlacings 
in the book of interpretive significance. While they may err on the side of 
over-analysis here, their evidence for careful, purposeful editing of the book 
is persuasive. Both as a matter of methodological principle and as a result of 
their study of the book, they are convinced that the major editorial/redac-
tional work evident is either by Amos himself or by an editor (or editors) 
fully compatible with the literary intent of Amos himself. Thus the entire 
book is authentically" Amos." 
In addition, they think it arbitrary to refuse the prophet the privilege of 
a dynamic, developing message of broad scope. Therefore, they are skepti-
cal of approaches which, as a matter of principle, e.g., deny to Amos pas-
sages that offer hope over against the book's dominant message of doom or 
which include the nations (and particularly Judah) within this prophet's 
purview. Even the radical hope of 9:8b-15 is lodged with Amos, against pre-
vailing opinion. 
Beyond their methodological stance, their exhaustive reappraisal of 
Amos' s geopolitical terminology supports these views, they feel (pp. 98-
139). With reasonable success they show that, with few exceptions (perhaps 
1:1 among them), Amos uses "Israel," unmodified, to refer to the kingdom 
of North Israel, and uses "Joseph" and "Isaac" as substitutes for Israel in 
this use. He uses qualifications of Israel ("children of Israel," "house of Is-
rael," "my people, Israel") and "Jacob" to refer not to the Northern kingdom 
but to either larger or historic Israel. I remain unconvinced that "my people, 
Israel" (in 7:8, 15; 8:2) and "house of Israel" (particularly in 5:4, 7:10 and 9:9) 
necessarily refer beyond the Northern Kingdom and find the analysis 
strained at points. But over all, they sustain the claim that Amos' s message 
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was for all Israel, with particular focus on the North. From this base, the ref-
erences to Judah and the crux at 9:8b look much different. 
The authors identify the book's literary forms and genres, passage by 
passage, and use these insights, where possible, to illumine the text. But 
Andersen and Freedman lack confidence in scholarly ability to reconstruct 
the history by which these pieces have come to the present text. Moreover, 
though they do not disdain the form critical enterprise, they doubt the ulti-
mate value of that quest for understanding the work as it now stands. Thus 
their to focus on the work in its final literary form. 
Andersen and Freedman see the book in four major divisions: The Book 
of Doom (1:1-4:13), The Book of Woes (5:1-6:14), The Book of Visions (7:1-
9:6), and The Epilogue (9:7-15). They think the prophet's ministry may have 
unfolded in four phases, seen in the Book of Visions and the Epilogue and 
correlating with sections of the present book (pp. 73-88). Visions 1 and 2 
(7:1-6) represent phase one. In connection with the plagues noted in the 
preaching of 4:6-11, Amos receives the first two visions and embarks on a 
ministry embracing all Israel, announcing imminent judgment, calling for 
repentance and offering hope. In response to his intercession, judgment is 
stayed, though his message falls on deaf ears. Chapters 5-6 derive from 
proclamation from that period. 
Visions 3 and 4 represent phase two of Amos's ministry, with 
focus primarily on North Israel. Destruction is now irrevocable. Confronta-
tion with the crown and religious establishment probably bring Amos' s ca-
reer to an end (arrest? martyrdom?). The Book of Doom, 1:1-4:13, is built on 
preaching from this phase, with the oracles of chapters 3 and 4 probably 
preceding the "Great Set Speech" of 1-2. 
Phase three, which may have overlapped the previous phase at points, 
is represented in the final vision (9:1-4) and focuses on the question of the 
fate of the leaders and justification of the terrible message of phase two. It 
correlates with 8:3-9:6. Phase four is connected with the Epilogue, pointing 
to the future. 
Andersen and Freedman's approach has the great value of taking the 
link between the text and the ministry of Amos himself seriously and pro-
vides numerous occasions for profitable reflection on the text. Of course, 
this reconstruction of the prophet's life and the literary correlations linked 
to that reconstruction are like the historical reconstructions based on form 
criticism and rejected by the authors. They are intriguing, sometimes bril-
liant; and the quest is certainly worth the effort. But the picture is plausible 
at best. The evidence allows little certainty. Fortunately the interpretation of 
the text itself rarely depends on the reconstruction. 
With regard to the division of the book, I have not been persuaded that 
the rhetorical links between 3:1-4:13 and 1:1-2:16 are strong enough to over-
ride the oracular introductions at 3:1; 4:1 and 5:1 and binding chapters 3:1-
5:17, at the least, together. This means a four-fold division of the work (1:1-
2:16; 3:1-6:14; 7:1-9:6 and 9:7-15) should stand, dividing the "Book of Doom." 
98 Book Reviews 
Andersen and Freedman's attention to the theology of the book of 
Amos presents, in this reader's mind, perhaps the inost gratifying feature of 
this entry in The Anchor Bible series, and that on three counts. First, they 
recognize that this work is a theological document and that, as such, any 
adequate account of it must treat that theology. This they do, in such in-
structive essays as "The God of Israel in the Book of Amos" (pp. 88-97) and 
at numerous points in the commentary. Second, they show interest in bibli-
cal theology and bring that interest to bear on their understanding of Amos, 
as, e.g., in the excursus, "When God Repents" (638-679). Finally, and most 
astoundingly, Freedman and Andersen write as though the God of Amos 
may well be their God also-a rare find in modem, guild scholarship! They 
write with spiritual sensitivity and sympathy that appears to grant validity 
to and seeks to appropriate the significance of the revelation of God to 
Amos (See, e.g., pp. 95-97). 
By far the most obvious weakness of the work, in my judgment, is its 
operation in a vacuum regarding the history of interpretation before 1850-
1900. The work would have been significantly enriched by dialogue with the 
Church and synagogue's historic understandings of many passages, beyond 
that accessed through the LXX and Targum. More ruthless editing could 
have trimmed redundant sections, e.g., the multiple introductions, making 
room for this dialogue without lengthening the already bulky work. Better 
production editing would have greatly increased the usefulness of a work 
this size. Unlike most other Anchor Bible volumes, this book's page heading 
references are so global as to make them nearly useless. For example, "1:1-
4:13" stands as the heading reference throughout the entire 273 pages of in-
troduction, notes and commentary on this unit! Locating comments on a 
single verse is a needlessly arduous task. Even so, what's there is worth 
plowing through. Not for the lay reader, the work will be most useful to 
well-informed students of Scripture and serious scholars. 
DAVID L. THOMPSON 
F.M. and Ada Thompson Professor of Biblical Studies 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Cole, R. Alan. The Gospel According to Mark: An Introduction and Commentary. 
Revised edition. Ed. Leon Morris. The Tyndale New Testament Com-
mentaries. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
1989. 340 pp. pb. ISBN: 0-85111-871-2. 
In spite of their diminutive size, the Tyndale commentaries on both tes-
taments often rank among the best buys in evangelical biblical interpretation 
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for pastors. Unfortunately, neither of Alan Cole's volumes on Mark, the 
1961 original nor this revision, approach that. Mr. Cole's revisions of his ear-
lier work appear almost entirely in the introduction where three main 
changes are evident. First, the blatantly apologetic edge of the earlier work 
has been softened. Second, form and redaction critical readings of the Gos-
pel and topics related to them receive more extensive and more balanced 
treatment, with fresh attention to works published not just after but also 
prior to Cole's earlier commentary. Third, new treatment of the structure of 
Mark's Gospel, of the theology and main motifs of the Gospel, and of ques-
tions of interest to current readers of the Gospel almost double the size of 
the original introduction. These are all welcome revisions. 
But the revised work still labors under serious ambiguity regarding 
critical study of Mark. This not only colors the tone of Cole's work (alterna-
tive views are still "perverse," e.g., p. 67) but also introduces inconsistency 
into the treatment and inhibits insight. For example, eager to distance him-
self from radical redaction criticism, he argues against(!) "theological" read-
ing of the Gospel (p. 11), positing that Mark adopted no conscious theologi-
cal position in his work, his arrangement of materials being "quite instinc-
tive and unself-conscious, under ... the Spirit's guidance" (p. 57). Yet he 
wants to discover Mark's purpose in writing by examining the way he put 
his material together (p. 37). Other results of this ambiguity diminish the 
force with which he grasps Mark's theology, as does his failure to appropri-
ate insights of recent literary critical readings of the Gospel which would al-
low him better to get at the structure and logic of the work as a whole. 
Mr. Cole is not only at pains to distance himself from "liberal" critical 
approaches to the Gospel study. Even treating such topics as "The Status of 
Women" (pp. 74-78) and "Signs and Wonders" (pp. 78-85), his concern not 
to be identified with Christian feminists or with charismatic/ power under-
standings of Christian experience, liberal or otherwise, mars the essays. 
Apologetic concerns again block free exposition of Mark's contribution. 
Of course there is much of value in the work. The Rev. Canon Cole is 
affiliated with the Church Missionary Society of Australia and is a lecturer 
at Trinity Theological College, Singapore. From long-term mission experi-
ence in the Far East, he writes with global perspective, with practical, pas-
. toral concern, and fine insight into the book of Mark at many points. On the 
whole, however, this reviewer looks for more in the Tyndale series. 
DAVID L. THOMPSON 
F. M. and Ada Thompson Professor of Biblical Studies 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
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Morris, Leon. Reflections on the Gospel of John. 4 vols. Grand Rapids, Michi-
gan: Baker Book House, 1986. 750 pp. Paper, ISBN 0-8010-6202-0. 
Leon Morris has provided a valuable contribution to studies in the Gos-
pel of John with this recent four-volume paperback work, the final volume 
having been released in 1988. Reading the first volume soon after its publi-
cation, I looked forward to the subsequent releases. Morris divides his study 
of the Gospel among his four volumes in this way: Volume I, The Word Was 
Made Flesh Gohn 1-5); Volume II, The Bread of Life Gohn 6-10); Volume III, 
The True Vine Gohn 11-16); and Volume IV, Crucified and Risen Gohn 17-
21). He provides his own translation of a few verses at a time, and then 
gives a commentary on those verses. 
The work maintains a delicate balance for the study of John's Gospel. It 
yields enough scholarship in the way of historical background and gram-
matical study to satisfy the serious student. However, it is not so weighty in 
these areas as to lose the man or woman approaching the Gospel of John for 
devotional purposes. Indeed, Morris states at the outset that "the tone is de-
votional." These readable volumes are nonetheless replete with excellent 
discussion and commentary on the essentials of the Gospel, the obvious re-
sult of Morris's own long and careful study of the Gospel of John. Many 
readers will be familiar with other books by this author, including those 
which deal with John's Gospel. 
There are many invaluable aspects of Reflections on the Gospel of John, 
three of which will be noted here. First, some of the background material 
and word studies, while perhaps familiar to the seasoned scholar, are cer-
tainly helpful for the conscientious student. Second, I found Morris's in-
sights into the various people whom we encounter in the Gospel to be in-
triguing. One sees Thomas, or Peter, or Pilate in a different light-or a more 
complete light-after reading Morris. Third, the author was faithful 
throughout the book in drawing out the devotional nature of the Gospel. 
Morris's application of the teachings of the Gospel of John to the twentieth-
century Christian is perhaps the greatest strength of this work, and for that 
reason will, I believe, be of benefit to pastors and teachers in churches as 
well as to college and seminary professors and students. 
The proof of a work like this is often in its effectiveness in the class-
room. I have used these volumes recently in a course on Johannine litera-
ture, and found that the students were engaged both intellectually and spiri-
tually by these books. This came as no surprise to one who has used other 
works of Morris in various courses, and found them equally well received. 
However, both the challenge and the appeal of this Christian's writing and 
thinking, as we have come to know them through the years, are still appar-
ent in Reflections on the Gospel of John. 
Rcx:;ER J. GREEN 
Professor of Biblical and Theological Studies 
Gordon College, Wenham, Massachusetts 
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Wagner, Gunter, ed. An Exegetical Bibliography of the New Testament. Macon, 
Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1987. 350pp. ISBN 0-86554-157-4. 
This is the third volume of this series, and deals with material on the 
Gospel of John and the Johannine Letters. The author, who began teaching 
in 1958, writes in the preface that he devised in that year "a detailed system 
for the collection of bibliographical information relevant to New Testament 
studies, ranging from the Old Testament background to the theology of the 
Early Church" (p. V). The exegetical material from that collection pertaining 
to the Johannine literature is presented in this book. 
The student of the Gospel or Epistles who has not yet discovered the 
volumes in this series will find this an extremely helpful source. Entries are 
given for entire chapters, or sections, or verses, so that the material listed 
will be beneficial regardless of how broad or focused the research being 
done. Because the entries are taken from voluminous sources, they are given 
in many languages. However, the student who may be limited to English or 
to English and only one other language need not fear-there are many in-
valuable sources provided in this volume. 
There are two practical matters about the book which I appreciated. 
First, in each entry the author's last name is given in capital letters so that it 
is quickly identified if one happens to be looking for Brown's or Metzger' s 
contribution to a particular verse or to a section of the Gospel or Epistles. 
Second, the entries for each section are given, not in alphabetical order by 
authors' last names, but in chronological order, so that one can see at a 
glance the building through the twentieth century of the books and articles 
germane to a verse or a section of Johannine literature. 
It is impossible to imagine the work which has gone into this and other 
volumes of this series, and it is hard work which sometimes goes unappreci-
ated. Nevertheless, access to this bibliographic resource is invaluable, and 
continues to fulfil the original purpose which was "to enable the student as 
quickly as possible to get down to research without wasting days, even 
weeks, on the search for the literature" (p. V). One anticipates the author's 
forthcoming fourth volume on major Pauline Epistles. This is, however, in-
tended only as a beginning for the student, and the good student will want 
to follow this course by continuing his or her own bibliographic reference 
file in order to keep up with the material published since the completion of 
this very useful work. 
ROGER J. GREEN 
Professor of Biblical and Theological Studies 
Gordon College 
Wenham, Massachusetts 
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Barth, Markus. Rediscovering the Lord's Supper: Communion with Israel, with 
Christ, and Among the Guests. Atlanta: John Knox, 1988. 113pp. ISBN 0-
8042-3749-2. 
Markus Barth here offers a clear and original exegesis of New Testament 
passages that deal directly with the Lord's Supper. Barth conducts this exe-
getical endeavor from the perspective of a New Testament scholar who is 
profoundly dissatisfied with the way in which the Lord's Supper is under-
stood and practiced in the contemporary Church. In fact, the present vol-
ume is meant to provide an alternative interpretation of the Eucharist over 
against the prevailing notions, as these are reflected in the famous Lima 
Document of 1982. 
Barth identifies four major corruptions of the Lord's Supper: (1) a radi-
cally individual and mystical emphasis that leaves no room for social con-
cerns; (2) the adoption of non-biblical and irrelevant language, such as 
"transubstantiation"; (3) an understanding of the Lord's Supper that is ex-
clusivistic, manifested ultimately in the use of the Lord's Supper to enforce 
excommunication; and (4) the fundamental problem of introducing philo-
sophical-religious elements which have replaced biblical concepts. Barth ex-
amines the institution texts of the synoptic Gospels, the teaching of Paul re-
garding the Lord's Supper in 1 Corinthians 10-11, and John 6 in order to 
counter each of these four distortions. The book closes with an "epilogue," 
directly attacking the sacramental theology of the Lima Document. 
Barth is to be commended for providing a discussion of the Lord's Sup-
per that is exegetical, concerned with the practical life of the Church, re-
sponsive to contemporary thinking and issues, and Christocentric. There 
are, however, two limitations to the present work. First, the fact that Barth 
brings specific concerns to the text causes him to focus only on certain di-
mensions of the relevant passages, and to deal even with these dimensions 
in a rather narrow fashion. A more comprehensive examination of the 
Lord's Supper in the New Testament will be found in studies such as that by 
I. Howard Marshall. Second, in the desire to make his theological points, 
Barth sometimes overstates his case, and draws conclusions that go far be-
yond the evidence. Highly problematic, for example, is Barth's claim that 
the Eucharist, standing as it does in continuity with the Passover, proclaims 
that Jews and Christians together are the people of God. Barth reaches this 
conclusion because of his desire to emphasize the inclusive character of the 
Lord's Supper; but it contradicts what he says elsewhere regarding the cen-
trality of Christ and the rejection of sacramental activity as the basis for 
unity. 
In spite of such limitations, this book is a major contribution to the bibli-
cal understanding of the Lord's Supper, and an eloquent appeal to the 
Church to recapture and live according to that understanding. 
DAVID R. BAUER 
Associate Professor of Biblical Studies 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
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Carson, D. A. How Long 0 Lord? Reflections on Suffering and Evil. Grand Rap-
ids: Baker Book House, 1990. 275 pp. ISBN 0-8010--02556-7. 
I have believed for some time that the problem of evil renders Calvinism 
untenable. So I approached this book on the subject, written by a representa-
tive of the Reformed tradition, with considerable interest. 
The problem of evil is especially troublesome for Calvinists for the fol-
lowing reason: If God's sovereignty means that He controls all things in the 
way Calvinists teach, there seems to be no reason why He could not elimi-
nate all evil. He could, but He will not. I will come back to this in a moment. 
But first I want to say what I appreciated about this book. It is a straight-
forward, tough-minded, pastorally motivated treatment of the problem of 
evil. Carson writes, not as a philosopher trying to give an account of evil to 
skeptics, but as a biblical scholar addressing fellow believers who struggle 
with the challenge evil poses for their faith. He warns that his book is not 
primarily for those who are in the midst of a crisis brought on by suffering 
or tragedy. Rather, he aims to provide "preventative medicine" which can 
lessen the shock of evil when it comes. 
As Carson recognizes, unbiblical and unrealistic expectations multiply 
the pain when tragedy strikes. He wants to help his readers bring their be-
liefs and expectation in line with biblical thought, and thereby inoculate 
them against unnecessary anguish. To this end, he devotes the bulk of his 
book to a study of "Biblical Themes for Suffering People." Among the 
themes discussed are the following: social evils, poverty, war, illness, death, 
hell, natural disasters and the suffering of God. Carson reminds his readers 
what it is like to live in a fallen world, emphasizing that Christians should 
not expect to be exempt from hardship, suffering and tragedy. Those who 
take to heart what Carson says here will find themselves strengthened in 
mind and spirit to deal with the trials of life. 
The final part of the book is the most intellectually challenging, but even 
here the author succeeds in his purpose of producing material useful for 
"general readers." Carson's task here is to tackle the "mystery of provi-
dence." More specifically, he takes up the difficult question of the relation 
between divine providence and human freedom. The difficulty is exacer-
bated for Carson because of his Calvinistic convictions. 
Carson identifies his own position on the matter as "compatibilism," by 
which he means that it is true both that God is absolutely sovereign, and 
that human beings are morally responsible creatures. Now the term "com-
patibilism" is a common one in the philosophical literature on freedom, but 
it is typically used there to signify the view that freedom is compatible with 
determinism. Absolute sovereignty need not imply determinism, however, so 
Carson is using the term in a somewhat distinctive sense. Indeed, as he ini-
tially defines these terms (pp. 201-202), I would have little quarrel with his 
claims. 
My disagreement comes when he spells out more fully the nature of the 
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freedom he believes is required for moral responsibility. At this point, it be-
comes clear that Carson' s view is, after all, essentially the same view called 
"compatibilism" or "soft determinism" in the current philosophical debate 
on freedom and responsibility. For he endorses the view of philosophical 
compatibilists that the heart of freedom is voluntarism. A free action, then, 
is one which is done willingly (p. 214). This is what makes it possible to hold 
that there is no inconsistency in saying that a person is free and responsible 
and that his actions are causally determined. So God can determine all a per-
son's actions, but this does not destroy his freedom or diminish his moral 
responsibility. Why? Because his will is also determined and he acts in ac-
cordance with his will, not against it. 
The debate over freedom seems likely to rage on indefinitely in secular 
philosophy. (There, of course, actions are thought to be determined by 
physical causes, not God.) In theology, however, I am convinced that there 
are decisive reasons for rejecting compatibilism. In a nutshell, the problem 
with compatibilism is that it is incompatible with God's perfect goodness, 
given the evil in our world. As I suggested at the outset, if freedom is com-
patible with determinism, then God could control things in such a way that 
all persons would freely make only good choices. He could, but He has not, 
if compatibilism is true. If God could eliminate evil and suffering in our 
world, while keeping our freedom and responsibility intact, but will not, 
then He is not a perfectly good Being. 
This problem is seen most sharply in view of the doctrine of eternal hell. 
In his book, Carson tells of a young woman who feared that her father had 
gone to hell, and mentions some helpful things he could say to her (pp. 105-
106). The bottom line, however, is that Carson really has nothing comforting 
to say to such a person if he is true to his Calvinism. For if Calvinism is true, 
then God could surely have drawn her father to Christ in such a way that he 
would have come, in the words of the Westminster Confession, "most 
freely." If her father was not a believer during his life, it is because God had 
not elected to draw him to Christ. And if he is damned forever, it is ulti-
mately for the same reason. Not surprisingly, Carson's Calvinism does not 
show its face at this point of the discussion. 
As I have already said, there is much in this book that will be helpful to 
Christian believers of all traditions. But it also illustrates afresh that the 
problem of evil is an insuperable one for the "truly Reformed." 
JERRY L. WALLS 
Associate Professor of Philosophy of Religion 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
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Smith, Jonathan Z. Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities 
and the Religions of Late Antiquity. School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London, Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion, XIV. 
Chicago Studies in the History of Judaism. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1990. xiii, 145 pp. ISBN 0-226-76362-5. 
Every once in a while a scholar is able to stand back and see the philo-
sophical structures and the development of an intellectual tradition with a 
clarity which escaped even the creators of that tradition. Such was the case 
with Albert Schweitzer's Von Reimarus zu Wrede: Eine Geschichte der Leben 
Jesu-forschung (Zollikon/Zurich: Evangelische Verlag, 1947). Jonathan Z. 
Smith has provided a comparable analysis of the comparative project which 
has dominated the study of Christian origins for the past four centuries. 
The book's five chapters provide an introduction to the seminal publica-
tions as well as an analysis of their role in the scholarly tradition. The pri-
mary structural problem of the volume is apparent at the outset: the original 
function of the chapters as self-standing, self contained individual lectures 
remains determinative for the presentation in the published medium. How-
ever, few will be able to read the volume once! After Smith's intent for the 
volume becomes clear, most readers will, of necessity, engage in the "divine 
drudgery" of rereading the earlier portions. The thesis that emerges is that 
contemporary New Testament and Patristic scholarship, like that of the last 
several generations, is dominated by the "Protestant hegemony" (p. 143) 
which imaged a '"pristine' early Christianity centered in Paul and subjected 
to later processes of 'corruption"' (p. 143), an orientation which does not 
provide an adequate basis for comparative studies. 
Chapter one, "On the Origin of Origins," (pp. 1-35) examines the influ-
ence in North America and Britain of Joseph Priestley's Socrates and Jesus 
Compared (London: J. Johnson, 1803) and posthumous The Doctrines of Hea-
then Philosophy Compared with Tlwse of Revelation (Northumberland, PA: John 
Binns, 1804), discussing Priestley in the context evolving personal relation-
ships of Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and John Q. Adams. From 
Priestley, it is suggested, comes much of the terminology which has figured 
heavily in the comparative project. However, the thesis of Priestley had al-
ready been formulated by continental Lutheran writers in polemic against 
Roman Catholicism and used in turn by Pietist scholars against the estab-
lished Lutherans. This earlier tradition is acknowledged by Smith, but not 
explored here. The same is true of the transmission by which the Lutheran/ 
Pietist historiography came into the English context where analogic com-
parisons became weapons in the Caroline and Wesleyan periods (Conyers 
Middleton, Wesley's protagonist, receives significant attention, pp. 23-25) . 
While it is certain that Priestley is important for subsequent developments, 
most of the same comparative terms were used by Pietist and Caroline writ-
ers long before Priestley, and with the same intent. 
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The seeond chapter (pp. 36-53) reflects briefly on the problems posed for 
comparative studies by unexamined assumptions of uniqueness. These as-
sumptions are frequently guarded by using Judaism as an insulation, sug-
gesting that similarities between Judaism and early Christianity indicate a 
lack of assimilation of "pagan" ideas, values and structures by the Early 
Church. Over against this he places a summary of his constructive approach 
to comparison, a theory which he has discussed and illustrated in other 
publications. 
Chapter three, "On Comparing Words" (pp. 54-84) examines the "word 
study" tradition of nineteenth- and twentieth-century biblical studies. While 
noting that the preoccupation, fostered by such giants as E. Hatch, A. Deiss-
mann, H. A. Kennedy and A. D. Nock, has produced quite useful tools for 
historical, theological and philological study, he argues that this tradition 
has been motivated and controlled by the same ideological strictures. The 
same is argued in chapter four with regard to "On Comparing Stories" (pp. 
85-115) as he reviews the "life of Jesus" discussions, the comparisons of Paul 
and the mystery religions, and the use of theories of development to differ-
entiate the stories of biblical characters from their contemporaries. 
This leads into the final chapter, "On Comparing Settings" (pp. 116-143). 
Smith begins with an analysis of the 1950 Haskell Lectures at Oberlin later 
published as The Old Testament Against Its Environment (G. E. Wright) and 
The Old Testament Against Its Environment (F. V. Filson). Here, too, he finds a 
preoccupation with "uniqueness" as an assumption, and an inadequate 
theoretical base to deal with the data for comparison. The evolution to "sot-
eriological" or sociological models has not necessarily, he suggests, im-
proved either situation. Smith concludes his essay with additional sugges-
tions regarding adequate paradigms for comparative studies. 
Smith's analysis is an articulate, profound, passionate and accurate cri-
tique of the historical and theological enterprise as it has been practiced in 
the Anglo-Saxon world (with occasional acknowledgements of German 
scholarship). Unfortunately, there is little dialogue with French historical 
scholarship, some of which, under the influence of the Structuralist tradi-
tion, has developed less ideologically determined structures for comparative 
study. It would also be interesting to bring Smith's constructive paradigms 
regarding comparison into discussion with folklore studies where it has 
been necessary to confront many of the same problems. However, Smith's 
challenge to those concerned with Christian origins to develop more useful 
ways of seeing Christianity in its various contexts and of evaluating diver-
gences and convergences, both within the larger tradition and with other re-
ligious systems, points toward a scholarly agenda for the next decades. The 
intellectual climate of both the contemporary academy and the restructure 
of international relations will not allow facile, unexamined and unexam-
inable assumptions of privilege to be maintained for any religious tradition. 
Despite the shortcomings of structure, especially the lack of an introduc-
tion and an index which is too brief for a book with no systematic bibliogra-
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phy, the volume is one which will probably grow in stature as time passes 
and as scholars continue to wrestle with these issues of historical method. 
DAVID BUNDY 
Associate Professor of Church History 
Christian Theological Seminary 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Tuttle, Robert D., Jr. Mysticism in the Wesleyan Tradition. Grand Rapids: 
Francis Asbury Press, 1989. 204 pp. ISBN 0-310-75430-5. 
For reasons not always clear, John Wesley's relation to mysticism has 
frequently been minimized or ignored by his biographers and interpreters. 
John Telford, in his 1924 biography, blatantly and inaccurately stated that by 
the time Wesley left Georgia he had parted with the mystics. Others have 
been less sure, but no more helpful in giving us a more accurate picture. 
In my opinion, Dr. Robert Tuttle (E. Stanley Jones Professor of Evangel-
ism at Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary in Evanston, Illinois) has 
given us the most accurate and comprehensive study to date. Drawing on 
more than twenty years of scholarly study of this topic, including a Ph.D. 
dissertation on the subject, Tuttle advances our knowledge in a balanced 
and helpful way. 
For those in particular who realize that the issue is by no means as 
simple as Telford stated, the book sheds welcome light on a neglected di-
mension of Wesley studies. But even for the more general reader, Tuttle suc-
cessfully uses mysticism as a "window" through which to see important is-
sues in Wesley's life and thought. 
Although the book has no formal parts, as such, it does have stages of 
development and progression. Chapter one gives the reader a compass to 
use in navigating the rest of the book. Tuttle provides an overview of mysti-
cism, offers a controlling definition ("intimate union with God"), and shows 
the more precise aspects of mysticism with which Wesley dealt (i.e., Catho-
lic Reformation mysticism, for the most part). One leaves this chapter with a 
readiness to travel on. 
Chapters two, three and four are primarily historical in nature. Tuttle 
charts Wesley's course from Epworth up to ten days before Aldersgate. 
These chapters are a virtual mystical compendium, filled with names and 
significant concepts. On the whole, this is slow reading, and a background 
in church history is helpful. But Tuttle is not hopelessly complex. His style is 
readable and he carries one along from phase to phase. I know of no finer 
history of Wesley's experience of mysticism. 
Chapter five is the "center" of the book. With the previous journey in 
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mind, Tuttle rings the changes on Aldersgate in terms of its immediate and 
long-term benefits. He shows how the Atonement was the "missing link" 
not only in relation to Wesley's experience of mysticism, but also in his 
overall Christian life. Tuttle argues that once the Atonement was in place, 
Wesley could make positive use of the mystics (separating their" gold" from 
their "dross") for the rest of his life. 
Chapters six and seven are implicational. The first draws out abiding in-
fluences for the Wesleyan tradition, including perseverance, Christian per-
fection, prayer, simplicity and social justice. The seventh chapter looks at is-
sues especially relevant for our time: a radical monotheism, "right-brain" 
awareness, a warning against "new-age" thinking and a reminder of God's 
presence and work in the world. 
What are we to make of this book? Since there is so little previous work 
on the subject, it is difficult to evaluate it on the basis of comparison. Person-
ally, I found the book to be substantive, reasoned, well-organized, readable 
and contributive to Wesley studies. Its footnotes and bibliography alone are 
sufficient to guide one on a major study of the subject after the book is read. 
I confess some hesitancy to "take it all in," as I do whenever I read a 
book which views Wesley through one particular lens. Special-interest 
books must always be read carefully. It is possible to be more deductive 
than inductive-that is, to "read into" Wesley more than you "read out" of 
him on the subject. However, I believe Robert Tuttle survives this problem 
quite well and writes with overall scholarly objectivity and accuracy. 
Those persons for whom the term "mysticism" is negative, or even dan-
gerous, may find the book hard to swallow. The erroneous substance and 
spirit which Telford represented (albeit well-intentioned) is not dead in the 
Wesleyan family. But if one will approach the book open-mindedly, the re-
sult may be for us what Tuttle says it was for Wesley: an opportunity to 
separate the "gold" from the "dross" in the mystics. 
J. STEVEN HARPER 
Professor of Spiritual Formation 
and Wesley Studies 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Carden, Allen. Puritan Christianity in America: Religion and Life in Seventeenth-
Century Massachusetts. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1990. 239 pp. 
Appendix, select bibliography and index. ISBN 0-8010-2543-5. 
In his introduction, historian Allen Carden, now president at Spring Ar-
bor College, describes three goals for his work on seventeenth-century Puri-
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tan Massachusetts. They are (1) "to provide the reader with an overall per-
spective encompassing the multifaceted experiences of Puritan Christianity 
in America"; (2) to correct the errors of previous historians, in particular 
Perry Miller, for their inattention to Puritan spiritualism and biblicism; (3) 
and to show that "[t)he Puritans who lived in New England three centuries 
ago can teach modem Americans much about how to live" (pp. 12-13). Re-
garding the first, Carden turns in a respectable job; as for the second, I will 
suggest that his position is seriously flawed; and regarding the last, he 
makes no effort to support it and, in fact, only mentions it occasionally in 
passing. 
What Carden primarily offers is an overview of the American Puritans 
that integrates social, intellectual and religious history. He presents fourteen 
chapters of varying length and complexity on Puritan intellectual and social 
roots in England; Puritan theology; their cultural and economic life in Amer-
ica; their understanding of church-state relations; their view of the family' s 
and the community's relationship to the individual; and the life, training 
and ministry of their divines. The work is nicely laid out with footnotes 
rather than endnotes, a useful chronology of relevant Puritan history, a bio-
graphical overview of ministers and a select bibliography. However, sur-
prisingly absent is much of the best work of the 1980s on Puritan theology 
and religious life. For example, no mention is made of Charles Cohen's 
impressive, God's Caress: The Psychology of Puritan Religious Experience (1986) 
or more surprisingly of Harry S. Stout's superb, The New England Soul: 
Preaching and Religious Culture in Colonial New England (1986). Additionally, 
he detracts from his synthesis by too frequent judgments of the Puritans 
which invariably suffer from being anachronistic. For example, he too often 
chides the Puritans for being intolerant or ethnocentric (p. 109) without real-
izing that his judgments are not the product of a more enlightened or mor-
ally superior culture but rather one that no longer believes that it has access 
to clear and consensually held truths, and of course the Puritans knew 
themselves to possess such truths in the Scriptures. Such reservations 
clearly detract, but not fatally so, from his competent synthesis of the most 
impressive recent studies on Puritan religious life and New England social 
history. 
In addition to his primary goal of synthesizing the work of others, 
Carden also advances an original thesis concerning the centrality of Puritan 
spiritualism and biblicism, and the inattention paid to both by secular histo-
rians who he argues overemphasize Puritan reasonableness. His best case is 
made in chapter three, "The Biblical Basis of the Puritan Way." Unfortu-
nately, his effort suffers from a failure to recognize the seamlessness of the 
seventeenth-century Puritan rational intellectual and religious world, one 
unlike ours where revelation and rational knowledge are frequently seen as 
in competition. This oversight has led to his treating proleptically and 
naively the Puritans' reliance on Scripture and their traditional understand-
ing of biblical inerrancy. 
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In effect, Carden creates a straw man, though one corroborated by copi-
ous and intelligent reference to published sermons, as he "persuades" his 
reader of the Bible's centrality to the thought of Puritan divines. He writes 
as if it were a novel discovery "that biblical infallibility was accepted 
dogma. Not only was the Bible viewed as the Word of God, but it was also 
seen as absolutely reliable, accurate, and complete" (p. 26). Carden believes 
that by demonstrating the primacy of the Bible to the Puritan mind he is cor-
recting the error of secular historians whom he takes to be overly concerned 
with the logic and learned assumptions of the Puritan divines' hermeneu-
tics. However, since no serious student challenges the Puritans' reliance on 
Holy Scripture, the more pressing question must be what kind of learning 
and interpretive strategies they employed in their quest to understand 
God's Word correctly. It was exactly because the Bible was their most criti-
cal source of knowledge that one must attend carefully to their hermeneu-
tics. In contrast, Carden suggests that the American divines approached 
being biblical literalists. These were men, we must remember, almost all of 
whom were trained in Greek, Latin, Hebrew and several Near-Eastern lan-
guages, as well as Classical Pagan, Renaissance, Humanist and Scholastic 
learning-all with one intention in mind. Yet, more importantly, as inhabi-
tants of the seventeenth century they would not have felt any need to adopt 
such a radical, epistemologically naive, exegetical strategy as simple literal-
ism. Carden is, thus, far off the mark when he writes that Miller and other 
historians, in their desire to understand the various influences on educated 
Puritan divines, have attempted "to secularize and rationalize Puritan theol-
ogy to make the Puritans more acceptable in the modem age" (p. 34). In 
truth, it is Carden who deforms and modernizes them in his implicit effort 
to make their seventeenth-century inspired mode of exegesis instructive to 
the dilemmas of contemporary Christians living in a world of hermeneutics 
shaped by a split between faith and reason, higher criticism, and increas-
ingly powerful strategies of textual analysis. 
Is this, then, a work worth reading? It is not if one seeks a sophisticated 
treatment of the Puritans' complex theology, most particularly because 
Carden rarely discusses their theology's diverse problems. Nor should it be 
read if one seeks a scholarly treatment of the intellectual, social or religious 
hisorical themes treated therein-for that, one is best served by turning to 
the monograph literature (for an introduction, see David D. Hall's,"On 
Common Ground: The Coherence of American Puritan Studies." William 
and Mary Quarterly 44 [April 1987]: 193-229). However, Carden's work is 
well suited for an undergraduate class in American religious or colonial his-
tory, and for such use, I recommend it. Nevertheless, even in this capacity, if 
I were teaching a talented or demanding group of juniors or seniors I might 
very well choose instead to use a collection of scholarly monographs such as 
Vaughan's and Bremer's ed., Puritan New England: Essays on Religion, Society, 
and Culture, or make use of photocopied selections taken from more nar-
rowly focused books than Carden' s, with its impressive sweep of concerns. 
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In sum, Carden provides an acceptable synthesis of the work of others 
on American Puritanism in the seventeenth century, yet, ironically in regard 
to his own thesis, he deforms their thought anachronistically in his effort to 
rescue the Puritans from the interpretive clutches of secular historians who, 
in fact, have much less reason to modernize their thought than might a con-
temporary Christian. 
BARRY ALAN SHAIN 
Assistant Professor of Political Philosophy 
Colgate University 
Hamilton, New York 
Hardman, Keith J. Charles Grandison Finney, 1792-1875, Revivalist and Re-
former. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987. Grand Rapids: Baker 
Book House, 1990. xvii, 521 pps. Paperback, ISBN 0-8010-4348-4. 
The shadows cast by Charles Finney over American social, religious and 
political history are extensive, profound and often difficult to document. 
The difficulties in defining the parameters of that influence have been di-
rectly related to questions concerning the biographical and personal intellec-
tual structures of Finney' s life. Hardman has made a significant contribution 
to the analysis of these matters. On the basis of extensive research in both 
primary (some unpublished, previously unexamined) and secondary litera-
ture, the structures of Finney' s life are delineated. 
The volume begins with an introduction which provides a cultural base 
for contextualizing Finney, drawing upon, and nuancing, the theoretical 
work of William G. McLaughlin, Revivals, Awakenings and Reform (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987). Describing the revivalistic traditions of 
New England, Hardman observes, "the 'mix' was right for the emergence of 
a new type of evangelism among American Calvinists, possibly similar to 
what the Methodists had been practicing for years" (p. 23). 
Finney' s life is narrated in detail, drawing heavily upon Finney' s own 
Memoirs (1876). Realizing that this source was written years after the events 
described, and designed partially as an apologia for his life, Hardman uses 
the discrepancies between these later recollections and earlier accounts by 
friends (and enemies), correspondence, ecclesiastical documents and other 
archival material to illumine the transitions in Finney' s perspective. The Fin-
ney thus discovered is an ambitious, rapidly evolving western New York 
country boy who accomplishes the metamorphosis, first to country lawyer 
and then to the urbane evangelist who would be at ease in the drawing 
rooms of New York, Philadelphia and Boston. The circle is completed when, 
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back in the "Old Northwest" at Oberlin College, he taught deportment to 
ministerial students (Practical Theology) with specific instructions about 
dress and brushing of teeth! 
Theologically he is portrayed as a person whose mentors attempted to 
form into a Calvinist Presbyterian minister, but who never achieved solid 
theological footing before coming under the influence of perfectionist theo-
logians and reformers, especially Asa Mahan and the Tappan brothers. Thus 
influenced, he developed a concern for the Methodist doctrines of sanctifica-
tion which Hardman dates to about 1836 (pp. 324-349). Hardman traces the 
perfectionist interpersonal networks back to the Oneida community of 
Noyes as well as to other New England and New York perfectionist figures, 
although the closest relationship was certainly with Mahan. However, it is 
the Presbyterian motif in the life of Finney which Hardman finds to provide 
the interpretative theological framework for Finney' s life. It functioned, he 
suggests, positively, as with his finding a cooperative ministerial network in 
the "New School" Presbyterianism which he helped define, or negatively as 
an orthodoxy against which he reacted, but to which he would eventually 
conform. 
This paradigm of deviation from the theological norm and the possible 
subsequent increasing conformity of Finney, in his later years, to the Presby-
terian tradition raises important issues. It would appear that there are other 
possible interpretations. The problem of the intellectual and praxis struc-
tures of Finney' s early ministry can be better understood as continuous with 
the early Methodist traditions of New England which Nathan Bangs sought 
to eradicate. Lorenzo Dow is mentioned only twice in the volume and then 
as an instance in a list of examples. Dow's methods, rhetoric and goals are 
not significantly different from those of Finney in the pre-1840 period. The 
differences are primarily the social class within which those are expressed. 
The efforts to trace Finney' s intellectual and ministerial development as re-
actions against an orthodoxy which he could not adequately comprehend, is 
too simplistic. It does not give sufficient weight to the cultural, economic 
and ideological context. The convergences with the "despised Methodists" 
are too great, and in geographical proximity, to be accidental. It is therefore 
unfortunate that the suggestion of Hardman in the introduction about 
Methodist style is not explored. The research of Timothy Smith, Donald 
Dayton, Richard Shiels and Douglas Strong, as well as the more recent vol-
ume of Nathan Hatch (The Democratization of American Culture [Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1990]) as well as Winthrop S. Hudson ("The Method-
ist Age in America," Methodist History 12 [1974] : 3-15) suggests that the 
Methodist factor in the development of revivalist religion (and the attendant 
intellectual and social structures) on the frontier and its importation to the 
eastern cities needs to be taken seriously. 
It is also unfortunate that only one chapter (pp. 424-448) was de-
voted to the last quarter century of Finney' s life and thought. Here it would 
have been helpful to explore and document more thoroughly the stated 
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trend toward declension of interest in both the social and theological aspects 
of perfectionism. From the narratives of the earlier chapters one could con-
tend that arguments such as those of James H. Fairchild ("The Doctrine of 
Sanctification at Oberlin," The Congregational Quarterly 18, 2 [1876]: 237-259; 
unfortunately, this article was not cited) were efforts to distance Finney 
from an increasingly unpopular tradition of radical piety. However, Hard-
man' s preoccupation with Presbyterian orthodoxy tends to suggest agree-
ment with the basic stance of Fairchild. The arguments of Victor B. Howard 
(Religion and the Radical Republican Movement 1860-1870 [Lexington: Univer-
sity Press of Kentucky, 1990]) merit attention when further research is done 
on the life of Finney. 
These concerns are not intended to detract from the very useful and 
stimulating treatment of this major American religious figure. It is to be 
hoped that Hardman and/ or other scholars will explore more fully the for-
mative influences and later decades of Finney' s life. Even then, Hardman' s 
treatment will remain a sensitive, balanced, readable standard interpretation 
of Finney. A carefully selected bibliography, notes and an index facilitate ac-
cess to the myriad details in the text and supportive of the narrative. 
DAVID BUNDY 
Associate Professor of Church History 
Christian Theological Seminary 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Crews, Mickey. The Church of God, A Social History. Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1990. xvi, 252 pp. ISBN 0-87049-634-4. 
The Church of God (Cleveland) traces its beginning to a meeting on 
August 19, 1886, in Cokercreek, TN, presided over by Richard G. Spurling. 
Since that modest beginning, the denomination has grown into the second 
largest North American Pentecostal church and the third largest North 
American Wesleyan/holiness church. As a "bridge" denomination between 
the two revivalistic traditions, it self-consciously maintains the insights of 
the Pentecostal tradition as well as the distinctively Wesleyan doctrine of 
sanctification. As demonstrated by the analysis of world Christianity by 
David Barratt, et alia (World Christian Encyclopedia [Nairobi, Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1982]), the denomination has maintained an 
extensive and successful mission program. If the non-North American 
members are included, it is second in size only to the Salvation Army among 
the holiness churches. It is also one of only two major North American de-
nominations which have achieved significant levels of racial inclusiveness 
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(the other is the Church of God [Anderson]). 
The volume by Crews had its genesis as a Ph.D. dissertation submitted 
at Auburn University under the direction of historian J. Wayne Flynt. In its 
published form, it is the first history of a Wesleyan/holiness denomination 
to be published by a university press. It endeavors to replace the excellent 
work of Charles W. Conn [Like a Mighty Army Moves the Church of God, 1886-
1955 (Cleveland, TN: Church of God Publishing House, 1955]) as the stan-
dard history of the denomination in the United States. Crews, who has been 
associated with the Church of God (Cleveland), is presently chairperson of 
the department of history and social science at Troy State University. 
The goal of the volume is to present a history which draws upon social 
analysis. Unfortunately, this is usually limited to placing the denomination 
in its "larger social context." What it generally fails to do is to place the de-
nominational develoment in the larger socio-religious context. The control-
ling hermeneutic is that the Church of God (Cleveland) began as a sect and, 
through cultural accommodation, is becoming a denomination. Instead of 
developing a wholistic approach to the Church of God (Cleveland), the deci-
sion was made to focus on selected issues in which the shifts of perspective 
of the adherents could be observed. The result is a series of essays which 
explore specific issues over wide-ranging chronological periods. It is espe-
cially unfortunate that no attention was given to the formal and informal 
networks of relationships which have been determinative to the history of 
the denomination. In this context, it is also surprising that the stance(s) of 
the denomination on racial issues which led to its racial inclusiveness, quite 
a remarkable phenomenon in the early twentieth century in the South, are 
not discussed in any detail. 
The chapters, therefore, are unrelated to each other. Chapter one, Popu-
listic Religion: The Social Origins of the Church of God (pp. 1-18), briefly de-
scribes the social and cultural nexus in which the early Church of God 
(Cleveland) evolved. The second chapter (pp. 19-37) summarizes the devel-
opment of ecclesiastical structures from the beginning of the denomination 
until 1987, with most of the material being devoted to the financial and lead-
ership struggles of the early 1920s. Here questions which might have been 
raised about style and structure of leadership in response to changing cul-
tural expectations are not addressed. 
Chapter three, Come Out From Among Them (pp. 38-68), is perhaps the 
best chapter of the volume. The effort is made to interpret the social mores 
and taboos established by the denomination in light of the theological per-
spectives which sustained them and made them viable for the adherents. As 
Crews suggests, "External adherence to the Holiness code was simply a 
product of an internal experience" (p. 39). The processes by which these 
evolved are described, as the tensions within the leadership structures of the 
denomination which attempted to slow the acculturation and participation 
in the larger cultural matrix. Crews asserts that the influx of urban members 
after World War II began to dissipate the "moral rigor" of the denomination. 
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No statistics, however, are given to substantiate a trend of urban expansion. 
Perhaps the least satisfactory chapter is that entitled, With Signs Follow-
ing (pp. 69-91). The early Church of God (Cleveland) believers attempted to 
actualize the claims of the New Testament, basing their understanding on a 
common sense reading of the text. That hermeneutic led members to experi-
ment with practices as diverse as healing and snake handling. The efforts 
are described as "eccentric practices" (pp. 67, 91). The social, psychological 
and theoretical structures which sustained the practices are not examined 
sympathetically. Instead, people who experimented and believed are pre-
sented as credulous, self-deluded sectarians. If the practices described had 
been placed in the context of the American healing movement, and its im-
plementation analyzed in terms of group formation and identification, the 
presentation would have been much more helpful. A similar critique can be 
made of the discussion of the role of women in the church (chap. 5, pp. 92-
107). It does, however, contribute by providing a preliminary sifting of some 
of the primary documents relating to women in the Church of God (Cleve-
land). 
The discussion of the positions taken by the Church of God (Cleveland) 
on pacifism and involvement in the military (chap. 6, pp. 108-137) is helpful 
for its presentation of denominational decisions and their social results. Be-
cause of eschatological concerns, understandings of corporate sin and per-
sonal responsibility, the Church of God maintained a pacifist stance through 
World War I, in the face of significant persecution. During World War II, 
evasion of the military draft was not encouraged, and the denomination 
maintained (but feared to publish) its pacifist stance. Only at the end of 
World War II, was the constitution changed to allow for individual decision, 
while committing the church to support conscientious objectors. No statisti-
cal data is provided to demonstrate the results of the relaxation of policy, 
and once again, the early position of the church is characterized as an eccen-
tric phenomenon. No effort is made to understand it as a considered moral 
decision which was shared by large numbers of revivalist adherents and 
denominations throughout this country and in Europe. 
A final chapter (pp. 138-172) describes the institutional, ecclesiastical 
and numerical development of the Church of God (Cleveland), arguing that 
the process of acculturation to mainstream American values has progressed 
quickly since World War II. Once again, minimal statistical support for the 
assertions is provided. The Epilogue restates this observation, suggesting 
that it is the major theme by which the history of the denomination is to be 
understood. 
The footnotes which lead the scholar to primary and secondary litera-
ture are generally helpful, albeit quite brief. The bibliography (pp. 201-248) 
is a major contribution. It includes periodicals and, especially, theses and 
dissertations related to the Church of God (Cleveland). Unfortunately there 
is little dialogue with the secondary literature, or with other ways of looking 
at the material. The historiographical issues mentioned above significantly 
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and adversely affect the resultant book. Sect theory combined with sugges-
tions of cultural accommodation were more appropriate in the 1950s and 
1960s than they are today. They do not address the deeper relational and 
structural issues related to a denomination's history or to its self-under-
standing. As a history, it does not replace the work of Conn which still pro-
vides more detail and basis for subsequent analysis, despite its having been 
written nearly four decades ago. 
DAVID BUNDY 
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Green, Roger J. War on Two Fronts: The Redemptive Theology of William Booth. 
Atlanta: The Salvation Army, 1989. 141 pp. Hardback. ISBN 0-86544-355-7. 
Roger J. Green, professor of biblical and theological studies at Gordon 
College, challenges recent arguments that William Booth initiated his Dark-
est England social program in 1890 to stop his Salvation Army's decline in 
Britain's slums. The Army, according to Green, was still a vital force when 
Booth turned it in the direction of social reform by 1890. Instead, Green 
holds that Booth underwent a theological change which permitted him to 
follow the lead of Salvationists and others who were urging him to embrace 
a program for Britain's social redemption. 
In this popular adaptation of his doctoral dissertation, Green defines 
Booth's theology in its earliest stage as a focused commitment to individual 
soul salvation and sanctification. Booth's revival ministry began as a result 
of his personal conversion in 1846 and his admiration for American Meth-
odist revivalist, James Caughey, who first preached in England in the mid-
1840s. Booth institutionalized his theology of personal redemption in 1865 
when he founded an East London home mission, which he renamed The 
Salvation Army in 1878. 
Apart from a general survey of Booth's theology, Green's concern is 
with a pivotal question over which Salvationists and historians struggle: 
Why did William Booth change his theology to include social salvation in 
1889-90? Early historians simply noted the change without curiosity as to 
the reason for it. But in 1963, K. S. Ingalls argued that the change came as a 
result of The Salvation Army's decline in urban slums by 1887, a decline 
which was observed by Anglican clergy as Booth's "unique failure" to save 
the "heathen masses." Booth disagreed with his clerical and newspaper crit-
ics and Green defends the general's assertion that the change came when he 
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saw that the poor needed social redemption as well as personal soul-saving. 
Without disputing the statistical data of an urban downturn, Green holds 
that Booth embraced a social salvation theology that led him to publish 
Darkest England and the Way Out. Booth, aware of London's "bitter cry" for 
reform and of efforts by Salvationist women and lay persons to aid prosti-
tutes and drunkards, developed a new theology of "a double mission" for 
social as well as personal redemption. 
Green argues that until 1889 Booth made "no public pronouncements" 
about social redemption. Herein he breaks with Salvationist writers who 
hold that Booth was a consistent social reformer from his boyhood commit-
ment to Chartism in 1848. Only in 1889 did Booth begin to preach "salvation 
from pinching poverty" and "two gospels of deliverance." 
Green devotes fifteen percent of his brief treatise to Booth's 1888-90 
post-millennial views wherein he placed the coming kingdom of God on 
earth and legitimized The Salvation Army as God's "chief instrument to 
bring about that kingdom." This optimistic view of how man could be God's 
instrument for perfecting a flawed social system joined Booth to the era's 
leading utopian thinkers. 
Inglis's mistake in placing emphasis on The Salvation Army's failure 
among the "heathen masses" as the prime motive for Booth's social pro-
gram was, in Green's view, to concentrate on Booth's history rather than on 
Booth's theology. Green admits that Booth was not a systematic theologian, 
but he does not conclude that this made him more susceptible to the winds 
of the era. Rather, Booth's "theological loyalties," an apparent reference to 
his Wesleyan moorings, provided "theological legitimacy for a dual mis-
sion." Yet Booth, who too was not a systematic social thinker, turned to 
Frank Smith and W. T. Stead to develop the social scheme which encour-
aged him to expand his views of redemption to embrace "whole-sale salva-
tion." 
It is difficult, Green admits, to make a non-theologian speak in system-
atic terms. He compares Booth to no other contemporary Wesleyan, such as 
Hugh Price Hughes, who may have taken a similar theological journey in 
the 1880s. Nor does Booth tie his doctrinal formulations to previous or con-
temporary creeds. Green also finds it difficult to confine Booth's statements 
to time limits he establishes for his intellectual evolution. 
Possibly more important than his study of Booth as theologian is 
Green's challenge to scholars who follow K. S. Inglis's views. Green requires 
that they reassess their institutional answers to the question of why Booth 
the revivalist became Booth the social reformer in 1889-90. No doubt there 
are those who will challenge Green's thesis that a change in Booth's 
Wesleyan theology is the primary answer to this question. 
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